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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Dissertation 
The problem of this dissertation is the formulation of a method 
for determining the ethical responsibility of the natural scientist for 
participation in the development of modern military weapons. It is an 
attempt to provide a method by which the scientist who is confronted 
with the ethical problems posed by weapons development may reach a sound 
ethical decision regarding his own participation in weapons development. 
Should he participate, or not? What are the important considerations 
and criteria and the valid methods of thinking in resolving the dilemma? 
In modern nations, particularly those with great political and 
economic power, the development and production of weapons has become 
an international function of central importance. There is thus a heavy 
demand for workers to share in this process. Furthermore, it is char-
acteristic of modern advanced weapons that a great deal of scientific 
work is expended in their development. New weapons begin with ideas 
for the application of scientific principles to military situations. 
Thus, in the twentieth century and especially during and after World War 
I 
II, there has been a heavy demand for scientists to use their abilities 
in weapons development, and the individual scientist has often received 
opportunities and invitations to accept employment of this kind. 
1 
2 
At the same time, science in these same nations is intertwined 
with the defense programs of the nations and heavily financed by the 
governments because of its relevance to weapons development. The op-
portunities for scientific research which are available to the scientist 
are thus often directly related to weapons development, so that it is 
only with some effort that scientists who decline to participate in 
weapons development are able to find satisfactory opportunities for 
scientific research. Significant research projects today commonly re-
quire expensive equipment and facilities that can be provided only by 
sponsors with extensive resources. 
Against this situation stands the fact that modern military 
weapons have reached a level of destructiveness completely unprecedented 
in the period before the development of the atomic bomb. Their destruc-
tiveness has increased to the point where it is readily possible to make 
weapons with greater explosive force than that required by any strategic 
military application. To participate in the development of modern 
weapons is to contribute to the potentiality of death or injury for a 
significant portion of the human race. 
The ethical problem posed by this dilemma has provoked a debate 
among scientists which continues in the present but which has been, in 
general, inconclusive. The aim of this dissertation is to make an ex-
tended study of the problem, employing methods of ethical analysis ap-
propriate to the situation. The effort will be to formulate a method 
by which the question of participation in specific instances can be 
decided. 
3 
2. Definitions 
The term "natural scientist" refers to a person who seeks new 
knowledge of the objective world of nature, using and extending theoret-
ical concepts which are developed and justified by systematic empirical 
observation. Sciences which study the objective world of nature are 
distinguished from those focusing on the human or animal mind, or on 
human behavior, either individual or social. The natural sciences are 
generally subdivided into two categories: the physical and the biolog-
ical sciences. 
The scientist as seeker of new knowledge is distinguished from 
the technician or engineer, who uses scientific knowledge in the devel-
opment of techniques or devices, but does not himself create new knowl-
edge. In practice, of course, the distinction is not absolute, but it 
is an applicable functional distinction between large groups of workers 
in the field of development and production of weapons. It should also 
be noted that the contemporary natural scientist is generally a profes-
sional rather than an amateur, and he is generally a specialist in 
science rather than a man of full professional competence in several 
fields. 
The term "participation" refers in this study to the process of 
directly aiding, at some point, the process of weapons development 
through the discovery of relevant scientific knowledge. 
"Development" refers to the process by which weapons are created, 
from the formulation of the basic concepts through the placing of the 
weapon in full operating order, ready for manufacture. Development 
4 
generally includes the processes of research, design, construction of 
prototypes, and testing; these processes interact as the project moves 
toward completion. Scientific research is only a part of the process 
of weapons development, but it is generally a central part. Weapons 
development is not understood to include the political and economic 
activities which surround and underlie the processes mentioned. 
The term "military weapons" refers to means of coercion or of 
destruction which operate by direct physical action against persons or 
property. Often the threat of employment of such weapons is adequate 
to produce a coercive effect. Military weapons, however, are generally 
distinct from political or economic forces which can be manipulated to 
produce coercive effects and which therefore may be referred to as 
weapons. Military weapons frequently have profound political and eco-
nomic influences, but this is because of their military applications, 
potential or actual. Since World War II, weapons employing nuclear ex-
plosives have received the most extensive discussion, but the category 
of military weapons includes many others, such as chemical, biological, 
and radiological weapons. 
"Responsibility" refers to obligations relative to behavior; the 
term is employed in reference both to persons and to groups. The obli-
gation is understood to be enforced by accountability to some other 
person or group, or to the self in the sense that personal integrity 
demands the fulfillment of a personal commitment. "Ethical responsibil-
ity" refers to obligations on behavior which are based on commitment to 
some concept of the good, the right, or the valuable. Frequently, as in 
5 
the present study, these concepts refer to a social context. They are 
based on ideals of interpersonal relationships, personal fulfillment, 
social structure and interaction, shared values, or the place of man-
kind in the universe, to name a few basic considerations. One of the 
most obvious value commitments underlying this study is the conviction 
that the destruction or frustration of human life through warfare or 
the threat of warfare is an evil. The third chapter will discuss the 
ethical theory which will be normative in this study. 
3. Limitations 
This study will seek to establish an analytical framework for 
future personal decisions regarding the scientist's responsibility. 
It will not seek to reach an immediate and general decision as to what 
the responsible scientist would do. Such an approach would have very 
limited value, for there are important variables in each situation, and 
the fact that weapons development projects are generally secret in im-
portant respects by itself precludes the formulation of a general answer 
in advance. Much of the information which is important for a responsible 
decision will be available only to persons directly involved in the spon-
sorship and development of the weapon. 
No effort will be made to pass a moral judgment on the decisions 
which have been made by scientists in the past, although the experience 
of such persons will be helpful in preparing an approach to the future. 
This dissertation will seek to take account of basic factors in the con-
temporary social situation, but it will not have its argument based on 
specific details which vary with the situation and which must be specif-
6 
ically treated in the process of individual decision. In this way the 
attempt will be made to arrive at an analytical framework of wide con-
temporary applicability, relevant to the general situation and capable 
of guiding specific decision. 
The social situation in the United States, with its context in 
international affairs, will be the reference point for social analysis 
in this study. There are many basic similarities between this situa-
tion and those in other countries, especially the democratic nations of 
Western Europe, including Great Britain. The results of the study may 
therefore be useful in these countries as well as in the United States, 
but no attempt will be made to generalize the results to make the study 
applicable in other countries without testing and adaptation there. In 
particular, this study will not attempt to deal with the peculiarities 
of the problem of responsible decision as it is faced by scientists in 
totalitarian nations. 
As indicated in the statement of the problem of the dissertation, 
this study will be confined to the ethical problem of weapons develop-
ment as faced by the natural scientist. The similarities which exist 
in the problem as faced by the engineer or by the social or psychologi-
cal scientist may be significant, but they are beyond the scope of this 
study. Similarly, the focus will be on participation in the develop-
ment of weapons, not on the general relationship of science and govern-
ment or science and the public, except as these factors are directly 
relevant to the problem of weapons development. The general cultural 
impact of modern science, involving such concerns as rapid social change, 
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concentration of population in industrial centers, materialism and the 
sense of human self-sufficiency, and the rational and empirical approach 
to knowledge, will be discussed only as it is related to the central 
problem of the dissertation, and will therefore not be comprehensively 
treated. 
4. Previous Research in the Field 
The many phases of the problem of social responsibility in sci-
ence have been extensively debated, especially since the second world 
war, and primarily among scientists themselves. The problem of the 
scientist's responsibility for participation in weapons development has 
held a significant place in that debate. Most of the written discus-
sion, however, has been limited to brief periodical articles. 
The one extended work in English that deals directly with the 
problem of participation in weapons development is Robert Jungk's 
1 Brighter than a Thousand Suns. This work takes an historical approach, 
focusing on the development of the atomic (fission) and hydrogen (fusion) 
bombs. The point of view taken by Jungk is that the scientists who par-
ticipated in the development of these weapons should not have done so, 
on moral grounds, and that those who had political influence should have 
opposed the use of the bombs against Japan. He deals with the forces 
affecting the awareness and activity of the scientists, and with their 
motivation. 
1Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, trans. James 
Cleugh (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958). 
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The essential limitation on Jungk's work, from the point of view 
of the present study, is that the conviction that scientists should not 
have participated is an assumption of his work, and is never directly 
discussed. Although scientists are criticized for their actions, the 
question of the moral unacceptability of these actions is never dis-
1 
cussed. It is a presupposition of this dissertation that the respon-
sible course of action for the scientist to follow is not immediately 
clear, but must be determined by careful and extensive study. The in-
conclusive character of the debate over the subject seems to bear this 
out. Thus Jungk's work serves, by its unsupported conclusions, to in-
dicate the need for a direct study of the scientist's responsibility 
in the development of weapons. The book is valuable for its historical 
information, although the lack of documentation limits the confidence 
with which his findings can be employed. 
Science and Human Values, by J. Bronowski, also deals with the 
ethical problems in science which were illustrated by the explosion of 
2 
atomic bombs over Japan. The central thesis of Bronowski's work is 
that science is the source of the primary values of Western culture, 
including the basic sense of the dignity of the individual man. Because 
of this, science is to be valued rather than censured, even if the de-
struction of Japanese cities with their populations is also one of its 
effects. Thus the book is a defense of science as a basic activity of 
1see especially pp. 295-96, 329, 335-41. 
2J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1956). 
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Western culture, but it does not deal specifically with the responsibil-
ity of the scientist in relation to the development of weapons. The 
1 
author's views on this subject are mentioned briefly in another place. 
In The Irreversible Decision: 1939-1950, Robert C. Batchelder 
has written a study of the problem of the ethics of war in a nuclear 
2 
age. His method involves a study of the interrelationship of histori-
cal events and ethical formulations, and the book therefore includes a 
study of the activities of scientists in relationship to the develop-
ment of the atomic bomb. This book is important to the present study 
for its attempt to understand honestly the ethical concerns of the 
scientists in their response to the potentialities of nuclear energy 
in the context of World War II. Its focus, however, is away from the 
ethical problem of participation in weapons development toward the 
problem of controlling nuclear weapons in the future. 
There are other historical writings growing out of the develop-
ment of the atomic bomb, written by scientists or about the activities 
of scientists. Arthur Compton's Atomic Quest is important for the sen-
sitivity with which the author, in these personal memoirs, deals with 
the ethical concerns which were important to him personally and to other 
3 
scientists involved. Thus this is a valuable historical source, although 
it is not a systematic analysis of the contemporary problem. Richard G. 
1J. Bronowski, "The Real Responsibilities of the Scientist," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (January, 1956), 10-13, 20. 
2Robert C. Batchelder, The Irreversible Decision: 1939-1950 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962). 
3Arthur H. Compton, Atomic Quest (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1956). 
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Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr. have written the first volume of an 
1 
officially-sponsored history of the Atomic Energy Commission. The sub-
ject of this volume is the development of nuclear energy programs in 
the United States from their inception through 1946; thus it is a his-
tory of the atomic bomb project, including its use in Japan. This is 
a thorough work, based on full access to the relevant files of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. It deals with the activities of scientists in bring-
ing atomic energy to the attention of the government and in seeking to 
influence the decision regarding the use of the bomb against Japan. It 
lacks, however, a fruitful consideration of the ethical concerns of the 
scientists except as they gained expression overtly in petitions, polls, 
and recommendations. It is a source of real but limited value for this 
dissertation, and in no way does it overlap the present study. 
Ian G. Barbour, in Christianity and the Scientist, approaches 
the problem of the scientist's responsibility in the development of 
weapons directly in the framework of Christian ethics. 2 His treatment 
is limited to the compass of a brief chapter, however, and he does not 
separate the problem of responsibility for participation in weapons 
development from other aspects of the scientist's responsibility in 
relation to the development and use of weapons, thus leaving the problem 
of participation unanswered. 
1Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World 
1939/1946, Vol. I: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Com-
mission (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962). 
2 Ian G. Barbour, Christianity and the Scientist (New York: 
Association Press, 1960), Chapter 2. 
11 
/ Science and the Nation, by J~ Stefan Dupre and Sanford A. Lakoff, 
contains in the second of its two sections a study of the relationships 
of scientists with the government and the public relative to weapons 
1 development. This is primarily a descriptive study, and it does not 
focus on the question of participation in weapons development. It does 
offer a brief theory of the scientises responsibility relative to weapons 
development, which will be discussed at the close of the fourth chapter 
of this dissertation. The first section of the book contains a useful 
description of the relationship of the government to the practice of 
scientific research in the United States today. 
Most of the direct discussion of the problem of participation 
in weapons development is in brief periodical articles. The Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists contains a very significant proportion of this 
discussion; it focuses on science and public affairs and serves as a 
forum for discussion on this and other issues of social responsibility 
in science. The pages of the Bulletin are a major source of thinking 
relevant to this study. 
5. The Method of the Dissertation 
It should be noted at the outset that the problem of this study 
is a normative one. The project will draw on the thinking of scien-
tists and others, as outlined in the previous section, but it is not 
to be understood as a descriptive study of the thinking of scientists, 
nor primarily as a normative evaluation of this thinking. Ideas will 
1J. Stefan Dupre and Sanford A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962). 
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be evaluated on the basis of their merit, rather than their source, 
and employed in a constructive analysis under the guidance of normative 
ethical concepts. 
An inquiry into the historical context of past decisions regard-
ing participation in the development of weapons will be made in order 
to determine the nature of the problem faced by scientists, especially 
during and after World War II. Representative instances will be sur-
veyed in an effort to determine the genuine ethical issues encountered. 
The perceptions of scientists as to the ethical issues involved will be 
used as basic data, and normative analysis will be employed to determine 
which among these are genuine concerns of social responsibility. Ethical 
issues, and not the correctness of the motivation of the scientists in-
volved, are the objects of this inquiry. This study will comprise the 
second chapter. 
The third chapter will set forth the concept of the responsible 
society, which is the basic ethical norm to be used in this disserta-
tion. The source of this concept is the discussions on Christian ethics 
held in the ecumenical movement among Protestant and Eastern Orthodox 
churches. A critical analysis of the relevant material will be made in 
order to formulate the concept in a brief and workable way. The con-
cept of the responsible society will provide a general framework of 
normative analysis for the next three chapters, providing a special 
stress of the responsibilities attendant upon the possession and use 
of social power. 
Three basic patterns of responsibility will be explored in the 
next three chapters. These patterns follow from the historical analysis 
in the second chapter. These chapters will critically analyze the 
social situation and the scientist's power to affect it. Then they 
will seek by constructive analysis to determine ways in which this 
power can be used to meet the demands for responsibility in each of 
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the three patterns. This will include the determination of limitations 
outside of which the patterns of responsibility are not valid. The 
fourth chapter will deal with responsibility for participation based 
on responsibility to cooperate with the policy of the government. 
The fifth chapter will be concerned with participation in weapons de-
velopment on the basis of concern for the advancement of the scientific 
quest. The sixth chapter will deal with responsibility for participa-
tion based on the scientist's independent analysis of weapons policies 
and problems. 
Since the three patterns must be related in order for the scien-
tist to use them in making an actual decision regarding participation 
in weapons development, the seventh and concluding chapter will concern 
the relationship of the three patterns of responsibility. This will be 
done under the normative guidance of a general structure of moral re-
sponsibility designed to guide decision among various value options. 
The system of moral laws designed by Edgar S. Brightman and extended 
by L. Harold Dewolf and Walter G. Muelder will be taken for this purpose, 
and applied by critical analysis to the problem of the relationshipilie-
tween the patterns of responsibility. The effort will be to indicate 
the considerations which will be basic in making responsible decisions 
in concrete situations; to this end the moral laws will be used as a 
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guide to the analysis of the social situation in order to determine 
the general form of the variables relevant to a responsible decision. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF THE SCIENTIST 
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to determine, through concrete historical 
investigation, the nature of the dilemma faced by the scientist as he 
considers his participation in scientific programs. Several specific 
instances in which scientists were required to decide about their par-
ticipation in recent programs of weapons development will be considered, 
and the reports of scientists themselves will be used as basic data. 
The purpose of the chapter, however, is to determine the nature of the 
ethical issues encountered which require consideration in a normative 
study concerned with the discovery of responsible courses of action. 
Thus this chapter will not pass judgment on the morality of the actions 
taken by scientists in the past; it will be concerned with the issues 
which they faced, 
The situations involved were charged with emotion when they oc-
curred, and decisions were made under heavy pressure. Some of the same 
conditions surround discussions of these decisions today. For this 
reason, the statements of the persons involved are liable to bias and 
difficult to verify. Since the purpose of the discussion is to deter-
mine ethical issues rather than to pass judgment on persons, however, 
it will be enough to discover the important issues involved, even though 
15 
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the precise motivation of the scientists in their choices cannot be 
completely clear. 
2. The Experience in German Rocketry 
i. Development of the V-2 rocket 
In the period between the world wars, rocketry in Germany grew 
from the practice of small experiments by private persons and groups to 
a large-scale military program. Wernher von Braun, who became the 
technical director of the military program, has indicated how the de-
velopment took place. 
The small group of pioneers in rocketry of which von Braun was 
a member had reached the stage of test-firing small liquid-fueled 
rockets near Berlin. The German Army became interested in their work 
in 1932; since the Treaty of Versailles contained no restrictions re-
garding rockets, the military leaders became interested in them as an 
approach to the problem of providing their troops with artillery weapons. 
The rocket builders were concerned for the exploration of outer space. 
It had become apparent, however, that resources much greater than any 
at their command would be necessary to pursue the development of vehicles 
adequate for space exploration. Thus von Braun accepted the offer of 
the Army to develop rockets under their auspices. "It seemed that the 
funds and facilities of the Army were the only practical approach to 
1 
space travel." 
This shift in sponsorship was made without concern for the im-
~ernher von Braun, "From Small Beginnings ... ,"in Project 
Satellite, ed. Kenneth Gatland (New York: British Book Centre, 1958), 
p. 26. 
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plications of weapons development on the part of the rocket builders. 
"At the time none of us thought of the havoc which rockets would even-
1 
tually wreak as weapons of war." Hitler was not yet in power, and 
was not taken seriously by them. 
After several preliminary developments, the rocket project laid 
plans for the A-4 rocket, which was later given the popular designation 
"V-2." The military leaders had become dissatisfied with continued ex-
perimental work; the A-4 was an answer to their demand for a usable 
weapon. Its design range was 275 kilometers; its warhead would weigh 
one metric ton (2200 pounds), and it would pass through railroad tun-
nels. The rocket was developed, tested, and perfected for combat use. 
A factory was built which produced the weapons at the rate of four 
hundred per month by the spring of 1944 and reached nine hundred per 
month later on. In September, 1944, the rocket was put into action 
2 
against London. 
Von Braun reports a sense of regret among the rocket builders 
over the military use of the rocket. Although the feeling was somewhat 
contradicted by the suffering caused by an Allied air raid which bombed 
the rocket development center at Peenemunde, "nevertheless there was 
much regret among us that our A-4, conceived as it was, as a first step 
3 
in interplanetary flight had joined in the bloody business of war. 11 
This is amplified by a further statement: 
We who gave life to PeenemUnde deplore as much as anyone 
that developments like aviation, atomic energy or rockets 
are applied to destructive purposes rather than for human 
2 12!£., pp. 36, 42, 47. 3 Ibid., p. 47. 
welfare. It was the space-station we sought and we still 
seek it, wherever we may be. We desire to open the planetary 
world to mankind.l 
ii. The decision to work for Hitler's government 
18 
(1) The absence of decision.--Von Braun is careful to point out 
that his move to Army sponsorship occurred before Hitler gained control 
of the German state, and that the V-2 was not conceived as a weapon for 
attack on London. Hitler did come to power very shortly after the shift 
to Army auspices, however, and the plans for the V-2 began in 1937, 
after Hitler had held power for several years and his warlike aims were 
becoming apparent. Von Braun gives no indication that he felt any need 
to reassess the ethical validity of his work because of the changed 
political-military context. His sensitivity to this factor in later 
discussion raises the question of why the rise of Hitler was apparently 
not a crisis point in his work. Two interpretations must be considered. 
(2) The need for military financing.--The first interpretation 
credits very seriously von Braun's statements about the. concern of the 
rocket developers for financial support. Daniel Lang quotes von Braun 
as saying, '~e felt no moral scruples about the possible abuse of our 
brain child. We were interested solely in exploring outer space. It 
was simply a question with us of how the golden cow could be milked 
2 
most successfully." This statement refers explicitly to the period 
before Hitler came to power, but in the absence of any disclaimer it 
1Ibid., p. 49. 
2oaniel Lang, "A Reporter at Large," The New Yorker, 27 (April 21, 
1951), 83. 
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may serve also as interpretation of continued work under Hitler. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that von Braun 
along with others went directly to Hitler to convince him of the mili-
tary value of the rocket program, in order to secure the continuation 
of military support and secure an increase in the priority rating of 
1 
the project relative to available resources. It is also supported by 
von Braun's statement that the V-2 was conceived as a part of a system 
of several stages intended to place satellites in orbit around the 
earth, and that the next design the rocket developers were making was 
2 
also usable both as a weapon and for space research. 
It is difficult, however, to accept the report that men of such 
vision regarding the usefulness of rockets could easily ignore their 
potential as weapons. In any case, such unawareness could not have 
lasted long after the project came under military sponsorship. The V-2 
was explicitly designed to meet combat requirements, and it was neces-
sary for von Braun to give convincing answers to the sharp questioning 
of Hitler about the military value of the rocket. 
Thus one interpretation of the actions of the rocket builders 
is that they deliberately employed the military effectiveness of rockets 
as a device with which funds and priorities could be secured for the 
development of rockets for space exploration. 
(3) Support of the German war effort.--It is also possible that 
lLang, pp. 84-85; 
Samuel A. Goudsmit, Alsos, the Story of a Mission (New York: 
Henry Schuman, 1947), pp. 145-47. 
2 Von Braun, pp. 47-49. 
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von Braun and others cooperated in the military efforts of the German 
government more readily than the accounts indicate. One of the sources 
of this discussion was written by von Braun with the help of an assis-
tant, and the other is a report by Daniel Lang of an interview with von 
Braun. Since the defeat of Nazi Germany, von Braun has continued to 
work on rocket development and space exploration in the United States, 
at first under direct military auspices and later with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. Both of these articles were writ-
ten during this period. It would be understandable that under such con-
ditions a person might minimize his support of the Nazi regime in its 
military efforts. 
The difficulty in crediting the report that the rocket developers 
had little awareness of or concern for the military results of their 
work supports this interpretation also, as does von Braun's initiative 
in pressing for advancement of priorities during the midst of World War 
II. Von Braun became a member of the National Socialist Party in 1940, 
apparently under political pressure, but it may be significant that he 
was willing to take this step. 1 
(4) Confluence of the factors.--The high social position of leaders 
of a major weapons development project may also have influenced the 
rocket developers in their decision. Von Braun received the Knight's 
Cross and the honorary title of "Research Professor" from Hitler for 
2 his work on the V-2 rocket. It is not possible with the information 
available to determine precisely what the motivation of von Braun or 
1 Lang, pp. 80-81. 2 Ibid. , p . 84 • 
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other workers on the rocket project was. It should be noted, however, 
that all of the factors mentioned might conceivably have combined to 
lead to the action taken. In any case, some of the ethical issues 
relevant to such a decision have become clear. 
iii. Moral issues 
The regretful human destructiveness of military weapons is one 
issue raised by the experience of the rocket developers. The value of 
the advancement of human knowledge by the exploration of space is another. 
Von Braun saw this as related to the economic and cultural advancement 
1 
of a technological civilization. These two factors came into conflict 
over the need for economic support for the scientific project, which 
was available from the military in return for the development of rockets 
as weapons. The relationship of the military effort to the moral status 
of the sponsoring government is a further important issue, although it 
is not clear in this instance just how this issue was handled by the 
persons involved and how it was related to the value of scientific ad-
vancement in dealing with the conflict of factors. 
3. The Making of the Atomic Bomb 
i. The American project 
(1) The efforts of the refugee scientists.--One of the results 
of Hitler's rise to power in Germany was that many of the leading sci-
entists of Europe were forced from their positions, chiefly in the uni-
versities. Many of them made their ways to England and the United 
1Ibid., p. 92. 
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States, some in open flight from Nazi persecution of the Jews. It was 
at approximately the same time that the neutron was discovered, and 
this was closely followed by the discovery that a moving free neutron 
would cause certain uranium atoms to split, with a relatively huge re-
1 lease of energy. This process is known as nuclear fission. 
The scientists continued their work in their new locations and 
made the further critical discovery that as the uranium atom splits, it 
releases two or three other free neutrons. This means that if other 
sensitive atoms of uranium are present, they will be struck by the free 
neutrons and will split in turn, so that the rate of the action multi-
2 plies rapidly and the energy released results in a great explosion. 
Having discovered the feasibility of the atomic bomb, the refugee 
scientists were disturbed, for they knew that it was quite possible for 
scientists cooperating with Hitler to make the same discovery. The dis-
covery and publication of the same facts in Paris, making them avail-
able to the Nazis, spurred on the efforts of the refugee scientists to 
arrange a voluntary censorship system, so that further dangerous in-
formation should not be given to Hitler. They also felt that the United 
States government should be alerted to the dangers and possibilities 
involved in the new discoveries. Enrico Fermi brought the situation to 
the attention of the United States Navy, which declined to take any ac-
3 
tion to promote further research. 
1Robert C. Batchelder, The Irreversible Decision: 1939-1950 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), pp. 9-14. 
2 Ibid., p. 15. 
3Ibid., pp. 15-17. 
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Soon afterward, in the summer of 1939, evidence began to indi-
cate that research which could lead to the development of an atomic 
bomb was being conducted in Germany. The scientists renewed their ef-
forts, enlisting the aid of the most famous and respected of the ref-
ugees, Albert Einstein, who signed a letter to President Roosevelt. 
The response was again slight, and Einstein sent a second letter. The 
men were persistent; they had had first-hand experience of the nature 
of the Nazi regime and they feared grave damage to civilization if the 
1 Nazis should be sole possessors of an atomic bomb. Arthur Compton 
interprets the reasoning that led Einstein to join in: 
As the Nazis expanded their power in Europe, Einstein saw 
destruction threatening all that he held of value. He knew 
the scientists working with the Nazis were bending every ef-
fort toward putting the power of the atom to military use. 
Peaceloving as he had always been, Einstein saw clearly that 
the only right course now was to outstrip the Nazis in this 
atomic development.2 
(2) American scientists join in the quest.--During the period 
when the refugee scientists were taking initiative in approaching the 
government, interest in the new developments was widespread among 
physicists, and research was carried out in many places. The result 
was that in 1941, scientists in Britain calculated that a much smaller 
amount of uranium would be needed to build a bomb than had been sup-
posed. At the same time, Ernest Lawrence, at Berkeley, California, 
discovered that plutonium was the natural by-product of the operation 
of a nuclear fission reactor. Plutonium could be readied for use in a 
1 Ibid., pp. 17-19, 21-22, 25-27. 
2Arthur H. Compton, Atomic Quest (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), pp. 31-32. 
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bomb by easier processes than uranium, and it would have the same ef-
feet. Thus it became clear that it might be possible to build an atomic 
1 bomb before the end of the war. 
With this information in hand, American scientists swung into 
action, on the conviction that if a bomb was to be had during the war, 
the Allies must have it first. Arthur Compton, James Conant, and Ernest 
Lawrence discussed the new possibilities, outlining a plan of action and 
2 
an approach to the government. Soon a great organization was developed, 
financed, and set in motion. New laboratories were built at Chicago, 
Oak Ridge, and Los Alamos. A plutonium production plant was designed 
and constructed at Hanford, Washington. The entire operation was guarded 
by the closest secrecy. Some who worked on the project did not find out 
what they were actually developing until the first bomb was dropped on 
3 Japan. 
The story of the development of the atomic bomb is a thrilling 
account of great effort, brilliant discovery, and astounding progress. 
The first successful test explosion occurred in New Mexico on July 16, 
1945. Three weeks later a bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. A second fell 
two days later on Nagasaki. Within a week Japan surrendered and the war 
4 
was over. 
The reasoning of the American scientists to take initiative in 
the development of the bomb was similar to that of the refugees. They 
could not prevent the development of the bomb; they could only see that 
1 Ibid., pp. 7, 49-53. 2Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 255. 
4Batchelder, p. 41. 
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it was developed in the hands of the Allies as well as in the hands of 
the Nazis, for they supposed that scientists in Germany were hard at 
work on the project. They had a loyalty to the values of Western cul-
l 
ture that they could not leave open to Hitler's destructive grasp. 
Moreover, they were concerned for the fate of their own country, in a 
way that the refugees could no longer be. As Compton summarized it, 
Human destruction has the same repulsiveness to the soul 
of the searcher after nature's truth as it does to the artist 
engaged in the search for beauty. But these men recognized 
that they were a part of their national community and must 
use their knowledge for the nation's defense.2 
(3) The personal motivation of two physicists.--Among those who 
shared in the development of the bomb, there were differences in per-
sonal reaction to the moral issues involved. This can be illustrated 
by drawing on Arthur Compton's account of his own motivation and that 
of Dr. Volney Wilson. 
Dr. Compton was the scientific head of the section of the project 
that produced the plutonium to build the bombs. He personally abhorred 
destruction of human life, but he saw clearly the duty demanded of him 
by the combination of new knowledge and Nazi activity. "We owed it to 
mankind, to our God who had given us freedom and the blessings of lib-
3 
erty, to take our part in the great struggle." He was dedicated to 
the preservation of freedom for its human value and as the necessary 
condition of scientific work. Apparently he proceeded with relative 
confidence that he had made the right choice and acted in the service 
of God, man, and science. He was further strengthened by an evolution-
1compton, pp. 208-209, 280. 2 Ibid., p. 22. 3 Ibid., p. 208. 
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ary concept of scientific development which placed such matters as bomb 
development somewhat beyond human control. This concept was rooted in 
1 
a theological interpretation of creation. 
For Volney Wilson there was no such inner peace. He was a teacher 
of physics at the University of Chicago when Compton asked him to pre-
pare a report to determine whether a chain reaction using ordinary 
uranium was possible. Wilson concluded that it was and then commented 
as he handed Compton his report, 
'I believe it can be done, and if so it will be of great 
importance. But,' he added, 'please take me off this job. 
It is going to be too terribly destructive. I don't want 
to have anything to do with it.•2 
Compton arranged for Wilson to work on the development of radar, which 
was thought of as a defensive project entirely. But after Pearl Harbor 
he came again and asked to be taken back on the atomic bomb project, 
changing his mind because of the changed military situation. He as-
sisted Enrico Fermi at Chicago in producing the first controlled and 
sustained nuclear chain reaction. Success was difficult for him to 
appreciate, however. Reflecting on the look on Wilson's face when the 
reaction experiment was successfully completed, Compton remarked, "He 
was among those who sincerely hoped that, even at the last moment, some-
thing might arise which would make it impossible to effect the chain 
. 3 
react1on." Wilson went on to participate directly in the development 
of the bomb at Los Alamos. He knew that his efforts and abilities were 
essential to American success. "He was doing his duty as he saw it, 
1 1£!&., pp. 202, 280, 283. 2Ibid., p. 42. 
3rbid.' p. 143. 
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but the conflict in his soul was still there. For him there seemed to 
1 be no right answer." 
ii. The German project 
(1) The failure of the project.--When the Allied forces invaded 
Eunope at the Normandy beachhead, they were closely followed by the 
Alsos mission under the scientific direction of Samuel Goudsmit. The 
purpose of this mission was to discover the state of German weapons 
development programs, particularly in relation to the atomic bomb, in 
order to guard against surprise if the Germans should introduce new 
weapons into the conflict. Goudsmit discovered that while there indeed 
had been a German atomic project, only a beginning had been made in 
solving the problems necessary to the development of an atomic bomb. 2 
The Germans had not progressed even to the point of the achievement of 
a sustained, controlled nuclear chain reaction. 
Many causes underlay this failure. The German economy could not 
support a project of the necessary size in addition to the other burdens 
of the war, and German leaders felt that the war would end much sooner 
than it did, so that long-range projects should not be heavily sponsored. 
In June, 1942, the German head of war production directed that the 
atomic program be continued, but on a limited scale. Damage and dis-
ruption caused by Allied bombing further hampered the project. Many of 
the best scientists in Germany had fled, been driven out, or were in-
terned, so that the strength of the scientific effort was undermined, 
1Ibid., p. 43. 
2Goudsmit, pp. 68-71. 
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and it has been held that the pride of some of the leaders in the effort 
prevented making full use of the work of some scientists whose ability 
was not held in high regard. A very few among those who remained in 
Germany openly declined to assist in the development of atomic weapons 
because of the immorality of the Hitler government. German scientists 
were reportedly confident that the Allied nations could not produce an 
atomic bomb in the time required if they themselves could not do it, 
and the organization of the German effort was weakened by placing per-
sons of lesser scientific ability in positions of leadership because 
of political loyalties. 1 
At the close of the war, the question of what relation existed 
between the motivation of the participating scientists and the failure 
of the project was raised. It is out of this discussion that the 
ethical factors involved in the participation of the sc,ientists can be 
explored. The discussion is highly charged with claims and biases, 
however, so that it is not possible to finally determine what pattern 
of motivation existed. An approach to the problem can be made through 
the exploration of three interpretive themes. 
(2) Sincere scientific participation.--On the basis of his dis-
coveries during the Alsos project, Samuel Goudsmit has concluded that 
the German nuclear scientists failed in their attempt to find the sci-
entific principles on which the construction of a bomb might be based. 
Thus he supports the thesis that the scientists made a sincere effort 
to develop the atomic bomb and that their failure to see clearly into 
!Batchelder, pp. 29-32. 
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1 
the problem resulted in limited economic support from the government. 
The German scientists apparently recognized that a bomb could 
be built with a concentration of Uranium-235, which must first be sep-
arated from its natural mixture with Uranium-238. They were not suc-
cessful, however, in finding methods to achieve the difficult separa-
tion. According to Goudsmit, they therefore concentrated their efforts 
on the development of an atomic pile which can sustain a nuclear chain 
reaction even though the uranium used is in its natural mixture. Their 
intention was to develop a pile in which the reaction would accelerate 
so rapidly that an explosion would result. The pile, however, depends 
on the use of a moderator such as carbon or heavy water, whose function 
is to slow down the neutrons released by the splitting atoms, so that 
they will be captured by other atoms of Uranium-235, which will split 
in turn and release more neutrons. Unless the neutrons are slowed in 
this way, they will be captured by atoms of Uranium-238, which does not 
split, to such an extent that no chain reaction can be sustained. The 
use of a moderator in conjunction with a natural mixture of uranium, 
however, prevents a pile from functioning as a bomb. An accelerating 
chain reaction in an atomic pile would explode the pile, stopping the 
reaction, before more than a small portion of the available energy 
could be released. The release of energy on a scale large enough to 
make an effective bomb requires the very rapid chain reaction which is 
possible only when Uranium-235 or a comparable material is present in 
concentrated form. 
1Goudsmit, pp. 136,37. 
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The normal operation of an atomic pile, however, does produce 
Plutonium-239, which, as mentioned before, was successfully used in the 
United States for the construction of a bomb. Goudsmit holds that the 
Germans failed to recognize this potential application of the atomic 
pile in bomb development. He found this made particularly clear in the 
reaction of the German physicists, who had been interned by the Alsos 
mission, to the news of the explosion of the bomb over Hiroshima by the 
United States. 1 
When the German scientists heard of the Hiroshima explosion, they 
were at first convinced that it could not have been an atomic blast. 
When confirmation came that it was really a nuclear explosion, they 
were unable to understand how it could have been developed in the United 
States when they had seen that it could not be developed so soon. It 
was a great blow to their pride to learn of the success of the American 
project, and a further blow came when Werner Heisenberg, leader of the 
German group, was able to understand, from the information they had re-
ceived, how plutonium had been produced in a pile and used in the bomb. 
It was at this point, Goudsmit reports, that the scientists decided to 
rationalize their failure and make future relationships with persons on 
both sides of the conflict easier by declaring that they had never in-
tended to build a bomb. It would have been immoral to place such a de-
structive weapon in the hands of Hitler; therefore they would report 
that they had only been concerned with the development of a pile, which 
could not function as a bomb. 
1 Ibid., pp. 134-39. 
31 
Goudsmit gives only one clue as to what he understood to be the 
true motivation of the physicists in their effort to develop the bomb. 
This is a comment referring explicitly to Werner Heisenberg. He notes 
that Heisenberg had actively opposed the Nazi party at times on the 
ground that the party was seriously damaging German science. His loy-
alty was to the nation rather than its government, and particularly to 
German science. He had, according to Goudsmit, a sense of personal 
mission regarding his role in the scientific quest in Germany. Thus he 
favored the aims of the government in expanding German power and hoped 
that Germany would be victorious in the war. On the other hand, he 
cherished the hope that the government would act more responsibly when 
1 
victory was achieved. In contrast to Heisenberg's approach, Max von 
Laue declined to cooperate in the war effort, including participation 
in the development of the atomic bomb, on the basis of his opposition 
2 to the government and its methods. 
(3) The pretension of cooperation.--A constrasting report and 
interpretation of the action of the German scientists is given by Robert 
Jungk. Jungk notes that the limited support available for the project 
after 1942 eliminated the possibility of success, but he focuses on the 
actions of the scientists before that time. According to his under-
standing, the scientists carried out the pretension of cooperation with 
the government's desire for the development of the atomic bomb. They 
did investigate the scientific problems involved but kept the results 
and their implications to themselves, at least until it seemed clear 
1 Ibid., pp. 113-15, 137, 166-67. 2 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
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that the development of the bomb under the conditions prevailing would 
not be practical. This pretense had several functions. By making slow 
progress these men could retain control of the project, preventing 
other scientists from becoming involved and possibly developing the 
weapon for use by Hitler. Thus by succeeding within limits they could 
avoid a final success by themselves or others. At the same time, they 
could make progress in important studies of nuclear physics and pre-
serve an active German scientific tradition which could function freely 
at a later time. This last consideration included the ability to se-
cure the release of promising young scientists from military service, 
where so many were killed, for employment on the atomic project. 1 
Max von Laue, who did not cooperate with the German war effort, 
indicates that it was necessary for directors of research institutions 
to cooperate with the government to a certain extent or be treated as 
saboteurs. He too observes that by so doing they were able to protect 
young scientists and to accomplish research which was valuable after 
the conclusion of hostilities. 2 
Jungk also relates that Heisenberg attempted in 1941 to indicate 
to the Danish physicist Niels Bohr that the Germans did not intend to 
succeed in developing the bomb. He hoped that Bohr would then inform 
scientists in the United States, so that they would forestall any pos-
sible development there. Heisenberg's hope was that when Germany lost 
1Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, trans. James Cleugh 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958), pp, 89-92, 96-97. 
~x von Laue, "The Wartime Activities of German Scientists," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (April, 1948), 103. 
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the war, as it seemed certain to do, it would be spared any atomic hom-
bardment by the Allies. His guarded attempt to communicate with Bohr 
was unsuccessful, however, and Bohr later indicated to the Allies that 
he knew Germany was seeking to develop the bomb. 1 
Jungk's report is in obvious conflict with Goudsmit's account of 
the reaction of the physicists to the news of the explosion at Hiro-
shima. Jungk notes that some of the participants in that conversation 
among the physicists deny the accuracy of Goudsmit's account, and he 
quotes von WeizsHcker on this point. It is obvious from the quotation, 
however, that von WeizsMcker was ignorant of the fact that the conver-
sation had been recorded, a fact which Goudsmit does not mention but 
2 
which Jungk himself brings out. 
Jungk also contradicts Goudsmit by stating clearly that Reisen-
berg saw the difference between a pile for a controlled nuclear chain 
reaction and a bomb, but it is not clear from Jungk's vague language 
just what the difference is understood to be or whether Jungk himself 
understands the problem. He also holds that von WeizsHcker, as well 
as Fritz Houtermans, saw that plutonium would be a product of a con-
trolled reaction in natural uranium. He quotes Heisenberg, in a letter 
written after the war, to the effect that the group understood that 
3 
plutonium could be concentrated for use in a bomb. 
(4) The hindrance of moral ambiguity.--A third possible inter-
pretation stresses the indecisiveness of the scientists and has the ad-
1 Jungk, pp. 98-104. 2Ibid., pp. 217-20. 
3 Ibid., pp. 92, 95-96, 102-103. 
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vantage of including much of the data on which the previous interpreta-
tions were based. Werner Heisenberg has written an account of the Ger-
man program of studies in atomic physics during the war, in which he 
states that primary attention was given to the development of a nuclear 
pile for the production of controlled energy and that although the im-
plications of the work for bomb development, including the potential 
use of plutonium, were recognized, they were not explored. Thus in 
1942 the report was given to the government that the development of a 
reactor for controlled energy might be possible during the war, but 
that the possibility of a bomb had not been followed up to the point 
where it could be seen to be feasible in the required length of time. 
The Minister for War Production then ruled that the work should proceed 
on a small scale, leaving concentration on the development of a con-
trolled power plant as the only feasible option. Heisenberg then notes 
that the physicists "were spared the decision as to whether or not they 
should aim at producing atomic bombs. The circumstances shaping policy 
in the critical year of 1942 automatically guided the work toward the 
1 
problem of the utilization of nuclear energy in prime movers." 
Hans Bethe relates his understanding that the German scientists 
lacked the same sense of urgency that prevailed in the United States 
and that they "had at least a divided mind as to whether and to what 
2 
extent they should help their government." However, Bethe adds, 
1
werner Heisenberg, "Research in Germany on the Technical Appli-
cation of Atomic Energy," Nature, 160 (August 16, 1947), 214. 
2Hans Bethe, Review of Brighter than a Thousand Suns, by Robert 
Jungk, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 14 (December, 1958), 427. 
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ethical considerations played a minor part in their decision not to 
seek actively to develop the bomb; it was because it seemed technically 
impossible to succeed in the project that they were able to pursue it 
at a slower rate and use it for the protection of younger scientists, 
without finally facing the ethical question of development of the weapon. 
Eugene Rabinowitch holds that the idea of a conspiracy to prevent 
successful development of the bomb is a postwar rationalization of a 
"vague uneasiness" over the ethical question, which caused the German 
scientists to work with less of a sense of urgency than those in the 
United States. Thus they readily accepted evidence that the bomb could 
1 
not be developed in time for use in the war. 
This interpretation of the action of the German scientists 
focuses on elements common to these three statements, stressing first 
that the many limiting factors surrounding the project made it impos-
sible to successfully complete it, and that the scientists, in their 
awareness of this general situation, may never have decisively con-
fronted the ethical implications of their work in the event of success. 
The second aspect of this interpretation is the possibility that in 
this context the scientists may have felt and acted inconsistently, 
taking pride in the advancement of the work at one time, and doubting 
and holding back or seeking to communicate with scientists in Allied 
countries at another. Thus it is not unreasonable to give some ere-
dence both to Jungk's reports of limited cooperation with the govern-
ment and the attempt to retain control of the work, and also to Goud-
1Eugene Rabinowitch, "Responsibilities of Scientists in the 
Atomic Age," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15 (January, 1959), 3. 
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smit's report of the severely damaged pride of the scientists when they 
learned of the success of the project in the United States. 
The particular biases held by the writers cited in this discus-
sion should be noted. The German scientists would have a natural in-
terest in indicating that they neither served Hitler nor failed in their 
own work, in view of the social context in which they found themselves 
after the war. Jungk is concerned to demonstrate that the German sci-
entists declined to manufacture a terrible weapon, in contrast to the 
1 behavior of the group in the United States. Goudsmit reflects some-
thing of an American nationalist outlook, although he is originally 
Dutch. He regrets, for example, that so many of the German scientists 
were found in the British and French zones of occupation, rather than 
in the American zone, after the war. He also lost his own parents in 
. 2 Naz~ gas chambers. The thesis of Goudsmit's report, moreover, is that 
German science failed to make significant progress under Nazi rule be-
cause of the distortions created by party rule compounded by the con-
fidence of Germans of their superiority in science. Thus he is con-
cerned primarily to demonstrate the failure of the scientists to under-
stand the atomic bomb, and his account of the sincerity of their efforts 
serves this end. Bethe and Rabinowitch, who both worked on the atomic 
bomb in the United States, may possibly be the most objective of the 
writers, but they do not indicate the sources of their insight into the 
situation in Germany. 
1For example, see Jungk, p. 105. 
2Goudsmit, pp. 46-49, 133-34. 
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Thus, although the third interpretation given is preferable to 
the other two, it is not likely to ever be possible to determine with 
certainty just what the motivations and actions of the German scien-
tists on the nuclear project were. Many ethical issues involved in the 
situation have become apparent, however. The moral issues arising both 
in the German and American atomic bomb projects can now be discussed. 
iii. Moral issues 
(1) The American project.--The scientists who participated in 
the American bomb project agreed with the general viewpoint of the 
nation that weapons were needed for defense. In general they felt that 
the interests of the Allies in defense and the interests of humanity in 
safety, survival, and a free society preserving the values of Western 
culture coincided. This was true because the Allied nations were held 
to embody the desired cultural values and because it appeared that only 
by Allied military resistance could safety and survival be insured. 
Thus they followed the decision of the British and American governments, 
since their sense of national loyalty and their own evaluation of the 
demands of human welfare coincided at this point. Some had gone beyond 
simply participating in an established government program and had urged 
the governments, out of their own scientific understanding, to sponsor 
the development of the bomb. 
The human welfare identified with an Allied victory was seen by 
some to conflict with human welfare in the longer view, because of the 
immense destructive powers of the weapon under development. These per-
sons were badly torn between their desire to help their nations and 
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humanity by building the bomb, and the fear that they were releasing 
such destructive force that they might be contributing to a greater in-
jury in the long run. 
As men dedicated to the scientific search for truth, they also 
recognized that in the situation confronting them, political-military 
action was required to preserve the freedom that made effective sci-
ence possible. They were willing to give up that freedom temporarily, 
working under secrecy, in order to protect it in the long run. The 
fact that the government financed research that otherwise might not 
have been possible apparently was not an important motivating factor. 
(2) The German project.--The German experience raises the issue 
of loyalty to government and nation in a contradictory form, since the 
scientists had serious misgivings or outright contempt for the govern-
ment, and yet some were able to retain the hope that the government 
under Hitler might succeed in advancing the political hegemony of Ger-
many. They could also hope and work for the preservation of German 
scientific activity, looking toward its continued pre-eminence after 
the war. 
This attitude toward the government made it difficult, in view 
of the destructiveness of the weapon, to feel that the bomb could be 
developed without doing a grave disservice to mankind. The contradic-
tory nature of these factors caused a questioning of the responsibility 
of cooperation with the government and led to the individual refusal of 
cooperation by von Laue. Other scientists apparently limited their co-
operation and may have used limited cooperation to prevent a more serious 
approach by others. One attempt may have been made by scientists to 
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approach the problem across government lines and reach an agreement not 
to develop the weapon. The question of the responsibility of the indi-
vidual to act in contradiction to the government was difficult to es-
cape in this situation. 
The moral problem was compounded by the totalitarian context of 
daily work, in which the scientists were confronted by the fact that 
lives might be lost if the project were not continued. They were also 
allowed to continue to do valuable scientific work by addressing them-
selves to nuclear problems, but no indication was found that they were 
motivated by government financial support. 
4. The Development of the Hydrogen Bomb 
i. The matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer 
In 1954 ~he scientific community was shocked and the nation dis-
turbed to learn that the Atomic Energy Commission had suspended the 
1 
security clearance of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. In April and May a 
Personnel Security Board appointed by the Commission heard testimony 
on whether the suspension should be made permanent. Many leading 
scientists were called to testify, and the transcript of the hearing 
reveals a great deal about the development of the hydrogen bomb, in-
2 
eluding the ethical problems faced by its developers. 
1 Theodore H. White, "U. S. Science: The Troubled Quest--II," 
The Reporter, 11 (September 14, 1954), 32-34. 
2united States Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. 
Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security 
Board, April 12 through May 6, 1954 (Washington, D. C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1954). (Hereafter referred to as Oppen-
heimer Hearings.) 
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Dr. Oppenheimer had served as head of the laboratory at Los 
Alamos, New Mexico, during World War II when this laboratory had de-
signed and built the atomic (fission) bomb. After the war he continued 
to serve the government in an advisory capacity, most notably as the 
chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Engrgy Commis-
1 
sion. On December 23, 1953, Major General K. D. Nichols informed Dr. 
Oppenheimer by personal letter that his clearance for access to secret 
documents was suspended. Nichols listed a series of charges against 
Oppenheimer which can be divided into three groups. One group dealt 
with Dr. Oppenheimer's past associations, another with his conduct in 
relation to security regulations, and a third with his alleged hinder-
ing, on moral and political grounds, of the development of the hydrogen 
2 bomb. 
ii. The opinion of the General Advis~ry Committee 
It is not necessary in this study to evaluate the Atomic Energy 
Commission's treatment of Dr. Oppenheimer or the wisdom of its decision. 
It is the testimony at the hearing, relevant to the third charge, which 
shows the moral dilemma in which the scientists found themselves. 
Soon after the war, Oppenheimer showed his concern for the moral 
problems created by the atomic bomb by working for the establishment of 
1J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Oppenheimer Replies," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 10 (May, 1954), 181, 183-86, 191. (Letter to Gen. 
Nichols in reply to charges, March 4, 1954.) 
2K. D. Nichols, "Nichols Presents Charges," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 10 (May, 1954), 174-76. (Letter to Dr. Oppenheimer, 
December 23, 1953.) 
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1 
an international atomic development and control agency. By 1949, how-
ever, the international scene had changed radically, and the Soviet 
Union had tested its first atomic (fission) bomb. The Atomic Energy 
Commission asked its General Advisory Committee if it would be wise to 
press for rapid development of the hydrogen bomb, which at that time 
2 
was receiving little attention. At its meeting beginning October 29, 
1949, the Committee unanimously recommended, as Oppenheimer summarized 
it, "that the United States ought not to take the initiative at that 
time in an all out program for the development of thermonuclear [fusion 
3 
or hydrogen] weapons." 
There were several reasons for this recommendation. There was 
some uncertainty about the feasibility of the bomb, but this was not 
decisive. The economic cost was high, and the rapid development of the 
hydrogen bomb would have weakened the effort to expand the arsenal of 
fission bombs. 4 The hydrogen bomb was conceived as employing tritium, 
and the production of tritium would require the use of large amounts of 
5 plutonium scheduled for use in fission bombs. 
In fact, however, moral and political considerations were impor-
tant, if not decisive. Dr. Oppenheimer's own comment was, "I think it 
is very clear that we did not like the weapon, not that it couldn't be 
6 
made." Only portions of the secret recommendation by the General Ad-
1oppenheimer Hearings, pp. 36-40. 
3Ibid., p. 77. 
2 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
4Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
5Roland Sawyer, "H-Bomb Chronology," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 10 (September, 1954), 290. 
6oppenheimer Hearings, p. 80. 
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visory Committee were brought out at the hearing. From these it appears 
that the Committee recommended that on many grounds the intensive devel-
. 1 
opment of the hydrogen bomb was unadvisable at that t1me. 
iii. The majority and minority reports 
Attached to the report, however, were two additional statements. 
Both of these appear to reject the idea of developing the hydrogen bomb, 
not merely in an intensive program at that time, but as a general pol-
icy. The ''minority report," signed by Dr. Fermi and Dr. Rabi, states: 
The fact that no limits exist to the destructiveness of 
this weapon makes its very existence and the knowledge of 
its construction a danger to humanity as a whole. It is 
necessarily an evil thing considered in any light. For 
these reasons, we believe it is important for the President 
of the United States to tell the American public that it is 
wrong on fundamental ethical principles to initiate the de-
velopment of such a weapon.2 
The other statement, signed by Drs. Oppenheimer, Conant, du 
Bridge, and Buckley, says that 
in determining not to proceed to develop the super bomb, we 
see a unique opportunity of providing by example some limi-
tations on the totality of war and thus eliminating fear and 
arousing the hope of mankind.3 
Thus the minority apparently opposed the hydrogen bomb on the 
grounds of its destru~tiveness as such, while the majority focused its 
concern on the possibility of limiting the character of warfare and 
avoiding an arms race in hydrogen bombs. Oppenheimer indicated that 
since Soviet development of the atomic bomb had largely been an imita-
tion of the United States program, development of the hydrogen bomb 
1 Ibid., pp. 77-81. 2 Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
3 Ibid. , p . 80. 
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would follow a similar course. The Committee hoped that if the United 
States did not develop the hydrogen bomb, Soviet efforts to do so would 
be slowed down or (the implication in the testimony is not clear) per-
1 haps prevented altogether. 
On January 29, 1950, the President put an end to the Committee's 
hopes by announcing that the United States would proceed with the de-
velopment of the hydrogen bomb. The General Advisory Committee was asked 
to participate in this development, and the members pursued this task 
2 
without further question of the basic assumptions of the program. 
The problems produced for the scientist by the contradictions 
in the moral logic of nuclear weapons were further illustrated by the 
reactions of scientists at Los Alamos to the General Advisory Committee's 
report. Edward Teller indicated that the report said to these men that 
as long as they made minor discoveries in improving atomic weapons, they 
did well, but that a major breakthrough leading to the hydrogen bomb 
would be an immoral piece of work. 3 
iv. Moral issues 
The members of the General Advisory Committee expressed their 
concerns about the moral issues involved in building the hydrogen bomb 
in response to the request of the government. Having received their 
views, the President made the opposite decision and ordered the project 
forward. The scientists then accepted the obligation of cooperating 
with the project, on the ground that it had now become national policy, 
although they personally felt that it was not the best approach to the 
2 Ibid., p. 81. 3 Ibid., p. 716. 
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interests of the nation or of humanity. 
In advising that the hydrogen bomb project not be pushed ahead, 
the scientists also advised that research into the process of nuclear 
fusion be dropped or held to a slow pace. Dr. Teller indicated the dis-
appointment this recommendation caused at Los Alamos. The members of 
the General Advisory Committee had called for the deliberate neglect of 
the search for new knowledge, which stands as the basis of the scien-
tist's commitment to his profession. 
5. Emergent Issues 
i. The weight of community decision 
These selected historical examples indicate that three basic 
commitments frequently motivate scientists to participate in projects 
with potentially undesirable social effects. Projects of this type are 
frequently sponsored by governments; in such cases the scientist may 
act out of a commitment to cooperate with the government as the agen~y 
charged with carrying out important functions for the community. The 
degree to which the government acts legitimately and wisely will vary 
from case to case. But the scientist may feel that the question of his 
participation should not be determined solely by his own evaluation of 
the wisdom of the project. He may participate because he feels that 
the community and its government have the responsibility to make the 
decisions important to community welfare, and that the citizen owes the 
use of his talents in cooperation with these decisions. Thus the mem-
bers of the General Advisory Committee cooperated in the development of 
the hydrogen bomb after the President had decided against their recom-
mendation. 
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ii. The value of the search for truth 
A second commitment is basic to the scientific endeavor as such. 
This is the commitment to the value of a continuing search for new truth. 
So great has been the significance of this search in the lives of men 
that many regard the unrestricted search for knowledge as self-validating. 
Yet the General Advisory Committee recommended heavy restrictions on re-
search into the process of nuclear fusion. The frustration this touched 
off among the men who were working on the project at Los Alamos indicated 
that participation in the search for new knowledge was an important reason 
to them for investing their efforts in this way. 
iii. Personal moral responsibility 
Scientists have frequently felt that they could not fulfill their 
own moral responsibilities if they followed unquestioningly the sugges-
tions of government. Neither could they be responsible by sharing in 
whatever research project was open to them, on the ground that any dis-
covery which results will be beneficial. They have felt it necessary 
to make their own evaluations pf the necessity for their participation 
and of its probable effects, and to act on that evaluation. 
Thus, while the rocket developers in Germany were apparently 
able to ignore other considerations and concentrate on the search for 
knowledge in space, many atomic bomb builders on both sides could not 
rest so easily. Some considered the issues and then contributed their 
efforts wholeheartedly. For others the values conflicted and there was 
no inner peace. Some were not able to give their best efforts, and some 
in Germany may even have deliberately retarded the work. 
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iv. Conclusion 
The scientist has frequently found himself in an ethical dilemma 
involving three factors: the right of the community to make the impor-
tant decisions affecting its own welfare, the continued search for new 
truth as a basis for improvement of human welfare, and the moral respon-
sibility of the scientist to pass personal judgment on the validity of 
his own actions. When the factors are in agreement, obviously there is 
no conflict for the participating scientist. But the examples show that 
it is quite possible for them to conflict, and it is further possible 
for any one of them to give ambiguous guidance when a decision is to be 
made. Further investigation of these factors and their interrelation-
ship will be necessary if the ethical dilemma of the scientist is to be 
understood and a basis laid for the guidance of the individual. 
CHAPTER III 
THE RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY: AN ETHICAL NORM 
1. Introduction 
The ethical norm for the interpretation of the scientist's re-
sponsibility will be the concept of the responsible society. This con-
cept has grown out of the efforts of the Christian ecumenical movement 
to develop a normative concept adequate to the social disorder of our 
time. 
The obsolescence of the antagonistic systems of capitalism and 
communism as social philosophies for the interpretation of the contem-
porary situation touched off the search for a new approach. Both of 
these outlooks were designed to provide a social system for channeling 
modern science, technology, and commerce to the service of man. Both 
have succeeded only partially and, as the ecumenical conversations have 
proceeded, the actual organization of "capitalist" and "communist" so-
cieties has tended toward a mixture of the elements stressed by the op-
posing theories. In the ecumenical conversations the concern has been 
to find an approach that can deal with this area of mixture on the basis 
of principle rather than pure pragmatism and which can deal with some 
of the problems of technological culture which both of the opposing out-
looks have failed to recognize. 
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It is held that the basis for much of the failure of communism 
and capitalism, and for the antagonism between them, is the separation 
and overemphasis of one of the two complementary principles, freedom 
and equal justice. At the same time, societies operating under each of 
the two outlooks have accepted the assumption implicit in both views--
that man is the master of his own destiny. This has paved the way for 
two tragic developments. One is the creation of a vast network of 
economic and technological forces which can no longer be effectively 
controlled. The other is a confusion of values and the loss of a sense 
of meaning and purpose that threatens the foundations of Western cul-
l ture. The concept of the responsible society is an attempt to deal 
with the challenge of these conditions. 
At the same time that these developments have been in process, 
the nations of the world have been drawn into a single interdependent 
network by economic developments, communication, nhe challenge of 
emerging nations, and, not least, by the common threat of nuclear de-
struction. Egbert de Vries points out that international economic re-
lationships have suffered from instability and lack of coordination, 
especially since World War II. Many nations have struggled without 
success to find a stable position in a pattern of trade and aid which 
:is chaotic and from which there is no withdrawal. The nations that are 
2 
most vulnerable to its vagaries are most highly dependent on it. Be-
1J. H. Oldham, "A Responsible Society," in World Council of 
Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1948), III, pp. 120-25, 145. 
2Egbert de Vries, Man in Rapid Social Change (New York: Doubleday 
and Co., 1961), pp. 212-14. 
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cause of these factors, the ethical demand for harmony among the nations 
has gained a new urgency, and the concept of the responsible society is 
in part a response to this fact. The need is seen for a true partner-
1 
ship among all mankind. 
2. The Basic Concept 
i. Definition 
The first explicit use of the term "responsible society" came at 
the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches at Amsterdam in 
1948. The report of the assembly contained this definition: 
A responsible society is one where freedom is the freedom 
of men who acknowledge responsibility to justice and public 
order, and where those who hold political authority or econ-
omic power are responsible for its exercise to God and the 
people whose welfare is affected by it.2 
This definition was amplified by several explicit requirements: 
For a society to be responsible under modern conditions it 
is required that the people have freedom to control, to crit-
icise and to change their governments, that power be made 
responsible by law and tradition, and be distributed as widely 
as possible through the whole community. It is required that 
economic justice and provision of equality of opportunity be 
established for all the members of society.3 
The statement affirmed that man is required by creation and calling to 
be free and responsible both to God and to his neighbor. Therefore 
any restrictions denying the individual or the Church the opportunity 
to act responsibly are condemned, especially restrictions on partici-
1walter G. Muelder, Foundations of the Responsible Society 
(New York: Abingdon Press, 1959), pp. 15, 29. 
2world Council of Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), III, p. 192. 
3Ibid. 
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pation in the shaping of society and on learning and communicating the 
truth. 
Clearly this definition does not specify a particular pattern of 
social organization, nor a formula for the functioning of an economy. 
It is a set of conditions rather than a clear pattern, but the condi-
tions make up a dynamic concept of wide usefulness in meeting the ethi-
cal problems of today's world. 
ii. The dynamic nature of the concept 
A religious approach to social problems has the task of finding 
the relationship between the content of faith and the social situation. 
But the logic of this relationship is seldom obvious, and within the 
ecumenical movement there is wide disagreement about its form. The 
concept of the responsible society has the form of a "middle axiom." 
The function of a middle axiom is to indicate in a general way the di-
rection of Christian concern for the social order at the time. It must 
give expression to the demands of faith, and it must channel those de-
mands in a manner relevant to the current social situation. Thus it 
can serve as a general normative principle from which specific recom-
1 
mendations for the social order can be formulated. In the ecumenical 
conversations it has the added advantage that persons using widely di-
vergent ways of applying faith to society have been able to agree on the 
lJohn C. Bennett, Christian Ethics and Social Policy (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 77; 
Richard Duey Nesmith, "The Development of the Concept of the 
Responsible Society: Stockholm to Evanston" (Microfilm Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Boston University Graduate School, 1957. University Microfilms: 
Doctoral Dissertation Series, No. 21, 744), p. 170. 
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usefulness of the concept of the responsible society and to share in 
its development. 
In the vast distance between the demands of the Kingdom of God 
and the actual situation, more than one level of mediating principles 
may often be needed. The concept of the responsible society is a gen-
eralized and inclusive concept which often points the way to subsidiary 
principles for the ultimate direction of actual social policy, such as 
the responsibility of society to provide opportunities for education 
leading to the full development of personal capacities. 1 
A middle axiom must always be directly relevant to its own time; 
it is not anticipated that it will necessarily refer to future condi-
tions when important changes may have occurred. A general concept like 
the responsible society, however, may be expected to be useful for at 
least several decades, for it is based on deep and fundamental theologi-
cal and social considerations. It is a growing concept, "an emergent 
2 
out of the matrix of ethical principles and concrete situations." With 
continuous investigation and new experience the concept of the responsible 
society takes on new and fuller meaning, shedding new light on the social 
situation. New subsidiary axioms are developed, both from reflection 
on the basic concept and its transcendent source and from the continued 
effort to find the most responsible course of action in concrete circum-
3 
stances. An interesting example of this is the call of the churches in 
East Asia for the abolition of the feudal landlord system, including the 
1 Nesmith, p. 58. ~uelder, p. 16. 
3Nesmith, pp. 211-12. 
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declaration that in some cases no compensation for the former landlord 
. 1 is ~n order. 
It has been the hope of many participants in the development of 
the concept that it would prove to be broadly useful. The intention is 
that it should carry meaning for those whose ethical thinking does not 
rest on explicitly Christian presuppositions, illuminating for them the 
nature of contemporary experience. In this way, for example, the con-
cept is intended to make contact with the work of agencies such as the 
United Nations Commission ori Human Rights. Thus it is not assumed that 
a Christian social ethic must be radically different from that of the 
rest of the world; rather the effort has been to let the Church be the 
servant of all men by contributing to an emergent coherence in social 
2 
outlook. 
iii. The functional content of the concept 
The concept of the responsible society is a dynamic pattern which 
functions by enabling the relationship of three crucial reference points. 
It seeks to indicate the nature of Christian concern in the social sit-
uation by relating responsibility to God, to the people affected by the 
situation, and to a set of principles held to be important in the cur-
rent situation. 
(1) The religious reference.--Responsibility to God relates the 
principle of responsibility in the social order to matters of ultimate 
concern. This reference point "saves personal and social responsibility 
from the threat of meaninglessness or the sense of cosmic indifference."3 
lMuelder, p. 34. 2 Ibid., pp. 18, 20-21. 3 Ibid., p. 22. 
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It is a transcendent "anchor" against the need to find security in the 
social circumstance and against the opposition or distraction of social 
pressures. 
The Christian faith also provides important val~tions which 
have direct application in determining the meaning of responsibility. 
God's love for men demands that the human personality be recognized as 
the basis of all human values. Each person must recognize that "every 
1 
individual is equally with himself the object of God's love." Thus 
all social patterns and social plans must be judged according to their 
contribution to the fulfillment of human personality. 
Another principle of faith which has direct relevance is the 
sinful nature of man. This aspect of human nature has the persistent 
capacity to bring about the perversion of values and especially to sup-
port the irresponsible use of power. The concept of the responsible 
so~iety contains the implicit assumption that it is possible to improve 
the quality of the social order, although there is disagreement on the 
extent to which this is true. But the nature of sin constitutes a warn-
ing that a responsible society must be very careful to see that controls 
are provided against the seizure and irresponsible use of social power, 
2 in its many forms. 
(2) Responsibility to the people.--The demand that persons and 
social systems be responsible to those with whom they are involved grows 
out of responsibility to God. The Christian is called to res·pect and 
love for men as objects of God's love, and he is called to work for the 
1 Oldham, III, p. 148. 2 Ibid., III, p. 151. 
society where personal values can be realized in a context of vital 
divine-human community. 
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In the formulation of an ethical theory, it is possible to focus 
on certain values which are desired in their own right or held to be 
the essential concerns in the welfare of the people. Then a social 
organization stressing the realization af these values may be devised. 
Capitalism and communism have both used this approach. The concept of 
the responsible society, however, attaches another condition to the re-
quirements for an ethical theory. The social system cannot responsibly 
be directed either by impersonal laws of economics designed to maximize 
productive efficiency, nor by a dialectic of history which destroys an 
oppressive culture and creates another with the help of an inevitable 
revolution and the complete socialization of the means of production. 
It is required instead that any grand scheme of social organization be 
tested by its responsibility to human values and especially to human 
control at points all along the way. 
Thus the holders of political or economic power are to have their 
actions tested by their responsibility to the people whose welfare they 
affect. Power is to be made responsible by wide distribution through 
the community, by a framework of law, and by a framework of tradition 
underlying and supplementing the law. The people must always have the 
opportunity to be heard regarding affairs which concern them, and to 
control and if need be to change either the form or the personnel of 
their governments. 1 This repeated reference to the approval and control 
1 Ibid., III, pp. 149, 151-52; above, p. 2. 
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of the people sharply distinguishes the concept of the responsible soci-
ety from approaches focusing either on benevolent regulation by the 
market and the powers which manipulate the market, or on the benevolent 
dictatorship of the proletariat. 
(3) Freedom, justice, and equality.--The third reference point 
in the concept of the responsible society consists of a set of three 
working principles. The concept grows in part from the conviction in 
the ecumenical movement that laissez faire capitalism had overstressed 
the importance of freedom in the economic sphere, while communism placed 
too much emphasis on equality. The result was a loss of important 
values and a perversion of justice in each case. A responsible society 
must reflect a balanced relationship between the three principles, in 
the context of responsibility to God and to the persons involved. 
Freedom has many facets, and over the years in the ecumenical 
movement many forms of freedom have been emphasized as requirements of 
responsibility in various situations. Among the most generally required 
forms of freedom are freedom for the full development of personality, 
freedom to act in obedience to one's understanding of God's will, free-
dom to seek the truth, to spread it and to educate one another thereby, 
and political freedom. By the latter is meant the freedom to control, 
criticize, or change the government, as mentioned above. 1 Obviously 
these requirements have wide implications, and freedom is an important 
dimension of the responsible social order. 
Equality, as Walter Muelder points out, is better understood as 
loldham, III, pp. 147, 152; Muelder, pp. 25-27. 
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a spiritual principle than as a quantitative relationship. It is the 
1 
claim of personal worth or the spiritual dignity of the person. Rea-
sonable equality in the distribution of economic goods and services is 
clearly one of the implications of this claim. Another is the claim 
for equal treatment and equal access to public services. No person may 
be treated differently through classification in a despised race or 
2 
class. The importance of the claim of equality and its relation to 
freedom at many points is clear. 
The task of social justice 
is to define the rightful place and privilege which each life 
must have in the harmony of the whole and to assign the duty 
of each to each ..•. Negatively justice delineates principles 
to restrain evil and the evildoer. Positively justice formu• 
lates the political and economic skeletal structure of society 
which carries the organic element of the community.3 
Justice is a broad concept which is often used to balance the claims 
of conflicting values or of opposing groups. In doing this it must con-
sider a broad range of human needs and rights, sound social goals, social 
well-being, and the responsible control of power in economic life as well 
4 
as in the political sphere. 
The three principles--freedom, justice, and equality--interpene-
trate each other and may at times coincide. They may also conflict, and 
the norm of responsibility then holds them in a relationship of polar 
tension. 5 Thus freedom, the claims of dignity, and the standard of jus-
tice all require that persons of different races have equal opportunity 
for education. But this of course denies the freedom of the dominant 
1Muelder, pp. 32-33. 
3Muelder, pp. 30-31. 4 
2oldham, III, pp. 148-49. 
Ibid., p. 27. 5Ibid., p. 33. 
57 
group to enforce segregation in the schools. In the economic sphere, 
freedom of economic activity conflicts with equality in the distribution 
of economic goods. Justice mediates the conflict and takes account of 
some significant inequalities such as ability to do productive work and 
the need for certain incentives to economic effort. 
The concept of the responsible society requires that the three 
poinciples be treated together, in the light of the responsibility of 
men to God and of the requirement that the social order and the power 
within it have the approval and control of the people. Justice and 
equality must not be stressed to the exclusion of freedom, for personal 
fulfillment and responsible action both depend on freedom. Freedom, on 
the other hand, must be used in responsibility to justice and equality. 
Explicit implications of these principles are developed after careful 
reference to the particular social situation under consideration. 
iv. Relation to cultural differences 
The concept of the responsible society grew partly from the fact 
that the world is becoming an interdependent whole. It is necessary to 
have an ethical theory which can take account of the fact of interdepend-
ence and lead toward the development of a true community of mankind. 
Since there are many different cultures in today's world, an adequate 
ethical theory·cannot be based simply on the assumptions of one cul-
tural outlook, even though the culture might be a dominant one. A 
theory framed in this way would risk irrelevance and invite resistance 
in many areas of the world. 
It is an important function of the concept of the responsible 
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society to provide ethical standards which are applicable to the needs 
of men in all countries, regardless of their dominant religions, polit-
ical forms, and historical cultural orientations, In doing so, the con-
cept makes use of standards of value which are coming to have essenti-
ally universal acceptance, such as concern for the less privileged 
groups in society, of the fact of increasing interdependence among 
nations, and of the common influence of scientific technology on cul-
tures around the world. In this way it seeks to provide a normative 
framework that can serve as a basis for a truly cooperative relation-
ship among men. In order that this framework might be real and rele-
vant in all cultures, it was required that the various cultures be kept 
in mind during its formulation and, equally important, that the explicit 
implications of the concept be developed with respect to the particular 
cultural contexts under consideration. These implications will vary 
from culture to culture, for the same values require different social 
1 forms as cultures vary. 
Thus there may be many forms of society which increasingly ap-
proximate the values of the responsible society, making international 
cooperation more feasible. It is not assumed, however, that a respon-
sible international order will be one of complete cultural homogeneity. 
The conclusions developed in this dissertation regarding the re-
sponsibility of the scientist will be expounded with reference to the 
cultural and political context of the United States. Although the con-
cept of the responsible society will be used as the ethical norm, it is 
1Ibid., pp. 18, 49-51; Nesmith, pp. 215-19. 
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not assumed that the conclusions made here will be precisely applicable 
without modification to other parts of the world. 
3. Applicability to Contemporary Problems 
i. Responsibility in contemporary societies 
Contemporary societies vary considerably in the degree to which 
they can be considered to fulfill the demands of the responsible soci-
ety. The Evanston assembly of the World Council of Churches recognized 
that some social situations are so unfavorable that it is necessary to 
point out that the demand for responsible action is binding on the in-
dividual Christian in all situations. 1 Other societies are nearer to 
meeting the demands of the concept of the responsible society, but even 
the best have serious deficiencies. Some deficiencies may always re-
main, but the concept was developed on the assumption that improvement 
is possible and that an adequate ethical norm could be helpful in caus-
ing improvement. 
ii. The provision of normative guidance 
The concept of the responsible society does not offer a political 
or social structure, fully developed and presented as an alternative to 
the patterns of actual current societies. The effort has been to assist 
in the improvement of existing structure by providing standards of crit-
icism for the evaluation of current practices, for the interpretation 
of social problems, and for the identification of areas of needed improve-
ment. At the same time, it contains an expanding set of recommendations 
!world Council of Churches, The Evanston Report (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1955), p. 113. 
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which provide more concrete guidance for the specific decisions which 
determine future policy. These criteria and recommendations form an 
emerging constructive pattern which becomes a normative goal for the 
development of changing societies. Within the context of various cul-
tures the structure of society which fulfills the goal must be worked 
1 
out. 
Similarly, the concept of the responsible society provides a 
normative foundation and context for the exploration of the responsi-
bility of the individual. It is a normative framework within which the 
meaning of the scientist's ability for his social responsibilities may 
be explored and developed. The results of this process of exploration 
and development will become an extension and completion of the concept 
of the responsible society itself. Such a development is only possible 
through the exploration of the concept within a particular social and 
cultural context. 
4. Interpretation of the Ethical Dilemma 
The ethical dilemma of the scientist was discussed in the pre-
ceding chapter. In the light of the discussion of the concept of the 
responsible society, it is possible to give a fuller interpretation of 
the nature of that dilemma by indicating the character of the scientist's 
individual responsibility and the status of the factors in the dilemma. 
i. The nature of personal responsibility 
Each person stands under the norm of responsibility with respect 
to both his actions and his influence. John M. Clark notes that respon-
1Ibid.; Nesmith, pp. 2, 221-22. 
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sibility "implies a range of inner discretion for the individual, which 
he exercises with a view to the rights of others; and it also implies 
1 
some accountability for the use that is made of that discretion." In 
making responsible use of his area of discretion, the individual mu~t, 
as Oldham notes, follow the course of action which seems to him most 
consistent with the demands of the concept of the responsible society. 
This does not mean that he must make an original analysis of each prob-
lem and follow only his own conclusion. He may find greater responsi-
bility in following the lead of some source which reaches a different 
conclusion about policy and action than his own. The competence of all 
persons is limited, and many needed actions can only be taken by groups 
commanding the support of persons in only partial agreement. Or he may 
feel it most responsible to cooperate with a person or group in whom 
the right of decision seems to lie. But whether he follows his own 
recommendation for action or a different one, he must be convinced that 
in so doing he is taking the most responsible course. He may not turn 
. 
over to another agency the right to direct his actions apart from his 
own responsible decision. 2 
The development of modern technology, including weapons technol-
ogy, shows clearly the influence of natural science on the modern social 
situation. The scientist has, by virtue of his ability, a significant 
potential influence on the social order. In his ability is power. The 
question of the responsibility of the scientist therefore becomes the 
1John M. Clark, Alternative to Serfdom (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1950), p. 118. 
2oldham, III, p. 132. 
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question of the responsible use of the power of scientific ability and 
effort. What are the demands of the concept of the responsible society 
on the holders of such power? 
ii. The factors in the dilemma 
The three factors in the dilemma of the scientist can be placed 
in the context of the concept of the responsible society. They are 
three patterns of action that have been identified in the course of 
actual social experience and held to be responsible courses by working 
scientists. Some have held that the responsibility of the scientist 
for weapons development is to accept the evaluation and direction of 
the government, using his ability in the manner which the government 
may request. Others have stressed that the scientist's primary respon-
sibility is to pursue his investigation of the natural world, using 
whatever opportunities may present themselves. Both of these approaches 
assume that the responsibility for decision regarding the use of weapons 
developed does not fall on the scientist in his professional capacity, 
although it is not assumed that the scientist will not make use of his 
scientific ability in seeking to influence the decision. 
The third approach is to make or accept an independent evalua-
tion of the social effects of participation in weapons development and 
follow the course that seems most responsible in the light of that eval-
uation. This may lead to participation in the same way as the other two 
approaches, but it need not. A number of scientists in various countries 
who follow this approach decline to participate in some or all weapons 
development programs. 
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In the light of the concept of the responsible society, these 
three approaches must be investigated. Their validity must be evaluated, 
and the context and limits of their applicability must be explored. Then 
they must be considered against a theory of moral decision, in an effort 
to develop bases for responsible decision and action by the working sci-
entist. 
C&PDR~ 
RESPONSIBILITY TO THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will explore the first of the three patterns of 
action--the responsibility of the scientist to engage in weapons devel-
opment according to the invitation and direction of the government. 
This will require a discussion of the moral basis of the scientist's 
relationship to the government, some consideration of the working lim-
itations of that basis, and a consideration of the meaning of the sci-
entist's participation in the democratic decision-making process for 
his role in weapons development. 
2. Scientific Ability and Government Policy 
i. Community dependence on scientific effort 
(1) Historical significance.--In the past several centuries 
natural science has played an increasingly significant role in shaping 
the lives of men. Major theoretical developments have at times sharply 
altered man's very conception of himself and his place in the universe. 
Notable examples include the thesis of Copernicus, which dislodged the 
view that the earth occupied a favored spot in the center of the uni-
verse and indicated that the universe was not compact but stretched awe-
somely into infinity. At several centuries removed from Copernicus, 
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Albert Einstein projected an interpretation of cosmology which weakened 
the sense of a fixed order in the universe through its stress on the 
importance of the observer and at the same time baffled men by indicat-
ing a universe so unlike the daily experience of the person that it can 
be described only through highly complex mathematics. It was both 
frightening and thrilling in its incomprehensibility. Henry D. Smyth 
commented, "Everyone felt better for knowing that one man's mind could 
1 
encompass ideas of such scope and penetration." 
Equally fundamental in shaping the pattern of life has been the 
role of science in economic advancement through the provision of the 
concepts on which modern technology is based. From Einstein's special 
theory of relativity came the revelation that a small quantity of mat-
ter was potentially transformable into a large quantity of energy, and 
later studies of atomic structure indicated how the transformation could 
be caused. The resulting development of atomic energy apparently puts 
a permanent end to the fear that the energy sources of the earth will 
be exhausted by the present high rate of energy consumption. Many other 
modern industries rest directly on scientific discoveries, including the 
chemical and electrical industries, telecommunications, the metallurgi-
2 
cal industries, and instrumentation and process control. Stevan Dedijer 
holds that the future of underdeveloped countries depends directly upon 
their success in establishing adequate programs of scientific research 
1Henry D. Smyth, "The Place of Science in a Free Society," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 (June, 1950), 183. 
2Louis N. Ridenour, "Physical Science and the Future," in Facing 
the Future's Risks, ed. Lyman Bryson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1953), pp. 78-79. 
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1 
which can lay the ne.cessary base for economic progress. This view may 
underestimate the usefulness of the research work already done in the 
more advanced countries, but it is correct in its appreciation of the 
value of science where rapid economic development is sought. 
The specific focus of this paper is on weapons development. In 
this area, too, the discoveries of science have had decisive effects. 
It has been shown that the discovery of nuclear fission was immediately 
applied in the development of the atomic bomb. This was in fact only 
one phase of a broad program of scientific work leading to the develop-
ment of new weapons and tools of warfare, conducted during the second 
world war. In the United States the program was directed by the Office 
of Scientific Research and Development. The list of important develop-
ments includes radar, the proximity fuse, advances in antisubmarine war-
fare, guided missiles, and improvements· in aircraft. 2 Scientists have 
developed methods of warfare by chemical, biological, and radiological 
means. In the postwar period they have concerned themselves with ad-
vancements and refinements in military strategy, developing tactical 
3 
nuclear weapons and new defense systems. They have pressed on to the 
development of hydrogen bombs and warheads, and have developed long-
range missiles with which to deliver these great explosives. 
1 Stevan Dedijer, "Research: The Motor of Progress," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 18 (June, 1962), 4-7. 
2For a description of the wartime operation, see James P. Baxter, 
3rd, Scientists Against Time (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1946). 
3J. Stefan Dupre and Sanford A. Lakoff, Science and the Nation 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 121-23. 
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(2) Continuing dependence.--Clearly in the future the advancement 
of science will be vigorously pursued. Continued research will be moti-
vated by the impulse of curiosity, by the challenge of new human prob-
lems, by a sense of the need for improvement, and by the power of com-
petition among both economic and political units. The importance of 
developments in the natural sciences has reached such a level that any 
vital modern community is dependent on continued scientific effort. 
Any nation aspiring to a role of leadership on the international scene 
must cultivate its science, for healthy scientific activity is a funda-
l 
mental condition of contemporary international power. 
Science has historically been an international activity. The 
great stream of development of physical science has moved forward 
through contributions by scientists from a large and diverse group of 
nations. Free communication of ideas and theor·ies has been a basic 
canon of the scientific approach, both because it is a necessary con-
dition for the fullest advancement of knowledge and because scientists 
have been committed to the practice of making their discoveries avail-
able for use in advancing human welfare. 2 Today, however, on many 
fronts of scientific activity, nations pursue separate development of 
science, hiding their discoveries under a cloak of secrecy. This 
secrecy is considered a requirement of the nature of modern military 
systems. Whether designed for attack, defense, or deterrence, these 
systems stem directly from advanced scientific discovery, so that secrecy 
lN. F. Mot t, ''Working for a Society Where Science Can Thrive," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 7 (December, 1951), 375. 
2Batchelder, pp. 34-35. 
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in some phases of science is considered vital to the national welfare 
by many nations. 
In modern military competition, science has become as important 
as the classic factors of bravery and strategy, and fully as important 
as industrial capacity. This indicates clearly that in the leading 
power nations today, the advancement of natural science has become an 
important national function. Scientists in their turn, in the words of 
Eugene Rabinowitch, have become the "weaponeers of hostile nations." 1 
ii. The social power of the scientist 
The pattern of connnunity dependence on scientific effort places 
the scientist in a position of social power which he had not previously 
known. His cooperation and, in fact, his intensive effort, are neces-
sary to the achievement of national goals. This is especially true 
with respect to the national military policy. The indispensable char-
acter of his work has become the basis for a new influence in political 
and military affairs. 
The scientist can cooperate with national policy by responding 
affirmatively to the request that he join in the development of new 
military weapons. He may also frustrate that policy by declining to 
cooperate personally and by discouraging others from doing so. Indi-
vidual scientists have been deeply troubled by the realization that 
they were among the very few people in the nation who could understand 
crucial scientific concepts or who had access to highly secret informa-
tion.2 In the United States during World War II, however, nearly all 
lRabinowitch, p. 2. 2white, p. 32. 
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of the research scientists in the nation joined in the task of weapons 
development or other work of strategic importance to the conduct of the 
war. 1 It has been shown in Chapter II that some scientists have engaged 
in weapons development at the request of the national government, even 
when they personally disagreed with the wisdom of the project invplved. 
Even though they questioned the morality of the government policyl, they 
have felt it their duty to cooperate with it, using the social pofer of 
their scientific ability to advance the policy of the national gotern-
! 
ment. I 
i 
Can this be a responsible course of action, seen in the light of 
the concept of the responsible society? The answer to this question 
will require a fuller development of that concept, based on an explora-
tion of the relationship of the person who holds social power to the 
community and its government. 
iii. Government as the agent of the community 
(1) The national community.--The relationship of a government to 
the community it serves is a crucial question in determining the respon-
sibility of the scientist to the government. A community, in this sense, 
is to be understood as a group of people who share a common geographical 
area, with a pattern of interaction and interdependence in economic 
life, an active system of intercommunication, a basic set of shared 
values, and generally a sense of distinction from other similar groups. 
The common values of the community are generally tied into a tradition 
shared by the people, with a sense of a common destiny for the group 
1Goudsmit, 140 41 pp. - . 
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as a whole. In the present age, the prevailing form for such groups is 
the national community. 1 One of the distinguishing characteristics of 
the modern national community is the sense of autonomy and independence 
with which its members define its place in relationship to other nations, 
in spite of the complex patterns of interdependence which exist. 
The community includes not only the people as individuals, but 
also an inclusive set of associations and organizations, of activities 
and patterns of control and standards of behavior. These do not spring 
from a single national center of control, but rather have their locus 
in the common life, in decentralized groupings, or in organizations 
which are national in scope but whose authority is limited to particular 
dimensions of life, such as religion. Of course, these patterns vary 
greatly among national communities, but they exist in every case and to-
2 
gether they make up the social fabric on which the state is built. 
(2) The political organization.--The state is the political or-
3 ganization of the national community. Within the ecumenical movement, 
as in Christian theology generally, there has been considerable discus-
sion concerning the nature of the state and of the standards by which 
it is to be judged. No comprehensive definition of the state has been 
agreed upon, and the concept of the responsible society therefore does 
4 
not at present contain a complete theory of the state. There are, 
lJohn C. Bennett, Christians and the State (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 75-76. 
2R. M. Maciver, Web of Government (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1947), pp. 193, 441. 
3Ibid., p. 193. 
4Richard D. N. Dickinson, "A Comparison of Concepts of the State 
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however, general lines of agreement and accepted standards of judgment 
which may be applied, 
The existence of the state is held to be an expression of the 
will of God as a part of the divine concern for human redemption. The 
authority of the state is thus derived from its function in the achieve-
ment of human fulfillment; it has no moral justification apart from the 
1 
services it performs for humanity.- Foremost among these services is 
the establishment of a fundamental framework of order within the com-
munity, within which the many activities of the community can be suc-
2 
cessfully carried forward. 
It is considered fundamental to the nature of the state that it 
possesses sufficient power to regulate if not to dominate any other 
power center within its boundaries. It can compel obedience by the per-
sons and groups within its jurisdiction. But it is also basic to the 
state that it is the custodian of law, which is built upon the ethos of 
the people in the community and on their desire for order and mutual co-
operation. Whether power or law is the primary characteristic of the 
state is the focus of some debate in the ecumenical conversations, and 
on this point hangs the issue of the degree to which the state can be 
the positive servant of justice, rather than serving merely in the neg-
in Roman Catholicism and the Ecumenical Movement" (Microfilm Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Boston University Graduate School, 1959. University Micro-
films: Mic. 59-3457). 
1Ibid., pp. 277-78, 290, 308, 367. 
2world Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report (New York: 
Association Press, 1962), p. 99. 
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ative sense of the restraint of anarchy and the establishment of mini-
1 
mal order. 
In general, ecumenical statements have affirmed that the state 
has positive functions, and these have been noted explicitly at times. 
It would appear, in the light of experience under a broad range of cir-
cumstances, that the state at its best can be responsible to the com-
munity and can serve the community in the promotion of the values of 
freedom and justice that are required by the concept of the responsible 
2 
society. 
(3) The administrative agent.--The state is the political organ-
ization of the national community. Government is the administrative 
agent of the state. It is to be distinguished from the community and 
is responsible to the community and the basic decisions of the community 
on the basis of its function and of the power it controls. Its task is 
to develop the policies and intentions of the state, express them in 
specific terms, and translate them into active form. 3 To the state be-
long the body of citizens, the constitution, the codified law, the 
method of organizing the government, and the pattern of succession for 
changing government personnel. The government operates within this con-
text as the agent of the state. It is normal for government leaders to 
take leadership in changing the form of the state, including the stand-
ard function of extending and revising the codified law. Maciver, how-
ever, holds that the community always sets determinate limits on govern-
1o· k' 291 1c 1nson, p. . 2Muelder, pp. 107-108. 
3 Maciver, p. 31. 
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ment power and always, if sometimes belatedly, reasserts its authority 
1 
over the government. The nature of government as the agent of the 
politically organized community is important in determining the respon-
sibility of the scientist to follow the policies of government concern-
ing weapons development. This will become more evident through a con-
sideration of the legitimate functions with which government is entrusted. 
The state is the inclusive political body which has jurisdiction 
over the entire national community. This inclusive jurisdiction is the 
key to the role of the state and its administrative agent. To the state 
2 falls the duty to act as trustee for the community as a whole. What-
ever requirements for the welfare of the community cannot be provided 
except by the inclusive political body become the duty of the state, to 
be carried out or provided for by government. These duties may be di-
vided into three classes. First is the provision of a system of regula-
tion for the various activities within the community, wherever regulation 
of private activity seems necessary in the interest of the larger pattern 
or responsibility within the nation. Second is the development of pos-
itive programs designed for the welfare of the entire community or seg-
ments of it, where these cannot be better provided by non-governmental 
units. 3 Public education provides a significant example of this function. 
Third is the conduct of relations with other states, or foreign affairs. 
It is the function of the state concerning relations with other 
states that is basic to the responsibility of the scientist for weapons 
1Ibid., p. 197. 
3Dickinson, p. 290. 
2Muelder, p. 36. 
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development. In the contemporary world the fundamental power units are 
nation-states. These units can and do enter into cooperative relation-
ships and into sharp conflict. Although it is held that the welfare of 
all nations is better served by the development of still more inclusive 
political institutions, especially one which is world-wide in scope, 
with power to regulate the conduct and conflicts of subordinate units, 
only the barest beginning of such an institution is now in ex5tence. 
It is not yet possible for a nation to coordinate its interests and ac-
tions with those of other nations within the inclusive context of a 
governmental unit serving mankind as a whole. At present, world order 
is first of arl a function of the activities of nations. 1 Governments, 
as the agents of the political communities with inclusive jurisdiction 
in the communities, are charged with the responsibility of managing the 
affairs of the state in relation to other states. No other agency which 
is responsible to the people involved has the power to do so. 
It is in the relationship of the government to the national com-
munity that the responsibility of the scientist to follow the policy of 
the government will be found. The government is the administrative 
agent of the politically organized community. It is therefore respon-
sible to the direction of the basic decisions of the community which it 
serves and which grants it authority. The conduct of foreign affairs 
is one of the basic functions of a national government. The responsi-
bility of the scientist to the policy of the government will be shown 
to stem from the scientist's influence on the success of the govern-
1oaniel Dubarle, "The Scientist and His Responsibilities," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (September, 1956), pp. 255-56. 
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ment's policy and thereby on the operation of a political organization 
which is responsible to the community by which that organization is 
constituted. The fact that the government is to be distinguished from 
the community, and is responsible to the community because of its basic 
function in foreign affairs, is a crucial point in this argument. 
iv. The scientist and government policy 
(1) The privileges of ability.--The scientist possesses social 
power by virtue of his special abilities and their influence on govern-
ment policy. Many American scientists have recognized and accepted, in 
the best way they are able, the responsibility that goes with the pos-
session of power. In the words of Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
Everybody has a responsibility to the society of which he 
is a part and, through this society, to mankind .. , • many 
individuals have additional responsibilities, arising from 
their belonging to special groups, endowed with special 
capacities, possessing special knowledge, or enjoying special 
power ...• In our time, when science has become an important 
force, affecting both the life of the individual and the life 
of society, scientists have acquired a peculiar responsibility, 
originating from their special knowledge and the power associ-
ated with it.l 
Not all scientists have accepted this view, however. Among those 
who have disagreed most sharply was the physicist P. W. Bridgman. 
Bridgman's basic point of view was that the scientist must pursue his 
scientific work because of the high value of the life based on intel-
lectual work. This thesis will be discussed in the next chapter. His 
argument is important here because it denies the validity of the claim 
1Rabinowitch, p. 2. 
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of responsibility as stated by Rabinowitch, which is basic to the argu-
ment of this chapter as well as to that of Chapter VII. 
Bridgman discussed this problem before a meeting of two sections 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, together 
1 
with the American Philosophical Association. His discussion focused 
on the question of the scientist's responsibility for the uses to which 
his discoveries are placed. This form of the question tends to reach 
an impasse quickly over the questions of the power and competence of 
the scientist to control discoveries which are already made and devices 
whose development is complete. This problem is avoided by taking the 
wider and more practical approach that responsibility is always a co-
ordinate of power. Bridgman's argument is not thereby irrelevant, how-
ever, for it is based on broader concerns. 
Bridgman attacks the question of the basis of society's right to 
impose special obligations on the scientist. Such an approach, he holds, 
is an expression of the social philosophy that grants the "stupid people" 
the right to "exploit the bright ones." This can be justified only on 
the basis of "a metaphysical concept of society as some superthing, 
2 
transcending the individuals who compose it." He denies the validity 
of such a concept, maintaining on the contrary that society is an ag-
gregate of individuals and their concerns and that all actions by the 
members of society can be justified only by their effects upon the mem-
bers as individuals. If there is no transcendent social order to impose 
lThe address is reprinted in P. W. Bridgman, Reflections of a 
Physicist (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), pp. 277-92. 
2Ibid., p. 283. 
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special responsibility, it can only be done by individuals acting col-
lectively. But there is no moral basis for this, for the individual is 
not expected to ask special service of his neighbor simply because the 
neighbor has special ability. 
Furthermore, it seems to me only decent and self-respecting 
for me to do my best to see to it that the group to which I 
belong does not act in a way in which I as an individual 
would not be willing to act.l 
Bridgman goes on to propose a society whose fundamental charac-
teristic is tolerance. It should enable as many as possible to lead a 
good life and not attempt to impose a definition of what a good life is. 
Apparently, however, the social order is to be designed so that ability 
is to be given high recognition. Each person is to receive a reward 
from society proportional to his contribution. The bright, however, are 
not to exploit the stupid. In this society the glory of intellectual 
achievement is to be highly appreciated, and a sense of the adventure 
of scientific exploration will prevail. "In a society so constituted 
I venture to think the problems created by scientific discoveries will 
2 pretty much solve themselves." The creation of such a society is 
therefore the most intelligent approach to the problems which arise from 
scientific discovery. 
Several basic objections must be lodged against Bridgman's argu-
ment. First of all, moral obligation is not rooted in the ability of 
society to impose sanctions on those who do not meet its demands. It is 
rather a quality of the person, based on his need and capacity for value 
experience and his involvement with other persons who have the same needs 
1 Ibid., p. 284. 2Ibid., p. 292. 
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and capacities. From the point of view of the Christian faith, moral 
responsibility inheres in the call from God to personal integrity and to 
loving concern for the welfare of all men. This concern can be made 
effective only when the holders of power acknowledge responsibility for 
their use of power to those affected by it. 
A second objection is that Bridgman ignores much of the reality 
of life in society. He is correct in holding that the conception of 
society as a superthing is problematic; it has a further disadvantage 
in that it has been used to justify the totalitarian state. But it is 
not therefore necessary to define society as an aggregate. The national 
community, which is apparently the unit that Bridgman refers to as soci-
ety, has been discussed above; its life includes many shared values and 
active forces which cannot be adequately described in collective terms. 
In .particular, Bridgman ignores power factors in group life. The de-
bate in social philosophy over the distribution of economic compensation 
does not concern itself with the differences among men in ability and 
intelligence nearly so much as it does with differences in economic and 
social power. Bridgman's hope of building a society which recognizes 
and rewards differences in ability and their contributions must remain 
empty until provision is made for bringing the power factors in society 
under control. The principle of the responsibility of the holders of 
power provides an ethical basis for this. 
Finally, Bridgman has ignored the crucial nature of the contem-
porary situation. The concern for the responsibility of the scientist 
has arisen because of the major problems confronting mankind, not the 
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least of which is the threat of nuclear warfare. Any adequate defini-
tion of the scientist's responsibility must have direct relevance to 
this concrete situation. By calling for an improved society based on 
tolerance, Bridgman has chosen to deal with an abstraction which is not 
relevant to the crucial ethical problem of the day. Bridgman's approach 
to the responsibility of the scientist seems clearly inadequate. The 
point of view expressed by Rabinowitch, on the other hand, captures some 
of the meaning of the concept of the responsible society for the person 
whose ability carries with it significant social power. 
(2) The basis of responsibility.--What is the specific basis of 
the scientist's responsibility to cooperate with the policy of the gov-
ernment in the development of weapons? The national community, as has 
been shown, is the basic responsible unit in international relations. 
In the contemporary arrangement of international antagonism, national 
communities, or voluntary groupings of such communities, are in fact 
communities of persons sharing a common destiny. The welfare of the 
members of the community depends on the success of the nation in advanc-
ing valid objectives, such as a workable trade program, and avoiding 
nuclear catastrophe or other undesirable developments. The government, 
as administrator of the power of the state, must therefore be respon-
sible to the community in its formulation and administration of inte~­
national policy. The final moral right to make decisions regarding the 
basic course of the nation in international affairs rests with the mem-
bers of the community. This includes the right to choose or approve the 
government officers who will formulate and carry out specific policies. 
As many scientists have recognized, it also includes the right to ap-
1 prove the sponsorship of programs for the development of weapons. 
When the community decision calls for intensive development of 
weapons to provide military strength for the international relations 
policies of the nation, does the scientist have the right to discount 
80 
the decision and refuse to give his efforts to the program? Of course, 
not every scientist is needed except in extreme emergency; the question 
is whether the individual scientist has a moral obligation to consider 
seriously the call of the nation and whether his cooperation in the de-
velopment of weapons is a responsible action. Scientists have frequently 
pointed out that if scientists in significant numbers refuse to partici-
pate in response to the community decision, they have thereby taken the 
fate of the community in their own hands, in the sense that the national 
policy will be defeated. This may mean that the nation is left to face 
2 its enemies with inferior military equipment. To act in this manner 
would be to make the scientists rather than the community the control-
ling power, at least in their ability to defeat a particular community 
decision. Hans Bethe notes that if scientists reserve the right to make 
the decision regarding participation, they constitute themselves a 
"super-political body." This body would be as fallible in its judgment 
3 
as any political body. It would furthermore be irresponsible in the 
sense that it would take from the community the basic right to decide 
1 For example, see Bethe, p. 428, and 
Edward Teller, "Back to the Laboratories," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 6 (March, 1950), 71. 
2Rabinowitch, p. 3. 3 Bethe, p. 428. 
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its own approach to international relations. 
In the ecumenical discussions of the concept of the responsible 
society, the duty of the individual to contribute to the welfare of the 
community is affirmed, as is the responsibility to acknowledge the polit-
ical authority of government officers acting as agents of the political 
community. 1 Oldham holds that it may be a responsible approach to fol-
low the policy of a political body, even when it differs from the judg-
ment of the person involved, provided that he does not grant that body 
the right to direct his judgment apart from his responsible decision to 
2 follow its lead. 
These statements are consistent with the analysis above, so that 
a conclusion now becomes clear. The social power that the scientist 
holds over the action of the nation, together with the right of the com-
munity to determine the course of national action in international af-
fairs, indicate that the participation of the scientist in a program of 
weapons development at the request of the government may be a respon-
sible pattern of action. Furthermore, in choosing among available op-
portunities for scientific work, he must give consideration to the needs 
of the national community for weapons. If the need is great, his re-
sponsibility may be to choose that course of action over others. Appar-
ently nearly all American scientists felt this to be the case during 
World War II. 
This is not to be taken as a complete description of the scien-
tist's responsibility to the policy of the government, however. There 
~uelder, pp. 109, 118. 2 Oldham, III, p. 135. 
82 
are limits to the position set forth here, as well as counterarguments. 
In the next section the primary limits of responsibility to government 
policy will be explored. Many of the counterarguments will appear in 
subsequent chapters, frequently as arguments for the superiority of 
another pattern of responsible action. 
3. Limitations on Responsibility to the Government 
i. The legitimacy of government 
The primary limitations on responsibility to government policy 
concern the legitimacy of the government involved, its competence, and 
its relationship to the ethical norm. The responsibility of the scien-
tist to government rests on the theory that the government is the respon-
sible agent of the politically organized community. The government is 
charged with the conduct of policy based on community aims in inter-
national affairs. The question of legitimacy is the question of whether 
the government is in fact responsible to the community and therefore 
properly its agent, 
(1) The distinction between community and state.--The distinction 
between the state and the community must be recognized by a legitimate 
government. The community includes many forms of association and activ-
ity, many patterns of culture and tradition, whose inner authority and 
basis for existence does not depend upon their relationship to the state. 
Institutional patterns in family life, education, economic life, and re-
ligious expression are included in this area. In any vital community 
these institutions and traditions form an interdependent pattern, re-
lated and given a common unity through generally accepted value themes. 1 
lMuelder, pp. 53-54. 
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In the modern nation the state is also an important institution 
of the community. In its capacity as the institution with inclusive 
jurisdiction in the community, it falls to the state to regulate other 
institutions, helping to determine their relationships to each other 
and to itself. This may even include creative support of some of them, 
such as education. What the state must not do is to determine the course 
of the inner life of the other associations and institutions of the com-
munity. It must not become omnicompetent; a legitimate government cannot 
seek to control the roots of the various sources of vitality in the com-
1 
munity nor justify their existence in terms of their effect on the state. 
This is necessary because a distortion of values occurs when institu-
tions which have their roots in the various basic dimensions of human 
life are subordinated to a single, comprehensive institution. Freedom 
and justice suffer. Both science and religion have known the meaning 
of government control carried to the point of distortion of the values 
of truth and faith. 2 
The relative independence of associations and institutions in the 
community from the state is necessary for a second reason. The freedom 
of these forms is necessary for the continuance of a vital and open com-
munity life. On them depends the existence of a cQmmunity which is cap-
able of controlling the powerful modern state. 3 The power exercised by 
the government cannot be responsible to the people most affected by it 
if the expression of the wide range of human values is distorted and if 
1 World Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, pp. 99-100. 
2oldham, III, p. 151. 4Muelder, p, 111. 
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the vitality of decentralized forms of community life is stifled. Fam-
ily life, religious activity, literature and arts, political action 
groups, and economic units must not be dominated by the state if the 
community is to control the state. 
(2) Constitutionality.--Beyond this, a legitimate government must 
conform to its constitutional base. The issue here is not obedience to 
a written document, although it may at times take that form. The deeper 
question is whether the government operates in conformity with the pat-
tern of political organization and action sanctioned by the community. 1 
Responsible government is responsive to the ends which are valued in the 
cultural tradition of the community and to the basic law of the community 
regarding the control and criticism of power. 2 This is expressed in the 
definition of the responsible society, which requires that power be made 
responsible by law and tradition. 
Maciver points out that one of the most crucial tests of consti-
tutionality is the manner in which power is transferred from outgoing 
3 government officers to their successors. Where there is not a clear 
constitutional pattern of succession which is followed in actual prac-
tice, government tends to be distorted by a struggle for favor and power 
among government officials. This may be compounded by efforts of those 
outside the government to gain access to political power. Responsible 
government is difficult at best under such conditions. 
Thus a legitimate government must preserve the distinction between 
~elver, p. 225. 
~elver, p. 225. 
~uelder, pp. 108-109. 
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the state and the community and it must conform to its constitutional 
base. It must furthermore be responsive to the will of the people. The 
Amsterdam definition of the responsible society "required that the people 
have freedom to control, to criticize, and to change their governments." 1 
(3) Responsiveness to community decision.--A primary condition 
for responsive government is the freedom and the practice of open dis-
cussion and debate regarding political issues. This in turn requires 
freedom to seek the truth and to share it, including the use of media 
of mass communication. Freedom of religious practice is also basic as 
a primary source of political criticism. These processes quite generally 
lead to a diversity of viewpoints and concerns. Responsible government 
leaders themselves have a primary responsibility to participate in the 
discussion, educating the people at large and participating in the pub-
lic formulation of basic policy conclusions. 
The government must recognize that it must be guided by the de-
cisions of the community regarding the basic outlines of policy in 
foreign affairs. It may not confuse its own decisions with the deci-
sions of the community, which can be reached only after the formulation 
of the clearest possible alternatives, which are then widely discussed 
and referred to the community for an expression of the public will. Com-
munity decision finds many forms of expression, including the choice be-
tween candidates for office, the expression of opinion by groups and as-
sociations, and direct expression of opinion in publications and in com-
munication with government officers. In this way, unacceptable policy 
1world Council of Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design, III, 
p. 192. 
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alternatives are rejected by the people. The government must then take 
the basic conclusions of the public will as normative guidelines in the 
formulation of specific policy. Where conclusions are diverse, the gov-
ernment must guard against unnecessarily overriding the concerns of min-
orities at the same time that it gives a major place to major issues. 
(4) Legitimacy and democracy.--These considerations give rise to 
the question of the relationship between the concept of legitimate, re-
sponsible government and democracy. John Bennett has observed that the 
concept of the responsible society "has given strong support to the sub-
1 
stance of democracy," although the specific term has not been used. 
Walter Muelder finds seven important Christian foundations of democracy, 
including the stress on free discussion and freedom of worship just 
2 
mentioned. Does it follow that only a democratic government can be a 
legitimate one? 
It is characteristic of effective democracy that it gives a work-
ing structure to the principles discussed above. Paul Appleby stresses 
the nature of democracy which makes it always ready to respond whenever 
the public will crystallizes into a strong majority viewpoint. He holds 
that the fact that such a crystallization is always a potential possi-
bility, more than the fact that it occasionally does occur, keeps the 
3 government responsive to public concerns. Maciver stresses the fact 
1 Bennett, Christians and the State, p. 149. 
~uelder, pp. 115-18. 
3Paul H. Appleby, Morality and Administration in Democratic Gov-
ernment (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press, 1952), pp. 30, 
35. 
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that in democracy the verdict of the polls is accepted in the determin-
ation of who shall govern and of the broad ends which the government 
1 
shall seek. From such considerations as these it may be concluded that 
a basically democratic state will have a basically legitimate govern-
ment. This is not to go so far as to say that the society involved is 
a fully responsible society. But should it also be said that only a 
democratic government is legitimate? To do so might be to rule out some 
useful alternate forms, particularly in those nations or territories 
which lack the basis in education, ethos, or technology which makes 
democracy readily workable in the modern age. On the other hand, the 
omnicompetent, dictatorial state, which refuses to recognize the rela-
tive independence of various forms of community life, nor to be respon-
sible to constitutional base nor public will until the government has 
shaped these factors to its own satisfaction, can never be legitimate. 
The factors of legitimacy mentioned above should be used directly 
in evaluating the legitimacy of specific governments, rather than asking 
specifically whether the government is democratic. If the question of 
legitimacy must be answered negatively, it is clear that the government 
involved is not a responsible agent of the community. If this is true, 
then the ethical basis for the scientist's responsibility to the govern-
ment policy is absent. Thus the question of legitimacy poses an impor-
tant limitation on the responsibility of the scientist to follow the 
government's request regarding the development of weapons. 
~elver, p. 198. 
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ii. The competence of government 
(1) Competence in contemporary affairs.--Another important lim-
itation on the scientist's responsibility is set by the competence of 
the government of his nation. This is a different issue from the ques-
tion of legitimacy; presumably a government may satisfy the basic cri-
teria of legitimacy and yet lack the competence to actually carry out 
its mandate as the responsible agent of the political community. Such 
a government may not be acceptable to the community and may be replaced 
shortly, but the question requires separate discussion because the great 
tensions between nations today challenge the competence of any govern-
ment to actualize even the responsible concerns of a responsible com-
munity. 
Since the development of the atomic bomb, scientists have enter-
tained grave doubts concerning the competence of governments to handle 
dangerous weapons. Both military and civilian officials were slow to 
grasp the differences between nuclear weapons and the previous "conven-
tional" weapons, although the scientists felt that the new weapons were 
so much greater in destructive power that they required a radically dif-
ferent pattern of use. Many scientists were disappointed to discover 
that government officers lacked a sense of urgency in dealing with atomic 
1 
weapons. Batchelder reports that after the atomic bomb project was be-
gun in response to the conscientious concern of scientists, institutions 
for developing and handling the bomb were established which developed 
1Eugene Rabinowitch, "Ten Years That Changed the World," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (January, 1956), 3. 
their own independent power. The competence of these institutions in 
1 dealing with the bomb was sharply questioned. 
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Norbert Wiener referred to the experience of Hiroshima in making 
public his distrust of the government's practices in handling weapons. 
He held that the scientist who participated in such a project placed 
"nearly unlimited powers" under the control of persons who could not be 
trusted in their use. To this he added, "It is perfectly clear also 
that to disseminate information about a weapon in the present state of 
our civilization is to make practically certain that the weapon will be 
2 
used." Apparently Wiener distrusted both the technical grasp of the 
responsible government officers and their judgment in moral concerns. 
With these words he declined to furnish a copy of some of his own war-
time work on guided missiles. 
(2) Limits on competence.--Competence in modern government has 
many facets. Do the leaders of the government have an intellectual 
capacity adequate to their tasks? It is necessary for them to have the 
capacity to adequately understand their situation and their role in it. 
They must possess a framework of analysis which allows them to recognize 
and grapple with basic issues in the handling of policy decisions. 
Batchelder holds that political and military leaders in the United 
States in World War II emphasized the military matters to the neglect 
of the political factors in the war, with the result that important 
1 Batchelder, pp. 36-38. 
2 Norbert Wiener, "A Scientist Rebels," The Atlantic Monthly, 
179 (January, 1947), 46. 
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opportunities were ignored or neglected. This pattern carried through 
1 in the handling of the atomic bomb. 
Technical understanding and ability is another important aspect 
of competence in government. The problems of understanding and handling 
modern military weapons have just been mentioned, The many intricacies 
of foreign affairs and aid programs require high technical competence, 
particularly in view of the patterns of conflict between the nations 
with which a government must deal. It is important that the government 
have the ability to formulate and carry out effective policies and to 
see as clearly as possible the implications of particular courses of 
action. 
Intellectual and technical ability must be efficiently used if 
the government meets the demand for competence. Internal communication 
and coordination has become a serious problem in modern government, as 
has the need for cooperation by various government agencies in support-
ing basic policies. The tendency in bureaucratic government to shift 
responsibility from one person to another or to an impersonal agency or 
committee may seriously impair efficiency. At present, the need for 
quick and coordinated action has taxed the abilities of legislative 
branches of governments to act rapidly and relevantly enough. 
It is also possible, in a nation whose government is responsive 
to the public will, that the public may not be competent to make the 
necessary judgments. The democratic credo holds that the people have 
not only the moral right but also the basic wisdom to determine the 
lBatchelder, pp. 205-10. 
91 
broad outlines of national policy. This may be challenged in the modern 
age of complex political situations and perpetual crisis. It is also 
possible to accept the public's basic ability and yet hold that at a 
particular time the public has an inadequate or distorted picture of the 
situation, or that public judgment has been distorted by such factors as 
war hysteria. Scientists have been disappointed both by the ignorance 
and by the seeming unconcern of the public on crucial questions of weapons 
1 development and use. Scientists themselves have an important responsi-
bility to inform the community and make it better able to deal with the 
issues presented by modern weapons, so that it can competently meet its 
responsibility for determining the basic direction of government policy. 
This will be discussed more fully later in this chapter. 
Competence is one of the basic conditions of responsible action. 
Where the competence of a government lags, whether because of failings 
in the government or of errors by the people in the political community, 
action in accordance with the norm of the responsible society is un-
likely. Thus the scientist's responsibility to follow the policy of the 
government regarding weapons development is sharply limited. This is 
not to say that the scientist has no responsibility to cooperate with 
the government's policy because he disagrees with it. That possibility 
will be discussed in the sixth chapter. But the scientist's responsi-
bility to participate in weapons development as the policy of a govern-
ment responsible to the community it serves.is limited if there is sound 
1
navid Riesman, "Private People and Public Policy," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 15 (May, 1959), 205. 
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reason to believe that the government is not capable of functioning 
correctly. 
iii. Government and the ethical norm 
There is another significant limitation on the responsibility of 
the scientist to participate in the development of weapons in line with 
the policy of his national government. The government policy must it-
self be consistent with the ethical norm. It is not enough that the 
government be legitimate and competent; it has a deeper responsibility 
than the effective expression of the public goals in international a£-
fairs. Albert Einstein protested in 1950 that the government leaders 
in neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were really earnestly 
1 
seeking to avoid a conflict between the two nations. Such an indict-
ment is a clear reminder that the content of the government's policy 
must be judged by its consistency with the norm of the responsible soci-
ety. If the policy of the government fails in this test, then the re-
sponsibility of the scientist to the government as the responsible agent 
of the community is thrown into direct conflict with his responsibility 
to seek an improved international community. Something of the meaning 
of this requirement must now be indicated. 
(1) Development of international institutions.--The concept of 
the responsible society is to be employed not only in relation to nations 
and subordinate groupings, but to the entire community of mankind. The 
international order today contains both patterns of cooperation and of 
1Albert Einstein, Einstein on Peace, ed. Otto Nathan and Heinz 
Norden (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 519. 
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antagonism. International economic relationships involve both qualities, 
while the combination of the great destructive power of nuclear weapons 
with the recently developed pattern of total war binds the world into a 
single community of fate. The norm of the responsible society calls for 
the establishment of a network of accepted and institutionalized rela-
tionships of responsibility to complement the factual relationship of 
interdependence, with an increased sense of true international partner-
ship as the final goa1. 1 
Since nations remain as the fundamental power units on the world 
political scene, the responsibility for the establishment of international 
community falls most heavily upon the nations themselves. It is through 
the development of new patterns for the handling of large-scale political 
power that the community of mankind can be most effectively improved. 
The principle that the holders of power are morally responsible for its 
use to the people affected by it has been applied in the discussion of 
the relationship of the government to the national community. The same 
principle must be applied to the relationship of the national government 
to the emerging world community. The balance of international order to-
day is both intricate and precarious. The actions of nations have 
world-wide repercussions. At the present time, nations decide their 
courses of action either independently or in concert with other nations 
whose cooperation is voluntarily sought. They are nonetheless required 
by the norm of the responsible society to give careful consideration and 
significant weight to the welfare of other peoples around the world and 
~uelder, p. 39. 
1 
to the goal of community among mankind. 
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This broad responsibility has many facets. Two of these must be 
siBgled out because of their crucial importance at the present time. 
The first of these is the careful avoidance of a destructive nuclear war. 
Such a conflict would be highly destructive of human life and would 
shatter both nations and the international order. Its avoidance is a 
basic precondition for the development of the community of mankind en-
visioned in the concept of the responsible society. The Assembly of the 
World Council of Churches in 1961 reaffirmed the commitment to seek total 
disarmament as the ultimate goal for the handling of modern weapons. 
Recognizing the difficulty of attaining this goal, the assembly proposed 
that at the very minimum nations must not use nuclear weapons against 
population centers, nor may they ever allow themselves to seriously con-
sider the possibility of initiating a nuclear attack (as distinguished 
from retaliation). 2 
Nuclear warfare is not likely to be avoided merely by concentra-
tion on the handling of weapons and on military strategy. For this 
reason and many others, the second crucial responsibility of nations is 
the building of international institutions which can give structure to 
a world order in which community among mankind can be increasingly real-
ized. The United Nations with its many specialized agencies is the most 
obvious of the beginnings that have been made in this area. Such insti-
tutions must increasingly provide for the settlement of international 
1 World Council of Churches, The Evanston Report, p. 142. 
~orld Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, p. 108. 
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disputes without resort to direct national power confrontations. They 
must also be the basis for a growing community ethos that results in 
fewer perceptions of national interest in terms that are fundamentally 
antagonistic to other nations. 
If such institutions are to become effective enough to signifi-
cantly alter the current pattern of international antagonism and threat, 
they will have to become more powerful than they have become thus far. 
This will mean not only increased stature in the eyes of national gov-
ernments, but the control of specific instruments of power including 
1 
military force. Nations must work toward the eventual transfer of 
military force, including nuclear weapons, to a responsible international 
institution which would have inclusive political jurisdiction over, and 
responsibility to, the whole of mankind. 2 This is not to imply that all 
political jurisdiction must be concentrated in a single center, but 
rather that an inclusive and responsible institution have adequate power 
to deal with situations affecting vitally the entire earth. 
The development of such an institution is undoubtedly a long way 
off. This shows the heavy demands placed on individual nations to fol-
low responsible courses of action in the immediate future. The prin-
ciples of freedom, justice, and equality have deep significance for 
national action, often as limits on available options and often as de-
mands for economic support or political self-government. In the power 
confrontations that will certainly continue in the immediate future, 
nations must be exceedingly careful not to touch off extensive chains 
1 ~., p. 107. 2Muelder, pp. 278-79. 
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of international action and counteraction, with disastrous effects on 
people not originally involved. 
Walter Muelder lists several factors contributing to international 
division and antagonism today. Included are the isolation and self-
absorption of peoples, sharply differing cultural patterns, competing 
institutions of property holding and economic life, nationalism and 
conflicting national policy goals, rival political ideologies, and the 
divisive influences of renascent world religions. 1 A nation is not ir-
responsible because its cultural background or economic system differs 
from that of another nation. It is irresponsible, however, if in its 
approach to other nations it stresses its own perceived interests to 
the point that it gives too little weight to the concerns of others. 
Nations are the fundamental political power units in the world 
today. Their existence rests on a consciousness of unity that binds 
2 
the community together in an intangible but very forceful way. Karl 
Deutsch notes that national consciousness expresses itself in the at-
tachment of national symbols to items of basic information, so that in 
the United States the tendency grows to speak not merely of "enterprise," 
but of "American enterprise."3 The growth of such a system of symbols 
establishes the nation as the primary political unit in the minds and 
the speech of the community members. The positive value of national 
consciousness has been its function in uniting people in the development 
1 Ibid., p. 40. ~civer, p. 159. 
3Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1953), p. 146. 
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of complex cultural-political units. 1 It has had, however, two impor-
tant effects that stand as obstacles to responsible international com-
munity. 
The term "nationalism" is sometimes applied to national conscious-
ness in general and sometimes to its excessive or negative effects. One 
of these effects is the general conviction that the nation is necessar-
ily the ultimate unit of world organization and the only rightful repos-
2 itory of political power. The other is the concentration of a people 
on national values to the exclus·ion of others and the distortion of their 
perception of other peoples and nations in such a way as to increase and 
3 
make more permanent the antagonisms resulting from other differences. 
Even the Christian Church, which seeks to draw its standards of judgment 
from sources which transcend the nation, finds its approach seriously 
distorted by the influence of nationalist symbols over its leaders and 
4 
members. 
Since World War II especially, national units have been increas-
ingly drawn into multination units. These units differ from earlier al-
liances in the degree to which they share common political ideologies 
which, like nationalist symbols, are deeply imbedded in the consciousness 
of the people. Thus many of the effects of nationalism, both positive 
1world Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, p. 105. 
2Edward H. Carr, Nationalism and After (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1945), p. 40 ·' 
3world Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, p. 106. 
~uelder, p. 261. 
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and negative, are found again on another level in multination units. 
This can be seen in the many implications of terms such as "the free 
world." 
Where such patterns of thought and valuation prevail in a nation, 
they will be reflected in the policy of the government, and the demands 
of the norm of the responsible society are unlikely to be served. The 
degree to which the ethos and policy of a nation are oriented national-
istically, rather than embracing universal concerns which are seen to 
include the national interest, is a strong index of its ability to act 
consistently with the ethical norm. 
(2) Concern for future generations.--The national government not 
only has a responsibility to the people of the world outside its own 
boundaries, but it must consider its influence on future generations as 
well. The ethical norm includes a consideration for generations yet un-
born. This question has been of special interest to scientists because 
of the problems which arise in the testing of nuclear weapons and the 
disposal of radioactive wastes. This question is in no way divorced 
from the considerations of international relations just discussed, for 
national governments have been motivated in their policies of weapons 
testing, with the resulting damage to the health of children not yet 
born, by international antagonisms and threats. 
The debate among scientists regarding radioactive fallout from 
1 
weapons testing will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
1For a recent summary of the calculated effects of weapons test-
ing on unborn children, see Linus Pauling, "Genetic Effects of Weapons 
Tests," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (December, 1962), 15-18. 
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It is important to note at this point that a government acting respon-
sibly must give careful consideration to the welfare of future genera-
tions at the same time that it seeks the best policies for dealing with 
the current situation. The two considerations may limit each other. 
The concept of the responsible society requires that the govern-
ment be the responsible agent of the politically organized community. 
It also requires that in so doing the government act consistently with 
the welfare of other nations and of future generations, including the 
positive promotion of the basic structure for future international co-
operation. A government which fails to follow both of these patterns of 
responsibility is itself responsible only in a limited sense. The sci-
entist who participates in weapons development programs in response to 
government policy may do so on the ground that this is an act of respon-
sibility to the people most affected by his actions--his own national 
community. But if the government is not responsible in its consideration 
for other nations, then the scientist will be giving assistance to a 
power unit which is responsible in one sense and not responsible in 
another. Thus participation in response to government policy can be 
responsible only if the scientist can have confidence bhat the actions 
of the government on the international scene are consistent with the 
ethical norm. This principle is an important limitation on the respon-
sibility of the scientist to government policy. 
Thus there are three categories of limitations on the responsi-
bility of the scientist to participate in weapons development in response 
to the government policy. First, the government must be legitimate, 
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recognizing that its role is that of an agent of the politically organ-
ized community. It must preserve the independence of other associa-
tions and institutions in the community, conform to its own constitu-
tional base, and be responsive to the will of the community, recognizing 
that the decision of the community must determine the outlines of policy 
within which its own decisions are to be made. Second, it must be com-
petent, able to formulate and carry out effectively the policies re-
quired. Third, its policies must be basically consistent with the ethi-
cal norm. At present, this requires vigorous efforts to avoid nuclear 
war and to develop institutions of international cooperation which can 
control the threat of modern warfare and advance community among all 
men. It also requires active concern for the welfare of future genera-
tions. If these limits are violated, then the basis of the scientist's 
responsibility to follow the policy of the government is undermined. 
Next it will be necessary to discuss an issue which is closely 
related to the question of participation in weapons development in re-
sponse to government policy. This is the issue of the scientist's par-
ticipation in the actual formation of government policy. 
4. The Scientist and the Formation of Government Policy 
i. The citizen in a democracy 
Democratic government is designed with the intention that the gov-
ernment will remain responsible to the community which it serves. Con-
stitutional channels are provided for the expression of opinion by mem-
bers of the community, and both personnel and the policy of the govern-
ment are subject to periodic confirmation or change at the polls. The 
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responsiveness of the government to the citizen carries with it a re-
ciprocal responsibility on the part of the citizen. He must use his 
influence toward the end that the action of the government will be con-
sistent with the ethical norm. This requires that he participate in 
the life of the state by sharing in the development of responsible po-
litical opinion in the electorate and by communicating his concern to 
the appropriate government officers. 1 If citizens fail in this respon-
sibility under a democratic state, they are themselves responsible for 
2 
contributing to the misdeeds of the government. 
This project is concerned with the scientist, who is, to be sure, 
also a citizen. But the scientist is the focus of special attention 
because of his special abilities and powers, and these affect his re-
sponsibility as a citizen. With this power goes the responsibility to 
employ it where it is helpful in the course of the scientist's partici-
pation in political life. This point requires specific attention be-
cause of the high degree of specialization inherent in modern industrial-
ized society. This has produced a tendency for individuals to pursue 
their specialized work without considering its relationship to the 
larger social system and.to assume that their special abilities are not 
3 
related to the duties of citizenship. 
1world Council of Churches, "Ecumenical Documents on Church and 
Society (1925-1953)," ed. John W. Turnbull (Geneva: World Council of 
Churches, 1954), p. 54. (Mimeographed.) 
2Edmond Cahn, The Predicament of Democratic Man (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1961), pp. 80-83. 
3Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (2d ed. 
rev.; Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), p. 560. 
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ii. The scientist in a democracy 
The same scientific ability which gives the scientist the power 
to develop weapons provides him with special insight into the implica-
tions of these weapons for national and international welfare. It does 
not make him a political expert, but it enables him to make a needed 
contribution to responsible political decision. He must be concerned 
to share this insight both with government officials and with the com-
munity, which is responsible for determining the direction of govern-
ment policy. 
Many natural scientists today recognize that their special abil-
ities carry special duties in a democratic system. Hans Bethe has ex-
pressed his sense of obligation in this aEea: 
I believe that it is not only the privilege but the duty 
of the scientist, individually and collectively, to make his 
opinion and vision known to the government--but it is for 
the government, not the scientist, to make the last decision, 
..• and he should then abide by it.l 
Bethe states two reasons why the scientist should make his views known. 
The first is that he has lived with the problem posed by scientific 
developments such as weapons, and he therefore knows the implications 
of these developments better than government officials, who are respon-
sible for the decisions. The second is that only the scientist and the 
military officer have full information on such questions. The scientist 
can contribute to the formulation of a decision with less professional 
bias than the military leader, in Bethe's view. 
A significant number of scientists have actively sought to dis-
1 Bethe, p. 428. 
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charge their responsibilities by contributing to the formulation of 
government policy regarding the handling of weapons. This number is a 
small minority of the scientists in the United States, but it is a 
vitally concerned group. 1 Seldom do occupational groups in democratic 
society have a larger proportion of their members participating actively 
on matters of general social concern. A survey of the activities of 
scienties relating to the formulation of government policy will indicate 
the scope of their efforts. 
iii. Political activities of scientists 
(1) The scientists speak on the bombing of Japan.--By the time 
the atomic bomb neared completion, the fears of German developments 
(which had proved to be fallacious) were obsolete. The war continued 
only against Japan. There was no longer a question of participation in 
bomb development; the task was almost complete, and the question which 
faced the scientists in relation to Japan was what they might do to in-
2 fluence the use of the bomb, By now the bomb had passed out of their 
direct control, and they discovered with some dismay that there were 
some who assumed that there could be no question, once a weapon was built, 
as to whether it should also be used. 3 
Several petitions were sent to the government by various groups 
of scientists. Some scientists opposed the use of the bomb on Japan. 
Others directly favored it, out of concern for the lives of American 
1Riesman, pp. 205-206. 2Dupre and Lakoff, pp. 96-97. 
3Batchelder, pp. 37-38; Compton, p. 238. 
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military men. Others took a more moderate position. 1 
At Chicago, a committee headed by Dr. James Franck submitted a 
report which insisted that the primary concern must be an agreement 
controlling or abolishing atomic weapons. Fearing that an unannounced 
bombing of a Japanese city would so prejudice the moral climate of the 
world that an agreement would then be impossible, the committee recom-
mended that a demonstration on an uninhabited place be used to induce a 
Japanese surrender. If such a demonstration would prejudice the possi-
bility of an agreement, then it too should be postponed. Only if the 
demonstration were tried, Japan failed to surrender, and world opinion 
made it seem feasible to drop the bomb on a city without losing the op-
portunity for an agreement, should it then be dropped. More American 
lives would be saved by such an agreement than by any military action 
2 
against Japan. 
The Interim Committee of civilians called to advise the President 
on this and other matters had a panel of scientific advisers. They were 
asked to determine whether a demonstration blast could be made effective 
enough to induce Japanese surrender. After careful consideration, the 
panel reported that they could find no way in which this could be done 
and that they therefore saw "no acceptable alternative to direct military 
3 
use." Dupre and Lakoff point out that the panel was unqualified to con-
sider the question in a wide context of political relationships and 
1
compton, pp. 241-43. 
2Reprinted in Jungk, pp. 348-50. 
3 Compton, p. 240. 
1 
therefore had to work only with the alternatives presented to them. 
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The conflicting opinions of the scientists caused confusion in 
the government as to what the actual thought of the scientific group 
was. A poll of scientists was suggested, and Arthur Compton carried 
it out at Chicago. He found that 87 per cent of the 150 scientists 
polled would approve the use of the bomb either in a demonsttation or 
an attack. Some of the questions on the questionnaire which were in-
eluded in this group implied, but did not clearly state, that an attack 
would follow if the demonstration failed to bring surrender. In his 
interpretation, Compton evidently took the implication at full value. 
Thus when "Washington" asked for the results, he stated that 87 per 
cent favored the military use of the bomb, at least if this was found 
necessary to produce surrender after other methods had been tried. In 
the poll itself, only 15 per cent approved the military use of the bomb 
directly in whatever way seemed necessary to bring about surrender and 
2 
save American lives. An hour after he had submitted the report of the 
poll, "Washington" inquired again, asking his own opinion. Compton re-
plied that "it seems to me that as the war stands the bomb should be 
used, but no more drastically than needed to bring surrender."3 
The results of all this activity by scientists regarding the use 
of the bomb in Japan went to Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, who 
advised the President on the issue. 4 Some of the material arrived after 
1 " Dupre and Lakoff, p. 100. 
2Batchelder, pp. 65-66; Compton, pp. 244, 246-47. 
3compton, p. 247. 4Batchelder, p. 67. 
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the decision to use the bomb had been made, and was simply filed away 
1 in the War Department offices. On August 6, 1945, the first atomic 
bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. 
The stated reason for the use of the bomb against Japan was the 
shortening of the war and the saving of lives. Not only American 
soldiers but Japanese soldiers and civilians would be saved if an in-
vasion of the Japanese home islands could be avoided. The casualties 
resulting from the use of the bomb would be far fewer than either side 
would sustain as the result of an invasion. Whether this was indeed 
the primary reason for rushing the bomb into action against Japan was 
questioned in 1946 in an article by Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Fin-
2 letter. P. M. S. Blackett has advanced the same idea in a discussion 
of the military and political consequences of atomic energy. 
The thesis of this approach is that the bomb was rushed into ac-
tion not so much to hasten the defeat of Japan as to prevent the Soviet 
Union from gaining a share in the postwar control of Japan. Blackett 
notes that although the bombs were employed with haste, the invasion of 
the home islands was not planned to begin until November 1, and that 
only air bombardment, which had become relatively safe, was planned until 
then. Furthermore, the Japanese government had extended a peace feeler 
1Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World, 
1939/1946, Vol. I: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), 
pp. 231-32. 
2Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, '~Beginning for Sanity," 
Review of A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, pre-
pared by David E. Lilienthal and Others, Saturday Review, 29 (June 15, 
1946), pp. 7-8. 
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through the Soviet Union in July, so that if ending the war and saving 
lives were the goal, it would have seemed feasible to delay use of the 
bomb until the possibility of a settlement was fully explored. Beyond 
this, the Soviet Union was expected to attack the Japanese forces in 
Manchuria around the eighth of August, so that as far as American lives 
were concerned~ the Soviet action might help save them by forcing sur-
1 
render without use of the atomic bomb. 
If the Soviet invasion had been allowed to go ahead, Blackett 
reasons, it would have crushed Manchuria and placed the Soviet Union in 
a position to demand a share of the postwar control of Japan. The bomb 
was dropped on August 6, and the Soviets did invade Manchuria on the 
ninth. By the twenty-fourth they had conquered the Japanese forces in 
Manchuria, but the Japanese government had surrendered to the United 
States on August 14, so that the Soviets were able to establish no 
claims beyond the reach of their own direct conquests. 2 
Robert Batchelder questions that this result was a primary reason 
why the United States dropped the bomb. He notes that even after the 
successful test of the bomb in New Mexico, which took place on July 16, 
U. S. officials, from President Truman downward, continued to urge the 
Soviets to carry out their long-intended invasion. As late as July 24, 
Truman and Churchill approved plans for cooperation with the Soviet 
Union in the Pacific war, and joint military conferences between the 
1 P. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., Inc., 1948), pp. 130-32. 
2 Ibid., pp. 131-32, 135-36. 
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three powers continued on a cooperative basis. If Blackett's thesis 
were to be fully granted, it would seem that at least some signs of 
slowing up in United States efforts regarding a Soviet invasion would 
1 have appeared. 
It is possible~ however, that the desire to prevent Soviet shar-
ing in the control of Japan was a factor among others considered in the 
decision to use the bomb. In view of postwar political relationships, 
such a fact would probably not be admitted by the leaders involved, in-
eluding some on whom Batchelder is dependent for his information. If 
this was the case, some of the scientists who advised the government may 
well have been aware of this factor and included it in their judgment 
regarding the use of the bomb. The Franck report, whether or not it was 
written with this specific problem in mind, argued against the use of 
the bomb because it would jeopardize the chances of obtaining an inter-
national control agreement. The prevention of Soviet control in Japan 
may well have contributed to this outcome, since they were certainly 
aware of the effect that the bomb had on their international position, 
which heightened antagonism toward the United States. 2 The problem 
posed by the Soviet invasion may have influenced the recommendations of 
other scientists who supported the use of the bomb or declined to oppose 
it, and this possibility must be taken into account in understanding 
their efforts to influence the plans for the bombing of Japan. 
(2) Action following World War !I.--Scientists and others present 
at the first atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New ~exico, were struck by 
1Batchelder, pp. 164-66. 2Blackett, p. 138. 
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the awesome power of the blast and impressed with the need to bring its 
1 
tremendous potential for destruction under control. After the destruc-
tion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the comment was made by J. Robert Oppen-
heimer that "the physicists have known sin; and this is a knowledge 
2 
which they cannot lose." Spurred on by these concerns, as well as by 
the disappointment felt by some over their failure to convince the gov-
ernment that the bombing of Japan was unwise, scientists labored to 
bring atomic energy under international conttol. Some, most notably 
Oppenheimer, participated in the drafting of the Lilienthal-Baruch plan 
for an international organization which would hold a monopoly on all 
dangerous activities involving atomic energy. Other scientists sup-
ported the plan, and it was proposed by the United States in the United 
Nations. The efforts to negotiate a successful agreement with the Soviet 
3 Union ended, however, in failure. 
The same motivation prompted scientists to seek to influence the 
control of atomic energy in the United States, and this time they were 
more successful. The War Department sponsored in Congress the May-
Johnson bill for the establishment of an atomic energy control agency. 
A few prominent scientists supported it, and an effort was made to get 
it passed by the Congress with little public notice. Groups of scien-
tists, however, led from the outset by Leo Szilard and others who had 
1 Henry D. Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (Princeton, 
N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 253. 
2J. Robert Oppenheimer, The Open Mind (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1955), p. 88. 
3Dupr~ and Lakoff, pp. 112-13. 
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worked on the atomic bomb at Chicago, vigorously protested the bill. 
Their primary objection was that the control agency would be dominated 
by military leaders and that this would result in the development of 
atomic energy primarily for military rather than peaceful use. Senator 
McMahon offered an alternate proposal based on extensive hearings in 
which the advice of scientists was sought. This bill was the basis for 
the Atomic Energy Act, which gives a civilian board of directors control 
of the Atomic Energy Commission and provides for responsible control by 
the President and by a joint committee of Congress. The scientists lob-
bied vigorously to secure the passage of the McMahon bill and rallied 
extensive public support through the use of forums, publicity, and 
letter-writing campaigns. 1 
(3) The development of action groups.--The institutional forms 
of the scientists' activity were varied. Many spoke as concerned indi-
viduals, and temporary groups were formed for specific campaigns. The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was begun in December, 1945 as a 
mimeographed circular for the purpose of providing a forum for the dis-
cussion of science and public affairs. It was also designed as a voice 
2 by which the scientists might speak to the public. In the same year, 
the Federation of American Scientists was founded, in close connection 
with the Bulletin, although it has its own publication. This group has 
remained small, with membership of only a few thousand, but its influ-
ence has been great for its size. Its original purpose was to influence 
1rbid., pp. 110-12. 
2Rabinowitch, "Ten Years That Changed the World," p. 2. 
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the control of nuclear forces; it has since dealt with other areas such 
1 
as freedom in science. The American Association of Scientific Workers 
and the Society for Social Responsibility in Science were also founded 
specifically for social action on the part of scientists. 
More recently, the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science has formed a Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Wel-
fare. This has not been a direct political action group, but it has 
pressed toward a definition of the professional responsibility of the 
scientist, has called for the spread of scientific information which is 
important for understanding public issues, and has urged scientists to 
collaborate in solving the scientific problems related to human survival. 
Because the AAAS is broadly representative of American scientists, its 
actions are significant in shaping the attitudes of the scientific com-
2 
munity. 
(4) Education of the layman.--Under a democratic system, the 
ability of the public to grasp the meaning of the existence of powerful 
weapons, and of the existence of scientific endeavor in general, is 
crucial to the development of sound national policy. Scientists have 
seen the education of the public as an essential part of their respon-
3 
sibility, and extensive efforts have been made to meet the need. One 
lclifford Grobstein, "The Social Conscience of U. S. Science: 
Sketch of a Decade," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (September, 
1956), 246. 
2[Paula Fozzy], "Scientists' Social Responsibility," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (March, 1962), 45-46. 
3J. Bronowski, "The Real Responsibilities of the Scientists," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (January, 1956), 11-12. 
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of the purposes of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists is public edu-
cation, and simplified technical language is deliberately used for that 
reason. Scientists have lectured, taught, and written widely, discuss-
ing both the technical and social aspects of modern weapons. Some or-
ganizations, such as the Greater St. Louis Committee on Nuclear Informa-
tion and the New York Scientists Committee on Radiation Information, 
1 have made public education their central focus. 
Scientists have further hoped that not only scientific informa-
tion, but also the scientific spirit of objective consideration of fact, 
could contribute effectively to the resolution of international diffi-
culties. Eugene Rabinowitch has called on scientists "to contribute by 
education, by persuasion, by political action . . • to the rationaliza-
2 
tion of the behavior of nations and of mankind as a whole." Considera-
tions of this kind have motivated ~ctivities by scientists on both 
national and international scenes. Daniel Dubarle has called for the 
establishment of a strong international scientific community, extending 
such current movements as the Conferences on Science in World Affairs 
(''Pugwash conferences"). His hope is that such a community can be heard 
by governments and citizenry alike, and that it can earn the right to be 
3 
taken with seriousness. 
(5) The hydrogen bomb controversy.--The question of the advis-
1Fozzy, p. 46. 
2Eugene Rabinowitch, "History's Challenge to Scientists," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (September, 1956), 238-40. 
3naniel Dubarle, "Toward a World Community of Scientists," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15 (May, 1959), 179-80. 
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ability of the development of the hydrogen bomb brought scientists into 
direct action on matters of national policy again. The second chapter 
discussed the recommendation of the scientists on the General Advisory 
Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. While this committee gave 
a negative recommendation on the advisability of rapid development of 
the hydrogen bomb, other scientists, led by Ernest Lawrence, Wendell 
Latimer, and Edward Teller, were urging administration and Congressional 
leaders that the hydrogen bomb should be developed in answer to Soviet 
1 
completion of fission bombs. Since the decision was to be made admin-
istratively, the opinion of the public on the issue was not generally 
sought. Arthur Compton objected to this approach and called for a pub-
lie poll. The President's decision came before there was time for any 
2 further development. 
After the President's decision on the hydrogen bomb, Hans Bethe 
raised the issue of the damage that would result from the extensive lib-
eration of carbon-14 by the thermonuclear blasts. In 1954 the crew of 
a Japanese fishing boat suffered illness, disability, and one death after 
exposure to radioactive fallout from a hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific 
Ocean. Soon a national debate was in full swing over the advisability 
of continued testing. Scientists outside the Atomic Energy Commission 
protested the AEC statements on the fallout danger, claiming that impor-
tant factors were overlooked and that the reports were so stated that 
lnupre' and Lako f f, p. 116 . 
2 Arthur H. Compton, "Let the People Decide," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 6 (!March, 1950), 74-75. 
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the most unpleasant facts were not made clear. Linus Pauling and Edward 
Teller emerged as leading protagonists in the debate, as scientists con-
tinued to disagree on both the technical and ethical interpretations of 
the measured fallout conditions. In 1957 two thousand American scien-
tists signed Pauling's appeal for an international agreement to end nu-
clear weapons testing. The question became an issue in the 1956 presi-
dential campaign and has been the basis of both unilateral action and 
1 
extended international negotiation since that time. Although many are 
dissatisfied with the failure of nations to permanently halt testing, 
it is clear that in this instance the debate among scientists has brought 
an important issue into the public attention and under the influence of 
the democratic process. 
(6) Advice to the government.--During and after World War II, 
scientists have often served as advisors to various government agencies, 
such as the Atomic Energy Commission. Since the orbiting of the first 
earth satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957, however, the role of the 
scientist has been given new emphasis in the executive branch of the 
government. The creation of the post of Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Technology and the inclusion in the executive or-
ganization of the President's Science Advisory Committee (of which the 
Special Assistant is chairman) have given scientists a new voice with 
which to speak on policy matters as well as with technical advice. In 
this way they have favored a nuclear test cessation and have helped to 
set negotiations in motion. They have also pressed to see that govern-
loupr~and Lakoff, pp. 119, 150-58. 
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ment efforts in space exploration are under a civilian agency. Other 
positions and opportunities for influence, such as the post of Director 
of Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense, have opened 
up since 1957. 1 Most recently, the Office of Science and Technology has 
been created as a staff service to the President. Apparently this of-
fice replaces the position of Special Assistant to the President, and it 
draws not only on the President's Science Advisory Committee for advice 
but also on the Federal Council for Science and Technology, the National 
Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation. This insures 
that a wide range of viewpoints are available to the President when 
2 
opinions differ. 
In the election·campaign of 1960, scientists participated directly 
in the partisan political process, as some of them assisted in drafting 
provisions relating to science and technology for the platform of the 
3 
Democratic Party. 
iv. Political participation and weapons development 
What is the relationship of participation in the democratic polit-
ical process to participation in the development of weapons? Albert 
Einstein stated that the scientist, whose "tragic destiny" has been to 
assist in the development of more terrible and effective methods of 
annihilation, must do all that he can to prevent these weapons from 
1Bentley Glass, "Scientists in Politics," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 CMay, 1962), 4-6. 
2Jerome B. Wiesner, "The Federal Role in Science and Technology," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (November, 1962), 42, 44-45. 
3 Glass, p. 6. 
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1 being used for their designed purposes. This moving view has motivated 
scientific participation in political affairs, but it offers little 
guidance concerning participation in future programs of weapons develop-
ment. 
Others, such as Hans Bethe, who was previously quoted, have ap-
parently taken the view that if scientists participate in the democratic 
political process by which government policy regarding development is 
formed, they then have a responsibility to participate according to the 
invitation of the government in the actual development. / Dupre and 
Lakoff find in the new government structure for scientific advice in 
the executive branch an opportunity for an acceptable pattern of respon-
sibility by the scientists. No longer are the scientists confronted 
with the sterile option of dictation or abdication; now they can parti-
cipate as "responsible professionals" in both forming government policy 
.2 
and carrying it out. 
The participation of scientists in the formation of government 
policy is certainly a desirable practice in a democratic state; it is 
in fact a responsibility of the scientist as a person with special abil-
ities who is also a member of the community. If the community is to 
face responsibly the dilemmas of international affairs, it must have the 
understanding of modern weapons that the scientist is best able to give 
it. If the government is to be competent and responsible in handling 
modern weapons, official and unofficial participation by scientists in 
policy formation is imperative. The distinction between community 
1 2 / Einstein, pp. 493-94. Dupre and Lakoff, p. 168. 
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decision and government decision requires that the scientist address 
himself to both bodies, so that an informed and responsible relationship 
between the two is possible. It does not follow from this, however, 
that participation in weapons development is a responsible course of 
action. From the scientist's basic scientific competence spring two 
abilities relevant to the handling of weapons. One is the ability to 
guide the community and the government in responsible decision-making 
regarding weapons policy. The scientist can help to make the implica-
tions of various weapons clear and can scrutinize or contribute to polit-
ical proposals. 
The other is the ability to contribute to the development of new 
weapons. These abilities are closely related, but they are nonetheless 
distinct. The basis for the participation of the scientist in weapons 
development in response to government policy has already been discussed, 
along with the limitations on that responsibility. It is in terms of 
this pattern of responsibility that the meaning of participation in dem-
ocratic political process must be evaluated. 
Thus the fact that the scientist himself participated in the dis-
cussion out of which the government policy emerged does not alter the 
conditions under which he can responsibly participate in carrying it out, 
The tests of the legitimacy'of the government, its competence, and its 
consistency with-the ethical norm must always be applied. If the scien-
tists' participation has helped to improve the governmental process and 
policy at any of these points, then it is in this sense that political 
participation has helped to make participation in the actual development 
of weapons a more responsible course of action. 
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5. Summary 
Scientific work has become an influential and vital function in 
modern advanced societies. The development of weapons is a very impor-
tant part of this function as it is currently practiced. Any nation 
aspiring to international power can be expected to press for the advance-
ment of science within the country, including particularly the develop-
ment of new weapons. This demand has resulted in the casting of the 
cloak of secrecy across some advanced scientific work, contradicting the 
scientist's traditional practice of free communication. In general, 
scientists have responded to the requests of their governments for work 
on the development of weapons and have become the "weaponeers of hostile 
nations." 
The question of this chapter is in what sense the decision of the 
government to sponsor weapons development places a responsibility on the 
scientist to cooperate with that policy by participating personally in 
the development of weapons. The dependence of the nation on the parti-
cipation of the scientist for the success of such programs is one impor-
tant factor in determining this responsibility. The other factor is the 
relationship of the government to the national community. 
The government is the administrative agent of the state; the 
state in turn is the political organization of the national community. 
Thus there is a distinction between the government and the community, 
and the responsibility and authority of the government stems from its 
duty in carrying out the functions of the state, including the conduct 
of foreign affairs. Wherever possible, the basic outlines of foreign 
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policy must be referred to the decision of the community; fundamental 
questions of weapons development are included in this demand. The gov-
ernment is then the agent of the community, responsible for the conduct 
of foreign affairs within these outlines. 
Because the national community is bound together by a common des-
tiny and a common responsibility, the scientist as a member of the com-
munity has a responsibility to it. As a member with special abilities, 
whose actions affect the execution of the decisions of the community in 
foreign affairs, he has a responsibility to cooperate with the national 
policy. Thus it may be a responsible course of action for him to par-
ticipate in government-sponsored programs of weapons development. This 
would be an exercise of his power in responsibility to the people who 
are vitally affected by it. 
There are basic limitations on the validity of the scientist's 
responsibility for participation in response to government policy; these 
fall into three categories. The first indicates that the pattern of re-
sponsibility is not valid if the government is not legitimate. The gov-
ernment must recognize the distinction between community and state, pre-
serving the independence of institutions and associations which are 
vital to the life of the community and which are necessary if the com-
munity is to retain control of the state. Beyond this the government 
must conform to its constitutional base, observing the pattern of social 
and political action sanctioned by the community and responding both to 
the basic values of the cultural tradition and to the basic law of the 
community regarding the control and criticism of power. Constitutionality 
is especially crucial in regard to the succession of new officers to 
positions of power in the government. 
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A legitimate government must furthermore be responsive to the 
will of the people in the formation of the basic outlines of national 
policy. This requires freedom for open discussion and debate on polit-
ical issues and channels for the expression of opinion to the government. 
It also requires the formulation of clear alternatives of policy, which 
must be referred to the community for decision. Government leaders must 
not confuse their own decisions with the decisions of the community. 
The contributions of citizens with particularly relevant abilities, such 
as the abilities of scientists in discussing weapons, must be encouraged. 
The basic conclusions of the public must become normative guidelines for 
the formation of specific policy. 
The second basic limitation concerns the competence of the govern-
ment. A government may be legitimate and yet lack the competence to ful-
fill its function as the responsible agent of the community. To the 
degree that this is the case, the scientist's responsibility to partici-
pate in response to government policy is limited, for the government 
will be unable to fulfill its function as the agent of the politically 
organized community. Intellectual ability, technical competence, and 
reasonable efficiency are all required if the government is to be com-
petent. Modern weapons themselves are a challenge to the understanding 
and ability of government leaders. Another important question of com-
petence concerns the ability of the community to determine wisely the 
broad outlines of national policy. Where the government is responsible 
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to the people, they too must be competent. This raises a challenge to 
educators, including scientists who can educate people regarding the 
implications of modern weapons. 
The third limitation on the scientist's responsibility to govern-
ment policy is the requirement that the policy of the government be 
basically consistent with the ethical norm. This does not mean that it 
must be the complete fulfillment of the individual scientist's hopes for 
it. But it does mean that the policy of the government must seek to 
support the development of institutions which will bring cooperation and 
community to the international order. Every effort must be made to 
avoid large-scale nuclear warfare, and persistent work is required to 
develop a responsible international institution which can replace the 
threat of war with patterns of cooperation and with the ability to deal 
with conflicts without allowing the resort to war. Thus a responsible 
government policy cannot be dominated by nationalism nor the point of 
view of a multination bloc, to the point of contradicting the pressing 
need for international cooperation. 
A responsible government policy must also be concerned for the 
welfare of future generations, a point which is made prominent by the 
genetic damage due to radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons tests. 
The scientist, as a person with special abilities, has a respon-
sibility to contribute to the formulation of government policy through 
his understanding of the nature and implications of modern weapons. 
This is required if the community is to be informed and the government 
which is responsible to it is to be competent in its handling of weapons. 
122 
Scientists in the United States have taken this responsibility 
seriously, working to influence the use of the atomic bomb, the inter-
national control of atomic energy, and the organization of the Atomic 
Energy Commission. They have developed programs for the education of 
the public, stressing the spread of vital information regarding weapons. 
At times they have led the national political debate, as in the case of 
fallout from nuclear weapons testing. Some of them regularly serve the 
government as advisers on matters relating to weapons policies. 
As serious as the responsibilities of scientists in this area 
are, however, participation in policy formation does not replace the 
question of participation in weapons development. Because the scientist 
understands weapons, he has a responsibility to advise, persuade, and 
educate. It does not follow that because he has done so he should par-
ticipate in weapons development at the government's request. Because 
he has the ability to develop weapons, he has responsibility for the use 
of that ability and for its influence on others. If he participates in 
government weapons programs out of responsibility to the national com-
munity, he is acting responsibly only if the government is legitimate, 
competent, and acting in responsibility to the larger international com-
munity. 
In the next chapter another of the patterns of responsible action 
will be discussed. This is the question of the scientist's participa-
tion in weapons development as a means of advancing the values associ-
ated with the pursuit of the scientific quest. 
CHAPTER V 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE SCIENTIFIC QUEST 
1. Introduction 
The second of the three patterns of responsible action is the 
subject of this chapter. The scientist is committed to the advancement 
of the scientific quest as the special focus of his personal efforts. 
Both scientists and theologians have held that the appropriate pattern 
of action for the scientist is to pursue this quest as effectively as 
possible, leaving the problem of the proper use of the discoveries and 
developments of science to appropriate political and economic bodies. 
In the words of J. Robert Oppenheimer, "The true responsibility of a 
1 
scientist, as we all know, is to the integrity and vigor of his science." 
He notes explicitly that the pursuit and communication of scientific 
knowledge contains no guarantee that the knowledge will be responsibly 
used. A very similar statement was made in the Christian Century by 
2 
Robert E. Fitch, Dean of the Pacific School of Religion. 
In evaluating this pattern of responsible action, this chapter 
will explore the values achieved in the process of the scientific quest; 
it will consider the relationship of modern science to the development 
of weapons; it will discuss the validity of this pattern of action in 
1oppenheimer, Open Mind, p. 91. 
2Robert E. Fitch, "The Scientist as Priest and Savior," Christian 
Century, 75 (March 26, 1958), 368-69. 
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the framework of the concept of the responsible society, and it will 
consider some limitations on the validity of the pattern. 
2. Human Values and the Scientific Quest 
i. The nature of the scientific quest 
Natural science involves the attempt by rational means to gain a 
systematic understanding of the structure and processes of nature. Ex-
planatory principles or theories are developed and applied to this end, 
and it is a canon of natural science that only those principles which 
can survive when tested by the process of the observation of nature 
1 
through the human senses can be considered valid. A principle which 
cannot be tested by the observation of nature, however refined the ob-
servational technique be made, is not necessarily incorrect, but it is 
not a principle of natural science. A fuller understanding of the prac-
tice of science will follow from the consideration of the fundamental 
and applied modes of scientific endeavor. 
(1) Fundamental research.--The process of fundamental scientific 
research, also called "pure" or "basic" research, is directed toward the 
development and improvement of the basic conceptual schemes of natural 
science. The investigator is concerned with the validity of existing 
principles of explanation and with the extension of the conceptual scheme 
to explain natural processes not currently understood. The explanatory 
value of his discoveries, rather than the practical usefulness of the new 
knowledge, determines the nature of the investigations he will make. 
1Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and World, 1961), p. 4. 
1 
Knowledge is treated as an end in itself. 
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(2) Applied research.--The attempt to gain the particular under-
standing of nature that will permit the achievement of some useful func-
tion is the basis of applied research. Knowledge becomes instrumental, 
and if the researcher does not see clearly at the beginning of his work 
what form the outcome is likely to have, he at least does not begin a 
project that does not seem to have a reas9nable probability of finding 
some useful information. Other possibilities for research, no matter 
how intriguing from the point of view of scientific knowledge, must be 
2 ignored in applied research. 
(3) Interpenetration of the forms.--The distinction between fun-
damental and applied research is a real one, but it should be noted that 
it stresses not method but the intention of the sponsor and the re-
searcher.3 The distinction is also real in the sense that most of the 
results of the two types of research are of the type originally sought. 
But it should be noted that both types of work are often involved in the 
same research project and that fundamental discoveries have in the past 
4 
arisen from projects of applied research. Moreover, applied research 
commonly makes minor discoveries of fact and theory which contribute to 
1Bernard Barber, Science and the Social Order (Glencoe, Ill.: 
Free Press, 1952), p. 95. 
2nael Lee Wolfle, Science and Public Policy (Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1959), pp. 20-24. 
3smyth, "The Place of Science," p. 180. 
4Peter L. Kapitza, "The Future of Science," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (April, 1962), 3. 
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the total stock of information out of which future fundamental advances 
1 grow. Fundamental research, on the other hand, often includes some 
very practical technological advances, as well as developing the con-
ceptual schemes which are basic to the work of applied science. 2 On a 
somewhat deeper level, it is seen that the general direction of very 
basic fundamental research has often been determined not only by the 
unfolding logic of scientific theories, but also by the basic technical 
needs of contemporary society. 3 
ii. Intrins~c values 
The scientific quest holds a wide range of values, both for its 
participants and for others affected by it. According to one study re-
ported by Bernard Barber, scien.tists felt that their major direct sat is-
factions from scientific work come from the intrinsic values of intel-
lectual endeavor and from the conviction that scientific work makes a 
valuable social contribution.4 The intrinsic values of the scientific 
quest and the cultural and technological values which it produces are 
the human values on which this chapter is based. The intrinsic values 
of the scientific endeavor will be discussed in this section and the 
cultural and technological values in succeeding sections. 
1
sir Robert Watson-Watt, "Science, Politics, and Citizenship," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (January, 1950), 28. 
2wolfle, p. 21. 
3J. Bronowski, Science and Human Values (New York~ Harper and 
Brothers, 1956), pp. 15-16. 
4 Barber, p, 109. 
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Intrinsic values are realized in those experiences which may be 
said to be ends in themselves or to be valued for their own sake. They 
are contrasted with instrumental values, which are values because they 
serve the attainment of intrinsic values. Again, however, the distinc-
tion is not clear-cut; the same events frequently involve both dimen-
sions of instrumental value and experiences whose value is intrinsic. 
Religious, intellectual, and aesthetic values, along with values of 
_character and association, and recreational and bodily values all in-
1 
elude important dimensions of intrinsic value. 
(1) Intellectual values.--Central among the values of the scien-
tific quest is the value of knowing, of being able to grasp at truth. 
Insight into the world of nature, with the help of concepts which indi-
cate relationships which are not ordinarily visible, is the primary goal 
of science. With the achievement of this goal comes the exercise and 
the fulfillment of the intellectual capacity of the person. Humanity is 
2 
affirmed in the act of increased understanding of the natural world. 
Scientists have testified frequently to the significance of the value 
experiences which come to them in scientific work. 3 
It is a fortunate characteristic of natural science that its gains 
in knowledge are permanent. If the value of scientific insight is most 
1Edgar S. Brightman, Moral Laws (New York: Abingdon Press, 1933), 
pp. 132-33. 
2Ian G. Barbour, Christianity and the Scientist (New York: 
Association Press, 1960), p. 41. 
3Bridgman, pp. 290-91; Einstein, p. 535. 
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fully realized by the discoverers of new principles, it is also avail-
able to other scientists who grasp the concepts involved. The same 
thing is true of the person who, while not himself a scientist, takes 
the trouble to educate himself in scientific knowledge. It is thus on 
a broad front that science functions "to make the contemplation of truth 
1 
more easy and complete." 
At present there is disagreement among philosophers of science 
regarding the quality of insight into truth which natural science pro-
vides. This is the question of the cognitive status of scientific the-
ories. Scientists generally are aware of the tentative nature of scien-
tific principles; the history of science shows repeated instances in 
which further investigation has shown existing principles to be inade-
quate, and better theories have taken their place. The question here, 
however, is whether, with increasing refinement, scientific theories 
approach a grasp of the objective structure and function of nature. If 
this is so, then scientific theories can meaningfully be spoken of as 
"true" or "false," and they will have significant metaphysical implica-
2 tions. Science becomes extremely important to man's understanding of 
his place in the general structure of being. 
An alternative view holds that scientific theories are valid only 
in an "instrumental" or "functional" sense. They are tools for drawing 
inferences and making predictions, but it is not assumed that the content 
1George Sarton, "Science and Morality," in Moral Principles of 
Action, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), 
p. 450. 
2 Nagel, p. 141. 
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of the theory refers to anything more fundamental than the thought proc-
1 
esses of the scientist. Fields, forces, waves, and particles are pri-
marily standardized thought-forms which are useful in predicting regu-
larities in the observed behavior of nature. Such philosophies frequently 
deny the possibility of the establishment of meaningful propositions in 
metaphysics and conceive of truth in science only in a very limited 
2 
sense. 
To the practicing scientist, the intrinsic value of scientific 
understanding is not vitally affected by this dispute. He is frequently 
content with the conviction that there is a natural world and that the 
processes of science provide an increasingly accurate grasp of important 
phases of that order. 3 The importance of the philosophical dispute 
should not be ignored, but the intrinsic value of scientific understand-
ing remains established regardless of the debate on the cognitive status 
of theories. 
(2) Moral values.--The possibility of gaining increased under-
standing of the order of nature presents the scientist with a moral 
claim. The values of increased knowledge of the truth ought to be real-
ized. The process of scientific discovery, however, also calls for the 
exercise of important values of moral character which are intrinsically 
good, as well as conditions of effective science. 
1 Ibid., pp. 129-30, 133. 
2Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 252-75. 
3c. P. Snow, ''The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science," in The New 
Scientist, ed. Paul C. Obler and Herman A. Estrin (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962), pp. 131-32. 
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Natural science seeks to treat nature as objectively as possible. 
Although scientific theories are indeed human inventions, they must be 
tested by referral to objective nature through the process of controlled 
and refined observation known as the scientific experiment. The ob-
served facts of nature must be treated with strict honesty and integrity, 
in spite of the fact that the scientist characteristically cherishes the 
personal hope that his hypothesis will prove to be correct. Careful at-
tention must also be given to the soundness of the logic employed in the 
proposition under consideration. The disinterested subordination of 
personal wishes to the greater value of the discovery of new truth is 
1 
an important value of personal moral character. 
Modern science is a social process, in the sense that investi-
gators refer their findings to the scientific community as a whole, or 
to as large a group as secrecy permits. Their findings become the 
property of the group, and the forward course of science thus depends 
on contributions from the many members of the scientific community. 
The efficient advancement of the scientific quest thus requires the 
transcendence of all barriers of personal pride, and of political, cul-
tural, or racial exclusion. The history of science shows clearly that 
scientific truth is not bound by any of these barriers, and important 
insights are overlooked if these boundaries are allowed to stand. A 
high valuation of men, based on their creative abilities, is implicit 
in the scientific quest. This outlook is buttressed and extended by 
the concern which is fundamental in the ethos of the scientific community, 
1J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science (New York: New 
American Library, 1949), pp. 172-75. 
that the knowledge gained by science be available for the benefit of 
1 
all men. 
131 
Another moral value required by the processes of science is per-
sonal responsibility. The scientist must at the same time be a creative 
member of the scientific community and take maximum personal responsibil-
ity for making his individual work as valid as possible. He may not lean 
on the authority of previous work except where it seems to his critical 
judgment to be scientifically sound, for the final arbiter in science 
2 
can only be reference to the facts of nature themselves. Of course, 
in any advanced science observed facts are always treated in a framework 
of theory, but any theory can be called in question on the basis of more 
fundamental observations. 
(3) Aesthetic values.--Scientists have testified extensively to 
the aesthetic values in scientific work. The discovery and awareness 
of harmony and order, resolving the apparent complexity of nature through 
the introduction of appropriate principles of relationship, are the 
basis for the aesthetic experience of the scientist. The fundamental 
human desire for experiences of beauty is thus fulfilled, most strongly 
in the achievement of scientific discovery, but also in the study of 
the principles of relationship which are the achievement of science in 
3 
the past. 
C. P. Snow indicates that aesthetic values even serve as a non-
rational criterion for evaluating scientific theories. He notes that, 
1 Barber, pp. 89, 91-93. 2 Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
3sullivan, pp. 164-67. 
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"for example, most physicists would feel in their bones that the pres-
ent bizarre assembly of nuclear particles, as grotesque as a stamp-
1 
collection, can't possibly be, in the long run, the last word." 
(4) Religious values.--Another important area of intrinsic per-
sonal value experience is the realm of religious values. This experi-
ence of value stems from the interpretation of the process and results 
of scientific investigation through theological perspectives, such as 
those of the Christian faith. It is a fundamental Christian conviction 
that God transcends nature and cannot be fully known by the empirical 
2 
study of nature. The center of Christian revelation lies in the person 
of Jesus Christ. For persons who hold these convictions, however, 
natural science may be the key to additional religious insight. 
The doctrine of the divine creation of the natural world is the 
theological root for the understanding of natural science. If it be 
granted that the natural world is the product of God's activity, then 
the apparent separation between the divine and natural spheres is trans-
3 
cended, without altering the methods of the natural sciences. The sci-
entific study of the natural world is at the same time a study of the 
working of God. In the words of Edgar Brightman, 
If science does not disclose the supernatural and re-
demptive purposes of God, it nevertheless discloses all 
1snow, pp. 164-67. 
2Edgar S. Brightman, "A Christian View of Nature," in Christian 
Bases of World Order (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943), p. 72. 
3Hans H. Wolf, "The Old Problem: Science and the Christian 
Faith," The Ecumenical Review, 9 (July, 1957), 363-64. 
we know about the means and powers used by God on the 
natural level. The laws of science are the ways of work-
ing of the God of Nature.l 
Thus the process of scientific investigation is potentially a 
path to religious insight. It can furthermore be a stimulus to the 
fuller understanding of other basic theological issues. 
The fact that the natural world is also the human environment 
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means that the scientific study of nature is likely to drive the mind 
of the student beyond the empirical questions of science to the ques-
tion of the meaning of the human situation. In this way the religious 
experience of the Christian is deepened, as he is made to approach his 
2 
relationship to the Creator in a more adequate way. In this sense, the 
scientific quest is caught up in the attitude of the eighth Psalm. The 
study of natural science, seen in the context of the Christian outlook, 
can be a response to the divine intention that men should approach their 
3 Creator with increased understanding and increasing awe. 
The intrinsic values which are realized in the scientific quest 
are perhaps experienced most fully by the scientist engaged in funda-
mental research. Experience shows, however, that the scientist involved 
in applied work has very similar value experiences and that the differ-
ence between the two is by no means great. The same basic elements of 
value experience are generally present whether the object of the search 
1Brightma.n, 11A Christian View of Nature, 11 p. 73. 
2wolf, pp. 364-65. 
3william G. Pollard, 11The Place of Science in Religion, 11 
The Christian Scholar, 36 (June, 1953), 117. 
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is simply new knowledge or the accomplishment of some technical goal. 1 
iii. Cultural values 
In addition to the value experiences realized by direct partici-
pation in the scientific quest, there are values springing from the 
scientific process which influence culture as a whole. Where science 
holds a significant place, both in esteem and extent, in the life of a 
cultural group, the values of the scientific community will make an im-
portant contribution to the value structure of the total community. 2 
Modern science itself developed in the context of Western culture, which 
shaped the nature of the scientific quest and embedded in it many of the 
values of the wider culture. As is the case with any basic cultural 
activity, science depends on the surrounding culture for support, and 
it also spreads its basic values throughout the culture through the 
pervasiveness of scientific activity. The fact that science is widely 
pursued today, coupled with the fact that social change with attendant 
reintegration of values is characteristic of the contemporary period, 
indicates that the cultural influence of these values is especially im-
portant. 
(1) The rational outlook.--At the heart of the scientific approach 
to the search for truth is the conviction tha~ all conclusions must be 
rationally justified. Nothing is established unless it is consistent 
with experience, and the relevant facts must all be taken into account. 
1Barber, pp. 95-96; Snow, p. 131. 
~uelder, p. 45. 
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Neither the use of logical thought nor the appeal to experience is the 
invention of modern science; both have existed from early days. The 
tremendous success of natural science in its own sphere, with its ob-
vious technological implications, has, however, given high cultural 
1 
significance to the ways of thought associated with "scientific method." 
One of the primary effects of this emphasis on rational method 
is the development of standards for approaching problems that are inde-
pendent of emotional or ideological bias. The existence of the rational 
outlook results in the existence of wide areas of common understanding 
and potential cooperation among people who are otherwise separated by 
2 divisive outlooks. Such cooperation is most feasible, of course, in 
areas of scientific and technological concern. J. W. N. Sullivan 
points out that this is true because questions of scientific fact are 
not the questions by which persons feel themselves most deeply affected, 
so that the reference to objective fact is more easily accepted. He 
notes that this limits the ability of scientific method effectively to 
3 
transcend divisions based on deeply held convictions of value. The 
existence of a common outlook does have value in helping men to under-
stand each other, however. Many scientists hope that one of the most 
significant results of their work can be the spread of the rational out-
look to the approaches governments take toward other nations and toward 
1Barber, pp. 86-87. 
2 J. H. Oldham, "Technics and Civilisation," in World Council of 
Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1948), III, pp. 35-36. 
3sullivan, pp. 174-75. 
1 
world problems. 
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(2) Universalism.--Scientists do not willingly tolerate any arti-
ficial barriers in their work. They assume that the same scientific 
principles must be valid in all parts of the universe. They hold that 
all persons have the same claim for access to scientific knowledge. 
They insist that all ideas, whatever their source, must be judged by 
the same standards and that personal or ideological opinions of the 
originators of the ideas are irrelevant. 2 
This universalism of outlook affects the attitudes of men toward 
each other, both in the sense of respect for human dignity and of the 
recognition of a common human situation. The influence of this outlook 
is reinforced by the sense of community that prevails among scientists. 
This community is quite international in scope, and although the actual 
lines of communication have been hampered by political conditions since 
the rise of Nazism in Germany, the loyalty of scientists to the inter-
national nature of the community of scientific practice remains strong. 
This group continues to strain against the barriers which divide and 
hamper it. 
(3) Communality.--The uniting bond of the scientific community is 
the sense of sharing in the scientific quest as a common cooperative en-
terprise. In spite of national barriers imposed upon them, scientists 
of various nations are working together to establish a fuller knowledge 
of the natural world. The fact that there is competition among scientists 
1Rabinowitch, "Responsibilities of Scientists," p. 6. 
2 Barber, p. 89. 
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does not change this fact, for it is competition to determine who can 
make the greatest contribution or who can be the first to solve a par-
ticular problem. The contribution itself becomes the property of all 
insofar as it is not restricted by national or industrial sponsors of 
1 
research. 
The existence of a community so motivated constitutes a judgment 
on all practices which carry self-interest to the point of limiting the 
values available to others. In a society whose economic life is based 
on the profit motive, the communality of science is a reminder of the 
need to temper profit-seeking by the responsible use of economic power. 
The refusal of scientists to accept financial royalties based on funda-
mental scientific discoveries makes the judgment concrete, as does the 
straining of scientists in industrial research for permission to com-
2 
municate their findings outside of the sponsoring company. 
The international nature of the scientific effort has a special 
significance in the present day, however. It means that regardless of 
the attitudes that governments take toward each other, an important seg-
ment of mankind, transcending national boundaries, is engaged in a com-
mon cooperative interprise. This cooperation of scientists in a common 
work, based on a commitment to common values, is an important building 
block toward the goal of a community of all mankind. In recent years, 
its vitality has been renewed by the yearly meetings of scientific 
leaders from both Western and communist countries in the Conferences on 
1Eugene Rabinowitch, ''Man Must Prevail," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 (December, 1962), 4. 
2Barber, pp. 90-93. 
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Science in World Affairs (Pugwash conferences). 
(4) Responsibility and freedom.--The scientist is responsible 
for increasing the understanding of the natural world, using his best 
abilities and accepting only the facts of nature as final authorities 
in the judgment of his work. No human authority, whether voluntarily 
accepted or imposed, can be allowed to pervert this process. Thus the 
discipline which controls the scientist is self-imposed and the exercise 
of it requires the freedom to investigate the natural world and to com-
1 
municate and discuss problems and results, without external restriction. 
Thus the scientists in a society are generally aligned on the side of 
freedom and openness in the exchange of ideas, and at the same time they 
exhibit a sense of responsibility for the use of their abilities through 
the proper pursuit of the scientific quest. The success of modern nat-
ural science both in gaining increased understanding of nature and in 
maintaining integrity within the community of scientists has helped to 
make these values widely significant in contemporary cultures. 
(5) Human responsiveness.--Scientists perceive the mysteries of 
nature as a challenge to human ability to discover and understand. The 
value and possibility of responding to that challenge is a basic convic-
tion of scientists which has been spread through modern societies by the 
impact of scientific and technological advances. As science continues 
to advance, at a time when progress in the solution of fundamental pol-
itical problems often appears very slow at best, this conviction of sci-
entists supports a faith in human ability to overcome the serious threats 
1 Barbour, p. 42. 
1 
confronting mankind. 
By its very success, natural science has supported a deep and 
pervasive pattern of social change in nations around the world. New 
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outlooks and new applications of science have radically influenced pat-
2 
terns of life and value structures. The conviction that this process 
of change, which continues into the future, is ultimately valuable in 
its own right, provides a basis for the acceptance of the problems in-
herent in the process of change. Furthermore, the conviction that the 
scientific quest with its attendant social change is a value, has been 
commonly held, and it has therefore served as a foundation of social 
3 
stability in the flux of continual change. 
The cultural values that grow out of the scientific process do 
not affect all areas of culture equally. Other values conflict with 
them and may take precedence over them at important points. 4 Political 
authoritarianism may limit the freedom demanded by efficiency in science 
strictly to the scientific sphere, and nationalism may prevent the 
spread of the scientific ideal of universal communality. The presence 
of the values of science in the cultural pattern does have an influence 
beyond the immediate areas of scientific activity, however. 
At the same time, because cultures tend toward the integration 
of values, it is important to the successful advancement of science that 
the central values of the culture support the scientific quest; Barber 
1Edward Teller, "Atomic Scientists Have Two Responsibilities," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3 (December, 1947), 356. 
2Barber, pp. 210-12. 
~uelder, p. 45. 
3 Sarton, p. 445. 
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observes that "liberal" societies, such as the Western democratic coun-
tries, have central values closely related to the cultural values grow-
ing out of the scientific process. Authoritarian societies, such as 
Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, find such values as the widespread 
and general application of rationality, receptiveness to the work of all 
competent investigators, and the free and open exchange of ideas to be 
in conflict with authoritarian ideals. 1 The values inherent in scien-
tific process may thus reinforce other values in the culture, in which 
case the influence of these values is likely to be strong and stabiliz-
ing. The values of science may also conflict with other values, in 
which case they will meet resistance and may be destabilizing, but will 
also constitute pressure for change. In societies where traditions are 
changing rapidly, the development of a tradition of science will mean 
that the values of the scientific process will be influential in the 
future cultural stabilization. 
iv. The values of technology 
A third group of values growing out of the scientific quest 
springs from the contemporary relationship of natural science to tech-
nology. Modern technological advancement is highly dependent upon the 
discoveries of natural science; this fact was mentioned before and it 
is so commonly known that it needs little amplification. The relation-
ship of scientists to industrial firms will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Here it will be sufficient to note the fundamental influence 
that nuclear power may be expected to have on technology. 
1Barber, pp. 73-83. 
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Modern industry requires large quantities of energy, which has 
come in the past from natural water power and from the combustion of 
fossil fuels. At the present time these are still the major sources 
of industrial power. There is a limit to the amount of energy that can 
be made available in this way, however. In time, under the pressure of 
increasing demands, the fossil fuel supplies must be exhausted. Slowly 
but steadily, power from nuclear reactors is being employed instead of 
or in addition to traditional sources. The time is likely to come when 
most of the power available to men will be in the form of electricity 
generated by the energy released in nuclear reactors. As an outgrowth 
of this change, the large-scale contamination of cities will be a thing 
of the past, for nuclear power stations do not release smoke or fumes 
1 into the atmosphere. 
In this way, fundamental research in nuclear physics has resulted 
in a solution of the most fundamental problem of technology--the con-
tinued provision of sources of large quantities of energy. If a method 
for the controlled use of the energy from the process of nuclear fusion, 
the basic fuel for which is hydrogen, is found, energy for the support 
of modern life will be still more readily available. 
The values provided by modern technology are essentially instru-
mental in character. One of the most fundamental is the basic fact that 
economic production in the advanced countries is great enough to allow 
all members of the society to live on an economic level far above the 
plane of subsistence. Persons can have adequate nutrition and pr~tion 
1samuel K. Allison, "Nuclear Power in the Next Twenty Years," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (December, 1962), 14. 
I 
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from the elements, with good medical care, which makes possible a full 
life span with relative comfort and without the fear based on economic 
insecurity. The problems of economic distribution and economic stabil-
ity have not been fully solved yet in any country, but very significant 
achievements have been made, and the technological base exists for further 
advancements. 
This level of productivity also makes possible significant amounts 
of time for persons of all segments of the population to employ according 
to their own discretion. Thus a whole span of values which are not 
readily available during working periods can be realized. Values of 
enlightenment, aesthetic enjoyment, creative experience, and variety in 
experience are possible in a new way. Scientifically conceived proc-
esses of communication and transportation, such as television, high-
speed aircraft, and music recording contribute to the creative use of 
discretionary time. Extensive transportation makes possible direct 
fellowship with persons residing in distant places and the experience 
of direct contact with different cultures. Release from complete pre-
occupation with economic production introduces an extended area of free-
dom into the lives of persons, with the challenge to make responsible 
1 
use of it. Thus it is seen that natural science, by its repeated and 
decisive contributions to modern technology, has helped to make avail-
able a wide range of human values. 
1John C. Bennett and Others, Christian Values and Economic Life 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), pp. 50-58. 
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3. The Scientific Quest and Weapons Development 
The scientific quest is clearly an important source of human 
values--intrinsic, cultural, and technological. What then is the rela-
tionship of the contemporary scientific quest, in which these values 
are realized, to the process of weapons development? This section will 
indicate that a large share of scientific work in the United States is 
sponsored by agencies concerned for weapons development, and that much 
of the fundamental research performed contributes unavoidably to weapons 
development. Thus the vigorous pursuit of the scientific quest depends 
on the widespread participation of scientists, directly or indirectly, 
in the development of weapons. Since the development of modern weapons 
is almost exclusively the function of the government, this will require 
first of all a study of the pattern of government sponsorship of weapons 
research. 
i. Government sponsorship of weapons research 
(1) Government laboratories.--Research and development work spon-
sored by the federal government is carried on primarily in the govern-
ment's own laboratories, in industrial and independent research labora-
tories, and under the direction of universities. In fiscal 1962, 2.2 
billion dollars, or 23 per cent of the estimated federal budgetary ob-
ligation for "research and development" was directed to government lab-
oratories. Of this total, 84 per cent was expended by the Department of 
Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and 
1 Space Administration. 
1Based on figures in u.s., National Science Foundation, Federal 
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In evaluating these facts, it is important to note that the 
category "research and development" is in practice difficult to set 
limits to. It includes fundamental research, applied scientific re-
search, and engineering work. Engineering work differs from applied 
science in the sense that it involves the relatively direct, although 
creative, application of established principles of science, rather than 
the discovery of new relationships. In practice the distinction is not 
sharp. Research and development further involves work that is more akin 
to production than to science, for complex developments require that 
1 test specimens and pilot projects be constructed and tested. Thus sci-
entific research is only a part of what is included by the term "research 
and development." In fiscal 1962, about three-tenths of the estimated 
total federal research and development obligation was specifically de-
fined as "research."2 It is possible that some additional work more 
properly labeled scientific research was done in the course of develop-
ment projects. In spite of its lack of precision, the term "research 
and development" is useful in understanding the relationship of science 
to government, in the absence of more detailed information. It includes 
the processes a£ scientific research, and because it is widely used it 
furnishes a standard of comparison of government sponsorship with sci-
entific activity throughout the nation. 
Funds for Science X (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1962), pp. 88-89. 
l / Dupre and Lakoff, p.25 
2 Based on U.S., National Science Foundation, pp. 16-17. 
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The types of work done by government scientists vary widely. 
Nearly· every scientific discipline is represented, and medical and agri-
1 
cultural research are involved. However, as just seen, five-sixths of 
the cost expenditure is made by the three agencies that are concerned 
with weapons development. The Department of Defense and the Atomic 
Energy Commission have weapons development as the dominant interest in 
research and development. The National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration is closely associated with the development of missiles, and its 
activities in satellite development and space exploration are forerunners 
2 for possible weapons development in the future. The NASA was allotted 
15 of the 82 per cent for the three agencies. 3 
(2) Industrial research.--Research and development in industry 
is by far the largest category of this activity in the United States. 
About three-fourths of the spending for research and development in the 
nation is done by industrial firms. This category includes independent 
research laboratories and laboratories managed by industrial firms for 
4 the government, which earn no profit for the parent company. 
In 1959 the total national expenditure for industrial research 
and development exceeded nine billion dollars. The amount of this pro-
vided by the federal government through grants and contracts exceeded 
5 five billion dollars and constituted 57 per cent of the total. The 
1 Barber, p. 171. 2 / Dupre and Lakoff, pp. 162-63. 
3Based on U.S., National Science Foundation, pp. 88-89. 
4Dupre/and Lakoff, pp. 20, 26-27. 
sibid., p. 20. 
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estimated total federal obligation for research and development in in-
dustry was nearly six billion dollars for fiscal 1962. The three gov-
ernment agencies particularly concerned with weapons development pro-
vided about 99 per cent of the government expenditure for industrial 
1 
research and development. This means that over one-half of the support 
for industrial research is invested in weapons development and related 
activities. The magnitude of this operation can be grasped more readily 
by noting that in 1957 United States industries employed 728,000 scien-
tists and engineers in research and development and that major industries 
derive the majority of their research funds from federal government 
agencies. Over 85 per cent of research and development costs in the air-
craft industry are provided in this way and nearly two-thirds in the 
2 
electronics industry. 
(3) University research.--Universities are a third major area of 
scientific research. Included in this category are both the research 
done on university campuses in connection with the educational programs 
of the schools and the research programs operated by the universities 
and schools of technology for the government. These programs are gen-
erally cantered apart from the campuses and are not fully integrated into 
the educational programs of the schools. They are sponsored by the De-
fense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration. Thus the Atomic Energy Commission 
sponsors the Los Alamos Laboratory, which is managed by the University 
1Based on U.S., National Science Foundation, pp. 88-89. 
2Dupre~and Lakoff, pp. 21-22. 
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of California. The California Institute of Technology directs the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, while a group of twelve schools, including Har-
vard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, are re-
1 
sponsible for the Brookhaven National Laboratory. In fiscal 1962 the 
estimated federal government obligation was 470 million dollars for the 
2 
support of these.research centers. From their sponsorship it is clear 
that weapons development figures importantly in their work. 
The contribution of the federal government to research work done 
in connection with the educational programs of universities in 1962 was 
3 690 million dollars. This was by far the largest source of funds for 
research of this type. It is difficult to determine how much of this 
was directly connected with weapons development. The government awards 
contracts to universities for research projects related to the specific 
needs of government agencies. It also makes grants for the support of 
projects of general intellectual interest, proposed by university sci-
entists. The fact that 10 to 15 per cent of federally supported research 
in the universities is conducted under secrecy indicates that a signifi-
4 
cant share of university research is connected with weapons development. 
The President's Science Advisory Committee reports that in 1957-58, 70 
per cent of all university research was paid for by the federal govern-
S 
ment. Apparently this includes the work of research centers managed by 
libid., pp. 43-44. 
2u.s., National Science Foundation, pp. 88-89. 
4oupre' and Lako ff, p. 46. 
5u.s., President's Science Advisory Committee, Scientific Progress, 
the Universities. and the Federal Government (Washington, D. C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 7. 
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the universities apart from their campuses. Such a ratio would mean 
that in fiscal 1962 roughly 20 per cent of on-campus university research, 
apart from the work of university-managed research centers, was sponsored 
by the Defense Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National 
. 1 Aeronautics and Space Admin~stration. 
Fundamental research which is not specifically directed toward 
weapons undoubtedly occupies a larger share of the efforts of university 
scientists than of those in government laboratories or in industry. In 
recent years, the National Science Foundation and the National Institute 
of Health have recognized the importance of this phase of university re-
search by extending unrestricted grants to be used for research projects 
chosen by the schools receiving them. The amounts involved have not 
been large enough to alter the general balance of university research, 
2 however. 
(4) The emergent pattern.--The expenditures of the federal gov-
ernment for research and development are large and growing rapidly. The 
total expenditure for fiscal 1963 will be close to fifteen billion dol-
lars. This amounts to 17 per cent of the total federal budget and rep-
3 
resents an increase of approximately 30 per cent over the previous year. 
The federal expenditure for research and development is estimated at 
4 
roughly two-thirds of the total national expenditure for that purpose. 
1 Based on U.S., National Science Foundation, pp. 88-89. 
2Dupre"and Lako f f, p. 50. 
3Robert C. Cowen, "Research Costs Soaring," The Christian Science 
Monitor (Boston), January 16, 1963, p. 10. 
4wiesner, p. 44. 
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Accurate information is difficult to get regarding these quantities due 
to lack of coordination and communication between the large number of 
agencies involved, so that all the figures in this discussion must be 
regarded as approximate. 1 
Even with this limitation, however, it is clear that patterns of 
federal expenditure for research and development are extremely influ-
ential in shaping the course of scientific research in this country. In 
fiscal 1962, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration expenditures 
totaled 90 per cent of the estimated total federal research and develop-
ment obligations. 2 In the general pattern of research and development 
expenditures in this country, these agencies account for roughly one-
half. It is thus clear that the current rapid advancement of the sci-
entific quest in the United States is dependent on its relationship with 
the development of military weapons and related systems. 
ii. Fundamental research and weapons development 
The advancement of the scientific quest at a significant rate re-
quires steady effort in fundamental research, as well as work in applied 
science. Most of the government-sponsored research described above falls 
in the field of applied study, but there are other sponsors, most notably 
the universities, that prefer to concentrate on fundamental studies. 
1Paula Fozzy, "Research Coordination," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 (March, 1962), p. 29. (This issue carries the erroneous 
volume number, 17.) 
2 Based on U.S., National Science Foundation, pp. 88-89. 
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Government agencies, especially the Office of Naval Research, have spon-
sored fundamental studies in recognition of the fact that these are nec-
1 
essary for a vigorous national science. 
The fact that a military agency should be concerned for funda-
mental research is a clue to the role of such studies in the process of 
weapons development. Fundamental science, in the words of Warren Weaver, 
has a basic "incapacity to be impractical."2 New applications regularly 
follow from the discovery of scientific principles which initially seemed 
to be quite abstract and unrelated to practical affairs. The relation-
ship of fundamental research to weapons development will become clear 
with an investigation of the problem of predicting the course of funda-
mental research and of the significance of the contemporary background 
of international antagonism. 
(1) The unpredictability of science.--The essence of fundamental 
study in the natural sciences is the careful investigation of the un-
known. It is true that science is progressive and that as a general 
rule the direction of future work is influenced by the nature of what 
has been discovered in the past. But the record of important discoveries 
shows that sudden advances are often made in unforeseen directions, as 
unexpected avenues suddenly open with the discovery of previously un-
k d t h ha d . li . 3 nown a a, or as a new t eory proves to ve unexpecte 1mp cat1ons. 
lBethe, p. 427. 
2warren Weaver, "Science and People," in The New Scientist, ed. 
Paul C. Obler and Herman A. Estrin (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 
Anchor Books, 1962), p. 103. 
3Paul Weiss, "The Message of Science," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 15 (September, 1959), 275. 
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Sullivan points out that the influence of a particular mind can make a 
great difference in the form of a theory where alternative forms are 
possible. 1 This in turn will affect the course of future work built on 
that theory, as well as its immediate practical implications. 
A classic case of an unpredictable development with far-reaching 
implications is afforded by Albert Einstein's formulation of the special 
theory of relativity. From this theory came the principle that energy 
and matter are interchangeable and that the conversion of a small quan-
tity of matter will yield a very large quantity of energy. This prin-
ciple guided the development of the atomic bomb and of controlled nuclear 
reactors, where the conversion amd release of energy was actually ac-
complished. Neither the principle nor its application to weapons were 
foreseen in advance of the formulation of the theory. To the author of 
an article which suggested that Einstein should have foreseen the impli-
cations of his discovery, he wrote, "As for the theory itself, it owes 
its existence to the efforts to discover the properties of the 'lumin-
iferous ether'! There was never even the slightest indication of any 
potential technological application."2 He pointed out that the empirical 
data on which the process of nuclear fission is based were unknown and 
impossible to foresee when the theory was published in 1905. 
(2) The predictability of science.--Once the theory was known and 
accepted by other scientists, however, they were alert to the possibil-
ity and the significance of a transformation of matter into energy. It 
was not known whether the transformation would actually occur in nature 
1sullivan, p. 169. 2Einstein, p. 623. 
152 
in a way that would release energy from the matter in the normal en-
vironment. What was known was that if an investigation of nature re-
vealed that appropriate conditions did exist, then according to Ein-
stein 1 s theory a transformation of matter into energy could occur. If 
the conditions were appropriate for it, a very large quantity of energy 
might be released. Thus the theory served as a guide for the course 
and the interpretation of future research and, in this sense, as an 
instrument of prediction. 
The theories of science function in this way to predict what may 
be found by further investigation. Predictions of this type can be 
wrong, as they often are. Scientists have no assurance of what will be 
found until they find it. The importance of this type of prediction 
for weapons development, however, is seen in the fact that workers in 
the field of atomic physics, knowing of Einstein 1 s principle, had reason 
to suspect that their research might eventually lead to the large-scale 
release of nuclear energy. This was realized by some at a fairly early 
1 date. Others, like the British physicist Ernest Rutherford, a leader 
in the field of the physics of the atom, doubted that the appropriate 
2 
conditions could actually be found. 
(3) New discoveries and weapons development.--The complex weapons 
of modern warfare do not spring into existence as the result of basic 
scientific discoveries. These weapons must be developed through an ex-
tensive and expensive process of applied research and development. 3 
1 Barber, pp. 219-20. 2compton, Atomic Quest, pp. 279-80. 
3
cuthbert Daniel and Arthur M. Squires, "Scientists• Responsibil-
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In the current world situation, with its extreme antagonisms between 
political centers possessed of great .scientific and industrial resources, 
however, promising fundamental discoveries are readily applied to the 
development of weapons. The extent to which scientific activity in the 
United States is geared to this end has been shown. 
Thus it is true that fundamental scientific research in the con-
temporary context contributes quite significantly to weapons development. 
Its direction is only partially predictable, and there is no advance as-
surance that even its general predictions will have significant applica-
tions. But in recent years many such applications to weapons develop-
ment have been exploited. Once a fundamental discovery is established, 
the probability that its implications for weapons will be developed is 
high. It becomes permanent knowledge, awaiting the application. This 
is illustrated by the development of the hydrogen bomb. The theoreti-
cal possibility of energy release through nuclear fusion was for years 
a closely guarded secret. Yet it followed from basic atomic theory 
which was known among scientists, so that it was discussed in a book 
published in Austria in 1946 by the physicist Hans Thirring. He had 
used only non-secret sources of information, and the book discussed both 
the basic concept of fusion and alternate processes by which it might be 
1 
achieved. In the arms race which followed, it was almost inevitable 
that the process would be explored, and if it proved to be practical, 
ities on the Way to Peace and After," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
5 (January, 1949), 27. 
1Hans Thirring, "The Super Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 6 (March, 1950), 69-70. 
1 developed by the international antagonists. 
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The science of meteorology provides a more current example. This 
science has generally been directed toward the understanding and predic-
tion of weather, which, while important in warfare, could be considered 
a weapon only in a very broad sense of the term. The possibility now 
looms, however, that fundamental advancements in meteorology, combined 
with other technological developments, may make the control of climate 
possible to such an extent that it will be a greater threat than nuclear 
2 
attack. This development, if possible at all, is probably still a long 
way off. But already the United States Navy is conducting experiments 
regarding the possibility of influencing the weather for tactical pur-
3 poses. 
iii. The inescapability of weapons development 
Clearly, the advancement of the scientific quest in the United 
States is closely intertwined with the process of weapons development. 
The relationship is one of interdependence. Modern military competi-
tion requires intensive research and development on new weapons, which 
involves extensive scientific effort. Science, on the other hand, has 
a dual relationship to weapons development. It is -dependent on weapons 
development projects for financial support for a large body of applied· 
1 Bethe, p. 428. 
2John von Neumann, "Can We Survive Technology?", in American 
Strategy for the Nuclear Age, ed. Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff 
(Garden City, N.'Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960), pp. 37-38, 40. 
3The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), January 2, 1963. 
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research and for some fundamental research as well. But in addition to 
its dependence on government funds, modern fundamental research in the 
natural sciences, by its very nature, makes decisively important con-
tributions to the process of weapons development. 
The extent of this interpenetration is dramatized by the fact 
that scientific theories have some predictive power as to what future 
discoveries will be. As seen in the example discussed above, once it 
became clear that the principle of equivalence of matter and energy 
raised the question of the possibility of nuclear energy release, the 
potential social significance of research in atomic physics was altered. 
No one could know what would be discovered, but future research in that 
area, motivated only by human curiosity, could not be conducted without 
finding the answers to some questions that were crucial for weapons de-
velopment. In this case the answer that appeared was that the large-
scale release of nuclear energy did seem possible. This became clear 
only after the discovery of the neutron and the discovery that uranium 
would fission under neutron bombardment. These studies were motivated 
primarily by general scientific curiosity. The final decisive funda-
mental step, the discovery that uranium releases free neutrons when it 
fissions, was made in explicit answer to the question of whether a chain 
react.ion was theoretically possible. 
For the scientist dedicated to the values realized in the ad-
vancement of the scientific quest, but questioning whether these values 
justify participation in weapons development, the interrelationship of 
the two activities presents a real moral dilemma. It is possible to find 
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opportunities for scientific research whose relationship to weapons de-
velopment is negligible. But science will not advance rapidly if the 
relationship is avoided. And in the most fundamental areas the back-
ground of international antagonism, provoking and sustaining the arms 
race, makes the connection unavoidable. If science is to be vigorously 
pursued, the participation of a large share of American scientists in 
the development of weapons is inescapable. The validity of such a pat-
tern of action in the light of the concept of the responsible society 
must now be discussed. 
4. The Advancement of Science and 
the Responsible Society 
To understand the relationship of the scientific quest to the 
concept of the responsible society, the significance of the values of 
the scientific quest must first be considered. This can then be fol-
lowed by a consideration of the relationship of responsibility for the 
values of science to responsibility for weapons development. The limits 
of the pattern of responsibility will then be discussed. 
i. The values of the scientific quest 
(1) Intrinsic values.--The realization of intrinsic values by 
its members is a fundamental goal of the concept of the responsible 
society. These various values can be related under the general theme 
of personality fulfillment. A social order which makes personality ful-
fillment ~re possible is one expression of the meaning of the respon-
sible society. It is recognized that the value-experiences of the per-
son are dependent on the nature of the society. It is also recognized 
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that the ability of the person to participate responsibly in the social 
order is dependent on his personal experience of values. And it is 
recognized that the realization of intrinsic values is a fundamental 
social goal, for these are values in the experience of persons. 1 
The intrinsic values of the scientific quest are realized most 
directly by the practicing scientists themselves. Intellectual, aes-
thetic, and religious values, however, may be shared to a certain degree 
by others who become acquainted with scientific theories, with the often 
attendant sense of wonder at the order found in nature. The moral 
values required by scientific work can assist the scientist in develop-
ing a responsible relationship to society and to individuals, although 
the ability of all persons to compartmentalize their moral concerns 
within limited areas of experience should not be underestimated. The 
realization of these various values through the process of scientific 
exploration is to be prized and advanced, as far as possible, in the 
responsible society. 
(2) Cultural values.--Many of the cultural values inherent in the 
scientific quest are basic values in the concept of the responsible soci-
ety. The need for a rational approach to social problems, making full 
use of the best thinking of the social sciences, has been axiomatic in 
discussions of the concept from the start. This does not preclude the 
use of theological presuppositions, but it does call for their rational 
understanding and application. The stress on the importance of human 
dignity rather than on social barriers, and the high valuation of 
~uelder, pp. 23-24. 
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cooperation and sharing of the fruits of scientific effort, is a con-
tribution to the goal of mutual concern and responsibility in society. 
The significance of this quality of the scientific community is growing 
in recent years as scientists consciously seek to relate their concern 
for social welfare to the existing patterns of the societies in which 
they live. In the United States, the expanding significance of the Com-
mittee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare of the American As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science is an important development, 
since nearly all natural scientists in the nation are affiliated with 
1 
the Association. 
The concern of scientists for an uninhibited atmosphere in which 
to work has caused them to press for a society based on individual and 
political freedom. They have accompanied this with a sense of respon-
sibility for the advancement of the scientific quest and, as just men-
tioned, have taken a growing interest in the responsible relationship 
of their discipline to the society in which they work. 
The cultural values of the scientific quest, even with their em-
bodiment in the community of scientists, will not by themselves create 
a responsible society. Such a society must rest upon the integration 
of the values of the many groups within a society, each with its own 
particular concerns and goals. Different patterns of values and modes 
of integration exist in different societies, and no single pattern is 
demanded by the concept of the responsible society. The basic cultural 
1Robert C. Cowen, '~The Sciences and Society," The Christian 
Science Monitor (Boston), December 26, 1962, p. 1. 
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values of the scientific quest, however, are found to be generally con-
sistent with the central value themes of the concept of the responsible 
society. The pursuit of the scientific quest, particularly as cur-
rently pra~ticed in democratic nations, is thus accompanied by a social 
force seeking the establishment and preservation of a complex of values 
basic to the responsible society. 
(3) Values of technology.--The effects of modern technology on 
the cultures of nations and peoples have been deep and fundamental. 
They have been a source of continual changes in social relationships, 
which require continual changes in values and forms of value integra-
tion. Natural science has played and continues to play an increasing 
role in the advancement of technology. 
As noted in the third chapter, the concept of responsible society 
was developed as a needed improvement on the approaches which had been 
taken to the social control and use of modern science, technology, and 
commerce. Thus the existence of continued technological development 
was a basic assumption of the concept from the beginning. Technology 
was not seen merely as something which had to be dealt with and con-
trolled, however, It was seen as a source of values, as a force which 
is desirable when it is held within a context of responsibility. 
The basic values of human life can be, and have been, realized 
by persons in all places and ages irrespective of the state of technol-
ogy. But with the advance of technology, perhaps particularly with the 
application of large-scale energy, advanced tools and methods, and auto-
matic control processes, more instruments for value realization became 
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available. These range from improved nutrition and health to the free-
dom and opportunity to travel to other lands and to participate in the 
arts. The end of technological advancement is not yet in sight, and 
the role of science in that advancement is crucial. The continuing 
development of modern technology, based on the related advancement of 
science, is a theme of modern societies that is supported by the concept 
of the responsible society. 
(4) Undesired outcomes.--The emphasis that has been made on the 
values realized through the scientific quest does not give a complete 
picture of the effects of science on the realization of values. In 
many instances the impact of science has made the realization of values 
more difficult. Its effect on warfare is a central theme of this proj-
ect, and no conclusions regarding that question will be drawn in this 
section. Also included in the list of problems raised by the impact of 
science are the gulf between the scientific understanding of nature and 
the Christian faith, the problem of excessive faith in human resources 
for the solution of all human problems, and the problems of economic 
justice springing from such factors as the concentration of economic 
power in the hands of a few persons, and the organization of labor along 
lines of technological efficiency without adequate concern for human 
1 
values in the work situation. 
A theological consideration of the relationship of scientific 
knowledge to Christian faith has been previously presented. It is in 
1world Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, pp. 96-97; 
Oldham, "Technics and Civilisation," III, pp. 37-45. 
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fact true that many persons have been unable to resolve the problems 
created by divergent positions taken by science and theology. The prob-
lems created by this difficulty for the human spirit are unfortunate, 
but they must be regarded as inherent in the struggle for truth. The 
problems must be resolved by pressing on in both scientific and theo-
logical quests until the relationship becomes clear. To do otherwise 
would be to stop short and avoid confronting ~ruth, in a manner unaccept-
able to the God who is Truth. 
Science has helped to sustain the conviction that human action 
and human resources ought to be applied to the problems which confront 
men. It has also helped to extend this conviction to the point of faith 
in human capacity to solve all vital problems, including the faith that 
science could be extended beyond the area of nature to find solutions to 
all problems. Sometimes the progressive nature of science and technol-
ogy has inspired the faith that a continuation of this progress would 
establish an era of peace and justice. Such exaltation of the authority 
of science creates a distorted picture which makes the actual solution 
of crucial problems more difficult. The problem which is created is one 
of seeing science in more adequate perspective, however, rather than 
foregoing the values of science because of the difficulties in placing 
it in proper perspective. 
Science has been an important contributor to the technological 
economic system which has concentrated power in a few hands without ef-
fective safeguards for its responsible use, and the rational outlook of 
science has not been unrelated to the concern for economic efficiency to 
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the detriment of the experience of workers. Against these practices 
the concept of the responsible society sets the fundamental demands of 
justice and responsible use of power. These problems are treated as 
problems within the context of a valuable or potentially valuable tech-
nological economy, however. Their significance is not minimized, but 
it is not assumed that they cannot be solved with relative satisfaction 
so that the basic economic situation should be rejected. 
Thus the New Delhi Assembly of the World Council of Churches ex-
pressed its awareness of these problems and its perspective for under-
standing them in the following statement: 
It is not good that man should be subdued by nature or 
enslaved by technology. Nor is it good that nature should 
be mastered by man, if the mastery merely feeds his rebel-
lious pride. But is ~ good that man should increase his 
knowledge and should use his growing mastery of nature for 
the benefit of mankind and the glory of God.l 
ii. Responsibility in the scientific quest 
Scientific effort is the source of both values and problems, and 
it is not to be rejected because of the problems for religious faith, 
for the understanding of the human predicament, and for justice in 
economic life, which have accompanied its growth. The basic question 
of this chapter remains, however, and must now be answered. Does the 
fact that the scientific quest is an integral part of modern culture 
and a significant source of values justify the scientist in pursuing his 
work in such a way that he also contributes to the development of weapons? 
1world Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, p. 97 (italics 
original). 
This is not the question of whether additional scientists are 
needed more today than workers in other fields. Whether or not that 
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may be true, the fact remains that much of the advancement of science 
in the United States today depends upon the sponsorship of applied re-
search by government agencies interested in weapons development. It is 
also true that fundamental scientific research continues to make, un-
avoidably, basic contributions to the development of weapons. Does the 
nature of science as a source of values justify the participation of the 
scientist in a process which necessarily takes this form? 
(1) The separation of moral categories.--The dilemma of the sci-
entist, seen in this light, is based on the dual effect that the exer-
cise of his abilities produces. The scientific ethos stresses respon-
sibility to the values discussed above and generally regards the effects 
on the development of weapons as unfortunate. This has led at times to 
the suggestion that scientists are responsible for science, which is a 
source of values, but that they do not have responsibility for the uses 
or misuses of the findings of science. Such a separation of moral cate-
gories, however, is in fundamental contradiction to the basic ethical 
thesis that the holders of power are responsible for its use to the 
people affected by it. The effects of science on the development of 
weapons cannot be ignored by the responsible scientist. To do so is 
what C. P. Snow has described as "one of the easier methods of letting 
the conscience rust."1 
(2) The division of responsibility.--The development and employ-
ment of weapons in the present age is an act of political bodies, and 
1 
Snow, p. 129. 
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the contribution of scientists is limited to a share in the development. 
Complex societies are always systems of interdependent relationships, 
and the concept of the responsible society accepts this as a basic fact. 
The concept seeks to overcome the abdication of moral responsibility 
which results from assigning responsibility to "society." But this 
does not mean that full responsibility for all the effects, throughout 
the society, of a particular development falls on a group which makes 
a partial contribution to that development. The network of interrela-
tionships cannot be thus ignored without the destruction of the coordi-
1 
nation essential to a functioning social system. 
Thus it is an expression of the goal of a responsible society if 
in an actual society special purpose groups advance the values relevant 
to the functions and, while cooperating in the efforts of other broadly 
based social institutions, allow these other institutions to carry pri-
mary responsibility for the effects of their actions. 2 The development 
and use of weapons is primarily the responsibility of political insti-
tutions, which must be adequate to handle the weapons in a responsible 
way. Where such political institutions exist, the scientists may pur-
sue the scientific quest, with its many values, as a responsible course 
of action even though their work is also a contribution to the develop-
ment of weapons. 
Thus in this chapter, as in the preceding one, the primacy of the 
responsibility of political institutions in the development and handling 
of weapons is stressed. In the previous chapter the emphasis was upon 
1 2 Barber, p. 228. Cahn, p. 88. 
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the responsibility of scientists to the community, as represented by 
the government. In this chapter the focus is on the realization of the 
values of the scientific quest, which is a responsible course if the 
political order includes institutions which can and will handle respon-
sibly the weapons which are developed. 
5. Limitations 
i. Political responsibility 
In the concrete world situation there are limitations on the ap-
plicability of this reasoning about responsible action. One of the most 
basic of these concerns the adequacy and responsibility of the political 
institutions to which responsibility is assigned. To the degree that 
these qualities are not found in the political institutions involved, 
the reasoning which justifies the scientist in his scientific search is 
not applicable. This fact calls for a critical evaluation in the diffi-
cult area of judging political institutions in the context of the inter-
national order. The phrase "the degree to which these qualities are not 
found" must not be allowed to obscure the instability of the international 
order under the threat of nuclear war. The patterns of action which are 
used in the political sphere in relation to the construction of a more 
stable order are open to considerable variation within the definition 
of responsibility. But in the areas which relate directly to the daily 
avoidance of nuclear war, there is little middle ground between success 
and failure. A political order which fails at this point is not ''ade-
quate and responsible." 
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The fourth chapter contains a discussion of the problem of eval-
uating the responsibility and adequacy of national governments, focus-
ing on the themes of legitimacy, competence, and responsibility to the 
ethical norm. These considerations are also applicable here. But the 
assignment of responsibility for the use of the ability of the scientist 
to political institutions requires the conviction that the political 
order can actually be successful in the responsible handling of the 
weapons involved. This requires a closer consideration of the inter-
national order. 
The prediction of the future course of international affairs must 
not only take into account the common interests and values of the great 
international powers, such as the avoidance of nuclear war, but also the 
antagonisms between them and the influence of other forces. With nuclear 
weapons poised in threat and counter-threat, a breakdown of the balance 
of deterrence· could result in inconceivable destruction. No scientific 
prediction of whether mutual terror and common values on cooperation 
will outweigh or survive the nuclear threat is possible. It is neces-
sary to make a judgment, but such judgments can inspire little confi-
dence. No real confidence in the stability of the international order 
can be held until the most dangerous military weapons are in the hands 
1 
of an institution which is responsible to all mankind. 
Whether participation in the development of weapons as a neces-
sary aspect of the scientific quest is a responsible approach is thus a 
question whose answer is poised upon a delicate judgment about the ability 
1Muelder, 278 79 pp. - . 
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of nations to move beyond the stage of potential nuclear destruction. 
ii. Preservation of values 
Another important limitation on the validity of this pattern of 
action stems from the fact that the introduction of new weapons devel-
oped through the scientific quest may undermine the values by which that 
quest is justified. The progress of scientific discovery has flourished 
under the relationship between science and government sponsorship in the 
United States. 1 As a result of this, the advancement of technology has 
also proceeded rapidly, since discoveries which are important for non-
military technology are released for ~ivilian use when their secrecy is 
no longer important for military reasons. In the area of cultural and 
intrinsic values, however, the secrecy and the nationalization of science 
which follow from its participation in weapons development are damaging 
to the basic values of the scientific quest. This is especially true 
with respect to the influence of science and the scientific community 
on universality of outlook and in the advancement of science as an inter-
national cooperative activity. 2 The efforts of scientists to bridge the 
gap caused by the nationalistic emphasis show that the basic scientific 
ethos is still active, but open and conscious cooperation is possible 
only on a limited scale. 
The threatened use of nuclear weapons may undermine these values 
in the broader society as well, reaching beyond the range of activities 
of the scientists. At New Delhi the Assembly of the World Council of 
Churches expressed concern that "the habit of thinking of persons as 
1 Bethe, p. 427. 2 Barber, p. 96. 
potential victims or potential destroyers in nuclear war will surely 
1 
reduce sensitivity to their worth." P. M. S. Blackett, a British 
168 
physicist, notes in addition that "once a nation pledges its safety to 
an absolute weapon, it becomes emotionally essential to believe in an 
2 
absolute enemy." Weapons are not the original cause of international 
antagonisms, but the nature of modern weapons is such that the weapons 
themselves may cause a decrease in human sensitivity and an increase in 
antagonism. If effects of this kind are too great, the basis in human 
values by which the scientific quest is justified will be undermined. 
6. Swmnary 
This chapter focuses on the thesis that the scientist is respon-
sible for the pursuit of science with its many attendant values, while 
the responsibility for the use of science in weapons development lies 
with the appropriate political institutions. The values issuing from 
the scientific quest are classified as intrinsic, cultural, and tech-
nological. The first group describes those experiences which are valued 
for their own sake. The values of increased intellectual understanding 
of the natural world, the moral values growing out of the discipline of 
effective research and out of cooperation in the scientific community, 
and the aesthetic values of scientific discovery and the study of sci-
entific principles of relationship are important intrinsic values. Per-
sons who approach natural science from the perspective of Christian 
lworld Council of Churches, The New Delhi Report, p. 97. 
2 P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of war (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1962), p. 94. 
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theology may also find it a source of religious values. 
The scientific quest is also an important cultural force, with 
the result that its basic value presuppositions are projected into the 
culture in which it exists, forming or sustaining the values of that 
culture. Of course, the basic value structure of the culture exerts 
its influence on the practice of science, sustaining or forming the sci-
entific quest as well. The basic values of the scientific quest, which 
exert a broad force in many contemporary cultures, include the widespread 
application of rationality in thought, in contrast with emotional or 
ideological bias. Universalism, in the sense that all valid contribu-
tions are accepted regardless of the race or nationality of their orig-
inators, is another important value, as is the sense of cooperative com-
munity that prevails internationally among scientists working in a common 
scientific effort. The stress on the responsibility of the individual 
investigator, and the pressure exerted by scientists for operating free-
dom and the recognition of the need for the independence of science from 
authoritarian control, both have broad cultural significance, as does 
the confident response of scientists to the challenge of understanding 
the natural world. 
The values of technology are instrumental in solving basic prob-
lems of human welfare and allowing men to live on a level sufficiently 
above the plane of subsistence that other value experiences are open 'to 
them. The advancement of modern technology depends heavily on the ad-
vancement of modern science. 
The important relationship between the values of the scientific 
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quest and the process of weapons development is seen in the fact that a 
large share of scientific research in the United States is sponsored by 
government agencies concerned with the development of weapons. Most of 
the work done in government research laboratories, toggther with roughly 
half the research and development done by industrial firms, a signifi-
cant share of university research work, and nearly all the work done in 
laboratories sponsored by the government and managed by universities, 
is sponsored by the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. To this must be 
added the fact that fundamental scientific research, regardless of its 
sponsorship, can be expected to have results which are useful in the 
development of weapons. Some of these results may be suspected before-
hand, but they cannot be avoided without discontinuing research in the 
fields involved. Thus, if the scientific quest is to be vigorously pur-
sued, it must continue to make important contributions to weapons devel-
opment. 
Is it then possible to say that the scientist is responsible for 
the realization of the many values growing out of the scientific quest, 
but not for the problems generated by weapons development? The values 
of the scientific quest are taken seriously in the concept of the re-
sponsible society. The idea that scientists have no responsibility to 
take account of the "misuse" of their findings is not acceptable, how-
ever; the scientist must use his ability in responsibility to the per-
sons affected by it. It is possible, however, to hold that the primary 
responsibility for weapons development falls on the political institutions 
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which sponsor it. If the political institutions are adequate and re-
sponsible in their handling of weapons, the scientist is free to devote 
himself to the scientific quest as his primary responsibility. 
Clearly the question of the adequacy and responsibility of exist-
ing political institutions is a crucial one for this approach to respon-
sible action by the scientist. If such institutions do not exist, the 
validity of this approach is limited or negated. An evaluation of polit-
ical institutions is needed which considers not only their intentions 
and the soundness of their approaches, but also their possibilities for 
success in such matters as avoiding large-scale nuclear war. It is not 
possible to have complete, justified confidence in such an evaluation 
in the contemporary world, so that the validity of the approach in this 
chapter is poised on a very delicate judgment. 
Another important limitation on this pattern of action is the 
possibility that the existence and continued development of advanced 
weapons may contribute to international antagonism to such a degree that 
many of the cultural values of the scientific quest are undermined. 
This would in turn undermine much of the justification of the scientific 
effort. 
In the next chapter the third pattern of responsible action will 
be discussed. This pattern stresses the responsibility of the scientist 
to base his response to the question of participation in weapons devel-
opment on an independent evaluation of the responsibility of the govern-
ment's policies. 
CHAPTER VI 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDEPENDENT EVALUATION 
1. Introduction 
The third pattern of responsibility will be discussed in this 
chapter. In the previous two chapters, the responsibility of the sci-
entist to cooperate in programs defined by the government or by the 
scientific ethos was considered. It was found that each of these ap-
proaches could be considered a responsible course of action, provided 
that certain limitations were not exceeded. The third pattern of re-
sponsibility requires the scientist to make an independent evaluation 
of the ethical validity of the various definitions of responsible pol-
icy in the development and handling of weapons. He need not necessarily 
create an original definition, although he may. But he must consider 
the ideas that have been offered regarding the problem of modern mili-
tary weapons and decide for himself in what way the problem is respon-
sibly approached. His personal decision regarding participation in the 
government's program of weapons development will follow from this eval-
uation. 
Whether the scientist follows this third pattern of responsible 
action or whether he chooses one from the previous two chapters, it is 
necessary for him to make an independent judgment in deciding whether 
the limitations on the validity of each of the three patterns have been 
exceeded. Thus it is necessary for the responsible individual scientist 
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to make some use of independent analysis in any case. This chapter 
will discuss the ethical necessity for independent evaluation, the re-
sulting patterns of action, and the limitations on this approach. 
First, however, it will be necessary to clarify further the relationship 
between independent analysis and individual responsibility. 
2. Individual Responsibility and 
Independent Evaluation 
This section will consider the way in which ethical responsibil-
ity falls to the individual scientist, the various patterns of evaluation 
which he must consider, and the place of independent evaluation among the 
patterns of individual responsibility. 
i. The individual dimension of responsibility 
(1) The active unit of decision.--Important decisions of social 
policy are frequently made through the process of group decision. A 
responsible government does not forget that the group which it serves 
is composed of individuals, but on basic questions of policy it must 
treat the concerns of individuals in their relationship as parts of the 
concern of the group. In this context the individual may express his 
responsible judgment, but the policy decision will necessarily arise 
out of the interplay of many personal judgments. 
When the issue is that of personal participation in a program 
defined by the government, however, the active unit of decision is the 
individual rather than the group. The group elects government officers, 
but the individual decides whether he will cast his vote, and how. The 
government determines a policy on weapons development, but the individual 
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scientist must decide whether or not he will participate in the scien-
tific work called for by that policy, and why. This is especially clear 
in nations like the United States, where the scientist may choose em-
ployment on one or more of a wide variety of projects that are open to 
him. There is in this country no conscription of scientists for ser-
vice in a national scientific force, and therefore the issue of civil 
disobedience does not arise. Likewise, there are no professional sci-
entific societies which can direct their members to work on various 
projects and back their directions with disciplinary authority. 
Even where coercion is applied to produce individual participa-
tion, however, the individual still must make the decision of whether 
to comply or to resist. However tacitly it may be done, the decision 
of participation is always made by the person himself. 
(2) The requirement of responsibility.--The basis for the respon-
sibility of the scientist for participation in weapons development has 
been discussed previously. The ability of the scientist to contribute 
to the development of weapons constitutes social power. The combina-
tion of this power with the option of the individual as to the use he 
will make of his ability places upon him the responsibility for the use 
of this power. The concept of the responsible society requires that 
power be handled in responsibility to God and to the people who are af-
fected by it. 
The ecumenical discussions have sought to develop some general 
standards for the responsible handling of power. They have recognized 
the broad authority of the state which is commensurate with its wide 
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range of power and responsibility. But the existence of units which 
rightfully limit the authority of the state is also recognized, and 
among these is the individual. The individual is not to challenge the 
authority of the state capriciously, but he has the inherent right and 
duty to follow the demands of his own conscience. 1 Although the issue 
of the participation of the scientist seldom involves, in this country, 
a direct challenge to the authority of the state, it is clear that the 
responsibilities of the individual have a broader reference than that 
of cooperation with government policy alone. 
The fulfillment of these responsibilities requires careful con-
sideration of the effects that the use of the scientist's power may have, 
in the light of the ethical norm and in the context of a complex pattern 
2 
of social interaction. Each of the patterns of responsibility under 
consideration here implies a mode of evaluation of analyses of these 
effects. These ways of evaluation must now be discussed. 
ii. Patterns of evaluation 
(1) Responsibility to government policy.--In the first pattern 
of responsibility discussed, the scientist participates in weapons devel-
opment in accordance with the request of the government, since the gov-
ernment is the agent of the community with responsibility for foreign 
affairs. The responsible officers of the government evaluate various 
opinions about the conduct of foreign affairs and the place of the de-
velopment and use of military weapons in that conduct. Ideally, they 
1Dickinson, pp. 309-11. ~uelder, p. 16. 
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select as government policy the course of action which their evaluation 
finds to be most responsible. 
The scientist, in deciding about his own participation, follows 
a different pattern of evaluation. He does not pass judgment directly 
upon the wisdom of the policy of the government. If he makes a respon-
sible decision to follow the government, he must make two evaluations. 
First, he must evaluate the argument of the fourth chapter, which con-
siders the role of the government in the development of weapons. Then 
he must analyze the nature of the government, including whether it is 
responsible in the handling of weapons. He does at this point evaluate 
government policy necessarily, but the question he must ask is not 
whether the policy of the government is the wisest one but whether it 
falls within the limits of certain standards of international respon-
sibility. Within these limits, described in the fourth chapter, the 
policy is acceptable to the scientist because it is the policy of the 
responsible agency. 
(2) The values of science.--The scientist who participates in the 
development of weapons as a means of advancement of the scientific quest 
also does not directly judge the wisdom of the policy of weapons develop-
ment. He evaluates the argument that the scientific quest is an impor-
tant source of values and that he is justified in taking responsibility 
for these values and leaving the problem of weapons for the concern of 
political institutions. To this he must add an analysis of the politi-
cal order, including the policies regarding weapons, to assure himself 
that political institutions are taking appropriate responsibility and 
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that the values he serves will not be destroyed directly by large-scale 
weapons or indirectly by the political and cultural effects of the 
presence of these weapons. If the state of political affairs allows 
such assurance, the scientist can proceed with his work on weapons proj-
ects without evaluating the policy of weapons development to see that it 
is the most responsible one available. 
(3) Independent evaluation.--The scientist who takes responsibil-
ity for an independent evaluation of the government's weapons policy and 
of the other available policy proposals seeks to go directly to the 
heart of the problem. He is concerned first of all for the problem of 
the weapons themselves and the manner in which they are to be employed. 
The question of the right of the government to determine policy is held 
to be secondary to the question of the moral validity of the policy it-
self. Similarly, the question of the development and handling of 
weapons is considered to be so crucial that the problem of the rate of 
advancement of the scientific quest takes a secondary place in the order 
of analysis. 
Thus he asks directly what policy in the handling of weapons most 
nearly meets the demands of the norm of the responsible society. He 
himself is responsible for the final decision as to which policy seems 
most acceptable. The policy so chosen then stands as a moral claim be-
fore the scientist, as one who holds power to influence the development 
and use of weapons. He must determine the question of his own partici-
pation accordingly. 
An example of this kind of independent evaluation is found in 
the writings of the German physicist, Max Born: 
I have spoken my mind often enough: that I consider the 
use of weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, 
atomic) to be criminal; that I do not believe in the theory 
of the deterrent, as the execution of the threat would mean 
suicide; that war as a means of settling political disputes 
has become useless because it would with great probability 
lead to the use of these weapons of mass murder, and there-
fore to the extinction of mankind; that the idea of the de-
fence of the realm has become equally senseless; and that 
all this has to be dinned into people until they understand 
it and force their governments to act accordingly.! 
iii. Patterns of responsibility 
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(1) Individuality.--The distinction between individual responsibil-
ity and independent evaluation can now be made clear. All of the three 
patterns of responsible action, each with its corresponding mode of eval-
uation of policy, are possible forms of individual responsibility in re-
lation to weapons development. The fact that the policy followed is one 
determined by a group in no way precludes the possibility that the indi-
vidual who cooperates with it may be exercising a high form of respon-
sibility. The requirement that power be used in responsibility to the 
people affected by it makes it clear that individual responsibility must 
frequently be coordinated with group decision. 
(2) Independence.--The pattern which stresses independent evalua-
tion is thus one of the possible forms of individual responsibility. It 
is distinguished from other forms not by the conviction that the indi-
vidual is responsible for the use made of his influence; this conviction 
is common to all of the forms. The distinguishing characteristic is 
~x Born, Physics and Politics (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1962), pp. 64-65. 
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the definition of personal responsibility to include the fact that the 
decision regarding participation is to be made on the basis of a direct 
evaluation of the policies regarding the use of the weapons to be devel-
oped, in the context of the international situation. The scientist must 
himself come to a decision regarding the policies that ought to be fol-
lowed by nations. He is not responsible, as a natural rather than a 
political scientist, for the design of original policy proposals. But 
as a moral person he must consider the consequences of the effort in 
which he is asked to participate. 
The course of action which he must then take follows from the 
relationship of his decision regarding weapons policies to the policy 
which is being followed by the government which has asked him to par-
ticipate in weapons development. It will be necessary to investigate 
the bases on which action based on independent evaluation is declared 
to be a responsible course. 
3. The Necessity of Independent Evaluation 
Independent evaluation of policies regarding the development and 
use of military weapons may produce a wide range of decisions. It is 
therefore not possible in a discussion of this kind to consider the ques-
tions raised by all of the possible alternatives. Action based on in-
dependent evaluation is not a single approach but a general class of 
methods. The fundamental characteristics of the class are all that can 
be considered here. 
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i. Direct relevance of the ethical norm 
(1) The crucial character of the problem of weapons.--One of the 
most important characteristics of the approach based on independent 
evaluation is its direct concentration on policies concerning weapons. 
The approaches in the fourth and fifth chapters focus first on patterns 
of responsibility of the person to the group or of the person to the 
realization of certain values which are incidental to the development 
of weapons. This, however, places only secondary emphasis on the prob-
lems created by the weapons themselves. 
In the quotation just cited, Max Born spoke of "the extinction 
of mankind" as the result of the use of modern military weapons of mass 
destruction in actual war. Some have felt that this is an overstatement 
of the actual potential effects of full-scale modern warfare. It cannot 
be denied, however, that modern nuclear weapons make possible the essen-
tial destruction of the structure and population of the great cities 
which are central to nations with well-developed economies. The major 
cities of the United States, Britain, Europe, and the Soviet Union might 
all be destroyed in a single outburst of warfare. The population out-
side of the cities might survive physically, at least in part, but the 
1 
social fabric on which they depend would also have been destroyed. 
Great political and economic problems would confront nations in the 
parts of the world not directly subjected to nuclear explosion, and all 
survivors would be affected by a significant increase in general back-
1Gerard Piel, "The Illusion of Civil Defense," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (February, 1962), 2-8. (This issue carries the 
erroneous volume number 17.) 
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ground radiation. 
Some, without denying the destructive nature of nuclear war, have 
taken the view that the very threat of such destruction will force 
nations to do away with war as a means of settling international dis-
putes. Whether or not this hope will prove to have been justified, it 
further illustrates the argument of this section--that the problem of 
the development and use of modern military weapons constitutes a crucial 
problem for contemporary civilization. It is a problem of immediate 
concern, for essentially no other values are secure if these weapons 
are not kept under control. 
(2) Direct use of the ethical n~~.--The crucial nature of the 
problem of weapons requires that the scientist begin here in his use of 
the concept of the responsible society. The question of the relation-
ship of his scientific work to the development of weapons must take 
precedence over its relationship to community decision or to the values 
of the scientific quest. To base his analysis primarily on these sec-
ondary considerations could lead to a course of action which is contrary 
or irrelevant to the ethical demands of the most crucial problem. 
Thus the ethical norm must be applied to the evaluation of pol-
icies for the development and use of weapons. To fail to apply it 
directly involves the risk of being a participant in or a contributor 
to serious irresponsible actions because of the use of an inadequate 
definition of responsibility. 
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ii. Responsibility to mankind 
(1) The wide influence of modern weapons.--The widespread power 
of physical and social destruction possessed by modern weapons was dis-
cussed in the previous section. It is important to note the way in 
which this power stands over all mankind. Nations possessing nuclear 
weapons and the means of their delivery confront each other constantly 
with the threat of mutual destruction. Although they perceive each 
other as enemies, such nations hold the fate of their enemies constantly 
in their own hands. Other nations with advanced economies do not pos-
sess the capacity to inflict extensive nuclear destruction but are 
closely aligned with nations that do and share the same danger of attack. 
Nations with less advanced economies and military establishments, 
often geographically remote from the major nuclear powers, may be in less 
danger of direct nuclear destruction. They do live under the threat of 
having the social and economic system of an interdependent world torn 
and destroyed by nuclear warfare. They also live in a world which is 
polarized by the antagonisms between the great nuclear powers. The 
roots of this antagonism precede the development of nuclear weapons, 
but the weapons contribute to the basic instability of the political 
situation. One of the consequences of this for the less economically 
advanced nations is the willingness of the great powers to sponsor or 
support military contests between the less advanced nations, or within 
them, along lines of antagonism parallel to those between the great 
powers. In this way, tests of military strength and determination in-
directly involving the great powers can be made with less danger of 
direct nuclear warfare. The presence of military bases belonging to the 
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great powers in some of the economically less advanced countries also 
involves them more directly in the dangers of warfare between the nations 
with great nuclear destructive capabilities. 
Beyond the possibilities of active military engagement, the simple 
threat of such engagement with large-scale nuclear weapons has become a 
fundamental fact in the lives of all men. The basic anxiety stemming 
from the constant possibility of immediate nuclear destruction has per-
vaded the minds of millions of persons who are aware of the danger. The 
international enmities which are the basis of the nuclear threat may be 
sharpened in turn by the fear and hatred generated by awareness of that 
threat. At the same time, the threat of nuclear destruction has raised 
the fundamental issue of war and peace in a new way, stressing as alter-
natives peace or mutual destruction. 
The widespread and pervasive influence of modern military weapons 
is further emphasized by the presence in the earth and the atmosphere 
of radioactive products of the testing of nuclear weapons, increasing 
the level of radiation to which persons are exposed, with a resulting 
increase in physical defects which are both genetic and somatic in 
nature. 
(2) The extent of responsibility.--The way in which modern mil-
itary weapons affect the lives of all men indicates clearly that the 
scientist has a direct responsibility to consider the fate of all men 
when deciding the question of participation in weapons development. It 
can be argued that moral responsibility is greatest in the area in which 
a man is most directly involved, such as his own nation. His influence 
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is generally greatest and most obvious in such a context. But the char-
acter of modern weapons is such that their developers exert a direct in-
fluence on men all over the world. Nations own and control the weapons, 
but the character of the weapons 'themselves influences the context in 
which persons and nations live. If such weapons as climate control are 
developed in the future, this effect will be extended even further. 
The knowledge of how to build weapons, once developed, is rela-
tively permanent. The political units which control the weapons are 
subject to great variation in time. Thus the nature of the responsible 
political units, with resulting consequences for the handling of weapons, 
is difficult to predict, while the potential dangers of the weapons are 
not hard to see. Thus the scientist can be more certain of the dangers 
to which he may contribute and of their reality for all men than he can 
of the ability of political institutions to prevent these dangers from 
becoming realized. This difficulty is further compounded by the fact 
that national governments, even though they may be influenced by a 
sense of responsibility for mankind and a sense of the common fate of 
men in an interdependent world order, have direct organizational respon-
1 
sibility primarily to the people of their own nations. When a conflict 
between national interest and the interests of mankind as a whole arises, 
it is difficult not to favor the former even at some risk to the latter. 
The wide influence of modern weapons, which tends to transcend 
the ability of nations to control them in the present context of national 
sovereignties, requires that the scientist determine the question of his 
1Ernest Lefever, Ethics and United States Foreign Policy (New 
York: Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 12-16. 
185 
participation in weapons development on the basis of explicit respon-
sibility to all men. 1 This requires independent evaluation of policies 
of weapons development according to this criterion. 
iii. The need for an independent witness 
(1) The importance of continued debate.--The question of appropri-
ate national policy regarding the development and use of weapons is not 
easily settled. The same thing is true of the relationship of the indi-
vidual to the national policy. The social situation in which these 
questions must be decided.does not contain a coherent pattern of ethical 
responsibility and power. There are alternate valid patterns of respon-
sible action based on differing criteria of responsibility which are not 
easily coordinated. The primary units of social power with respect to 
weapons, the national governments, are limited both in their ability to 
control the effects of the weapons and in the responsibility they ac-
knowledge to the people affected by them. 
In this context, policy decisions must be worked out after ex-
tended study and debate and must be continuously reviewed and revised 
according to new developments and new insights. Thus a government which 
is responsible to the community it serves will engage in continual dia-
logue with persons and interests within the community, seeking the man-
date of the community for its policies and changing policies according 
to the demands of the situation and the changes in community concern. 
The question of policy is a continuous one, not one which can be decided 
1Kathleen Lonsdale, "The Ethical Problems of Scientists," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 7 (August, 1951), 204. 
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and carried on without further question. Unless there is continued de-
bate, a government cannot be responsible either to the community whose 
agent it is or to the other nations and peoples whose life it influences. 
(2) The function of independent witness.--The scientist who de-
cides about his own participation in government-sponsored programs of 
weapons development on the basis of independent evaluation of weapons 
policy may contribute to this debate by his decision as well as through 
the standard channels of political expression. This is particularly 
true if his evaluation leads him to take a course of action which is 
sharply distinguished from that implied by the prevailing policy of the 
government. A bold stand by an individual or minority group can have an 
important effect on the course of official policy in the future. The 
responsibility of the scientist to contribute to the debate leading to 
the formation of weapons policies, because of his special ability to 
understand the weapons involved, was emphasized in the fourth chapter. 
Here it is seen that his response to the question of participation in 
weapons development may itself be a vital contribution to the policy de-
bate, both in its direct effect on government planning and in its wit-
ness to the community which must make the basic decisions on which the 
government bases its policy. 
This effect can take place in several ways. It may call attention 
to the responsibility and wisdom of an alternate policy, leading others 
to support the alternate way and thus forming a new majority. Or it may 
be that the participation of one or a few persons is sufficiently impor-
tant to the government's program that their stand by itself brings great 
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pressure on the government for a change in policy. Robert Jungk quotes 
Werner Heisenberg as saying that in 1939 the agreement of twelve scien-
tists would have been sufficient to prevent the development of the atomic 
1 bomb both in Germany and in the United States. As seen in the fourth 
chapter, such an approach runs directly counter to the pattern of respon-
sible action based on the fact that the government is the responsible 
agent of the community with responsibility in foreign affairs. On the 
other hand, it is the argument of this chapter that the individual has 
the right to decline cooperation with the state if he is convinced that 
such a course is morally unacceptable. The point to be made in this 
paragraph is that by so declining, the scientist may also help to bring 
pressure on the government to adopt a policy more nearly in conformity 
with the one selected by his independent analysis. 
It may also be that the scientist is not alone in the conclusion 
reached by his independent analysis. In this case, which would not be 
unusual, the social force of his decision on participation in weapons 
development may combine with the efforts of other persons and groups in 
the community to influence policy. It is also possible that there will 
be no change in government policy as a result of the positions taken by 
scientists regarding participation in the development of weapons. Even 
where this is true, the witness of those whose course of action contrasts 
strongly with government policy may serve as a constant criticism of 
government action, serving the basic function of emphasizing in the con-
tinuing debate the importance of questions of responsibility which might 
1Jungk, p. 81. 
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otherwise tend to be submerged. 
The social witness of the scientist who determines the question 
of participation by independent analysis of the problem of weapons pol-
icy is a force in support of responsible policy which would be lost if 
responsibility to the community obscured the responsibility to independ-
ent evaluation. 
4. Resulting Patterns of Action 
The approaches which the scientist may take toward participation 
in weapons development must now be considered. Four general approaches 
to participation, following from the type of evaluation of government 
weapons policy which is made, will be discussed. This will be followed 
by a discussion of the relationship of individual decision and partici-
pation to the groups of scientists who are concerned about this problem. 
i. The question of participation 
(1) Agreement and participation.--One of the most obvious patterns 
is participation in weapons development at the request of the government 
on the basis of an evaluation which finds the policy of the government 
to be essentially sound, if not the best available. Frederick Seitz 
offers such an evaluation, noting that military research is necessary 
for the defense of Western culture, which is the locus of such important 
ideals as freedom of thought and investigation. He holds that increased 
military strength in the Western nations will allow more alternatives in 
the effort to counter the efforts of the Soviet Union and to develop the 
context of peace. Thus he urges scientists to give increased attention 
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to scientific research of military significance. 1 
Apparently this approach has been taken by many scientists in 
the United States during and since World War II, as well as in the period 
before that time. Many who have participated have done so on the basis 
of commitment to community decision or to the values of the scientific 
quest, or simply in uncritical acceptance of national goals or of the 
opportunity for scientific employment. Others, however, have made inde-
pendent evaluations of weapons policies and have decided that partici-
pation was the most responsible course. Hans Bethe declined the invita-
tion of Edward Teller to join in the project to develop the hydrogen 
bomb, making the independent evaluation that such a policy facilitated 
unacceptable destruction. After the outbreak of the conflict in Korea, 
however, he reversed his stand and participated in the project, feeling 
that the situation demanded the performance of the research necessary to 
develop the bomb in the United States if that development proved pos-
sible. 2 He continued to cherish the hope that it would not be possible. 
(2) Leading the government.--In instances where the government 
has not yet formulated a policy regarding the development of a particular 
weapon, scientists may take the lead in urging the development of such 
a weapon. Often this may be a question of direct participation in 
weapons development, as well as the normal process of advising the gov-
ernment. This is true not only because the scientist taking the lead 
in urging the government may also join in the development project when 
1F~;ederick Seitz, "Physicists and the Cold War," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 6 (March, 1950), 86-87. 
2Jungk, pp. 276-81, 291. 
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the government sponsors it, but because he may perform research on the 
project in advance of government decision, to show its feasibility. 
Such a course would follow from an evaluation which indicated that such 
a weapon should be developed by the government in the interest of inter-
national responsibility. 
The beginning of the atomic bomb project in the United States 
during World War II; as discussed in the second chapter, is an example 
of this kind of participation. When it became clear that a nuclear 
chain reaction might be possible, scientists pressed the research for-
ward and at the same time sought to convince the United States govern-
ment that it should sponsor further development. Both American scien-
tists and recent refugees from the Nazi expansion in Europe joined in 
this work, motivated by the common evaluation that the project was nee-
essary to prevent Hitler from emerging as the sole possessor of the 
atomic bomb. 
With the highly developed weapons research program which the 
United States possesses today, few important weapons projects are likely 
to originate in private research and be taken up by the government only 
after urging by scientists outside of the government. Scientists in-
valved in government work, in government laboratories or other government-
sponsored research, may continue to urge the selection of particular 
projects. The efforts of Edward Teller and others to promote the devel-
1 
opment of the hydrogen bomb show the possibility of this approach. 
Much of the responsibility for leadership in this area now falls on 
1oupre/and Lakoff, pp. 115-16. 
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"scientist-statesmen" who hold either full-time or consulting positions 
with the government and are committed to the general position that con-
tinued development of weapons by the government is a responsible policy. 
They employ their scientific abilities both in deciding which projects 
should be sponsored and in guiding the development of the projects and 
are always concerned about new developments in scie~ce that can lead to 
new developments in weapons. Such an ~pproach may be based on an inde-
pendent evaluation of weapons policies, but it may equally well spring 
from other lines of analysis, such as response to a government policy 
of maximizing military strength. 
(3) Refusal to participate.--An independent evaluation of weapons 
policies may lead to the conclusion that the policy of the government 
is sufficiently irresponsible that the scientist should not participate 
in it. He may then decline to use his ability to support such a policy. 
Cuthbert Daniel and Arthur M. Squires have suggested that scientists, 
after discussing the matter among themselves, determine whether the con-
sequences of a given research project are likely to be evil. If they 
are found to be so, the scientists should refuse to engage in that re-
search. A list of research topics could be developed on which the civ-
ilized scientist would not work. Since modern weapons are developed 
only after intensive group effort, such an approach would make funda-
mental research harmless or constructive, with the assurance that a 
group of workers would not be available to apply fundamental principles 
in destructive ways. This approach is related to the current government 
policy with the suggestion that American scientists, by non-participation, 
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could take the lead in ending the arms race, since Soviet scientists do 
1 
not have the freedom to act in this way. 
Various scientists, including some of outstanding ability, have 
declined to participate in weapons development. In 1947 Norbert Wiener, 
who had participated in the development of guided missiles, declared, 
"I do not expect to publish any future works of mine which may do damage 
. 2 
in the hands of irresponsible militarists." Wiener had concluded, in 
the light of the experience of World War II, that United States policy 
made the employment of highly destructive weapons too likely in the 
event of conflict. Albert Einstein, who also declined to participate 
in .weapons development, commented on Wiener's stand with the observation 
that "a similar attitude on the part of all the prominent scientists in 
this country would contribute much toward solving the urgent problem of 
3 international security." 
In West Germany in 1957 eighteen scientists joined in a declara-
tion of unwillingness to participate in the development of atomic weapons. 
This stand was taken in response to the announcement that the West German 
army was expected to acquire nuclear weapons. The declaration observed 
that tactical nuclear weapons have effects similar to those of the atomic 
bombs dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The scientists stated that 
the fear of nuclear warfare with hydrogen bombs did at the present time 
serve to enforce peace, but that such an approach to peace is unreliable 
in the long run, and the danger of the breakdown of the system is deadly. 
1cuthbert Daniel and Arthur M. Squires, "Freedom Demands Respon-
sibility," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 300-302. 
2wiener, p. 46. 3Einstein, p. 401. 
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Their refusal to take part in atomic weapons development in Germany was 
based on a~ analysis of the relationship of such a policy in West Ger-
many to the practices of the great powers and the general state of in-
ternational relations. 
We think that today a small country such as the Federal 
Republic can protect itself best and promote world peace by 
renouncing explicitly and voluntarily the possession of 
atomic weapons of any kind. Be that as it may, none of the 
undersigned would be ready in any way to take part in the 
production, the tests, or the application of atomic weapons.l 
The list of eighteen signers included Max Born, Otto Hahn, Werner 
Heisenberg, Max von Laue, Fritz Strassman, and Karl Friedrich von Weiz-
sHcker. The first four of these are winners of the Nobel Prize in phys-
ics, and Hahn and Strassman are generally credited with the discovery 
of uranium fission. Heisenberg and von WeizsUcker were both leaders in 
the atomic bomb project in Germany during World War II. 
The government of West Germany was openly critical of the state-
ment of the scientists, but there was an expression of public sympathy 
with their stand. Later, government officials met with the signers of 
the statement and a joint message was issued which acknowledged the right 
of the scientists to decline to participate and which stated that the 
government would not ask them to work on atomic weapons. 2 The witness 
of the scientists in this case had to be taken seriously by the govern-
ment in its planning for the acquisition of weapons, and the action 
stands as a clear case of leadership in public debate • 
. 
1
"Declaration of the German Nuclear Physicists," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 13 (June, 1957), 228. 
2sSRS Newsletter (Society for Social Responsibility in Science), 
No. 60 (April, 1957) and No. 61 (May, 1957). 
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In 1948 the French Association of Scientific Workers invited all 
scientists to join in a collective refusal to work on research in biol-
ogy if the results of the work would not normally be published. The ap-
parent cause for concern was the development of methods of biological 
warfare and the antidotes for biological attack, if the latter are not 
. 1 to be made publ1c. 
Reports from the Soviet Union indicate that Peter Kapitza (or 
Kapitsa), Director of the Institute for Physical Problems in Moscow, 
refused to engage in nuclear weapons research. As a result, he was kept 
under house arrest for seven years until the death of Josef Stalin, when 
he was returned to his post. It is not clear, however, whether he ob-
jected to the government policy regarding the employment of weapons or 
2 to some other aspect of the government's request. 
(4) Conditional participation.--!£ the scientist finds the gov-
ernment policy on weapons development and use unacceptable, he may agree 
to participate provided conditions are met which make the program more 
acceptable in terms of his independent evaluation. The amount of pres-
sure which could be brought on a government in this way would depend on 
the degree of urgency with which the government regarded the program and 
the importance of the scientist to the program. 
The history of the development of the atomic bomb provides an ex-
ample of the influence that scientists can have, although the disputed 
question was one of freedom in science and not of weapons development 
1French Association of Scientific Workers, "French A. Sc. W. 
Statement," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 309-10. 
2
science, 124 (August 24, 1956), 361. 
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and use. The laboratory at Los Alamos was to be set up as a military 
post, with the scientific and engineering staff members as commissioned 
officers. However, Robert F. Bacher and I. I. Rabi, physicists then 
working on other weapons projects at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, declined to come to Los Alamos under the military organization. 
Their assistance was considered important enough, especially in view of 
the sense of solidarity which would probably prevent other scientists 
from coming if Bacher and Rabi declined, that the organization was 
changed. The scientists were allowed to remain civilians up until the 
time the testing of the bomb began. Rabi served as a consultant to the 
prog~ct, and Bacher accepted a position at the laboratory, submitting 
in advance his resignation as of the day when military organization was 
invoked. 1 
The objection which Rabi and Bacher raised was that the order of 
ranks and general rigidity of military organization would prevent sound 
scientific work, which does not allow deference to authority in scien-
tific thought. The operation of the laboratory by general military con-
trol, but with the scientists as civilians, was so successful that the 
order to bring full military organization was never given. Where the 
issue is the general weapons policy of the government, such questions 
as participation by the scientist provided that the government agrees 
in advance not to use the weapon in attack, or against civilians, or to 
deliberately raise the level of radioactivity, might arise. It seems 
probable that scientists would need to be able to place very heavy pres-
1Hewlett and Anderson, pp. 231-32. 
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sure on governments by declining to participate if any such fundamental 
conditions are to be met, however. It is also not likely that a govern-
ment would or could consider itself permanently bound by any such prom-
ises. 
The discussion of various patterns of action based on an inde-
pendent analysis of weapons policies raises the question of action by 
groups of scientists. The individual scientist's response in the con-
text of scientific groups will be discussed next. 
ii. Participation and the scientific society 
The theme of this chapter is the responsibility of the individual 
scientist for an independent evaluation of weapons development policies. 
It may be, however, that an evaluation is shared by a number of scien-
tists, so that group action in terms of participation in weapons develop-
ment is possible. The German scientists mentioned above joined together 
to make their witness to the public and the pressure of their refusal 
on the government more effective. This section will discuss the use of 
the group approach to participation based on independent evaluation in 
the United States. 
(1) Professional societies.--Professional societies in American 
science include both specialized groups whose interest is focused on a 
single scientific discipline and larger interdisciplinary groups, such 
as the Society of the Sigma Chi and the American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science. Most scientists belong to one or more of the 
smaller groups and are frequently related to one of the more general 
organizations. The American Association for the Advancement of Science 
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now has 72,000 individual members and 298 affiliated individual soci-
eties. The individual specialized groups are generally concerned with 
the advancement of the work of their disciplines, especially with the 
communication of information on research findings and with some loose 
coordination of efforts. Occasionally they have asked questions of the 
relationship of their work and their interests to those of science as a 
whole, or to the broader questions of social concern. The general, in-
terdisciplinary societies are concerned with a loose coordination of 
science as a whole and with its relationship to the larger society. 1 
This has long included a concern for a social situation conducive to 
the advancement of the scientific quest. With such developments as the 
formation of .the Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare 
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, this concern 
has been extended to questions of the responsibility of science to the 
larger society. The committee has taken note of the problems created by 
weapons, along with others, in calling for scientific research purpose-
fully directed toward the acquisition of information needed in the future 
to insure the possibility of responsible handling of the power provided 
by science. 2 
The scientific professional societies have not, however, con-
sidered the problem of participation in weapons development to be a part 
of their concern as groups. This is not to say that many of their mem-
bers have not been concerned about this question, but rather that these 
1Barber, pp. 116-18. 
2cowen, "The Sciences and Society," p. 1. 
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persons have generally raised the question among scientists in other 
contexts. It should also be noted that scientific professional societies 
differ from some other professional groups in that they do not have sig-
nificant disciplinary authority over their members. Thus they could not 
enforce, by any official action, conformity with any standard of behavior 
that might be adopted. 
(2) The Society for Social Responsibility in Science.--In addition 
to the scientific professional societies, there are several groups of 
scientists whose primary concern is the social influence of scientific 
developments and the responsible use of the power of the scientist. 
These groups have sought to influence government policy regarding weapons 
development; they have educated the public about the problems posed by 
scientific developments and the government's use of them, and they have 
struggled against such barriers as secrecy regulations in government re-
1 
search and security clearance practices for scientific workers. One of 
the groups has given primary attention to the problem of the participa-
tion of the scientist in weapons research; this is the Society for 
Social Responsibility in Science. 
The Society was founded in 1949; in each issue of its monthly 
newsletter it describes itself as 
an organization of scientists and engineers whose purpose 
is to induce scientists to recognize a personal responsibil-
ity for the anticipated consequences to society of their work 
and to exercise their profession always for the benefit of 
humanity.2 
1Grobstein, p. 246. 
2ssRS Newsletter, No. 125 (January, 1963). 
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This statement is an expression of the conviction of the members of the 
Society that the scientist should always use his abilities for construe-
tive purposes and never for destructive ones. The distinction between 
constructive activities and destructive ones has not been easy to define, 
and the Society leaves it up to each member to make his personal decision. 
Direct participation in the development of weapons of mass destruction 
would almost certainly be defined as destructive work by the members of 
the Society; in other work the decision has been found more difficult. 
The Society has sought to influence government policy in a manner 
similar to the efforts of some of the other organizations of scientists. 
For example, in 1962 Professor Armand Siegel, Boston University physicist, 
presented a statement to the Governor of Massachusetts asking that the 
state take steps to prepare its economy for the transition that would be 
1 
necessary in the event of disarmament. The major purposes of the group, 
however, have been two. The Society has been a fellowship of those who 
have taken the stand of non-participation in destructive work, and it has 
2 
sought to induce other scientists to take a similar approach. 
The Society functions primarily in the United States, but it has 
members in nineteen countries. At the Conference on Science in World 
Affairs in London in September, 1962, ten of the two hundred twenty del-
egates were members of the Society; these ten came from eight different 
countries. William C. Davidon, Linus Pauling, and T. Rosebury were among 
3 the delegation from the United States. The Society has a total of a 
1ssRS Newsletter, No. 117 (May, 1962). 
2victor Paschkis, "The Future of the SSRS," SSRS Newsletter, 
No. 113 (January, 1962). 
3ssRS Newsletter, No. 124 (December, 1962). 
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few hundred members; it provides fellowship for those committed to its 
ideals and seeks to spread them. In this way it serves to keep its 
point of view represented in the debate among scientists over their re-
sponsibilities and may serve to provoke concern for social responsibil-
ity among other persons and groups who do not, having considered their 
responsibilities, come to the same conclusions as the Society, but who 
take their responsibility more seriously than before. Thus it carries 
on the witness of a minority social action group. 
(3) The individual and the scientific community.--The relation-
ship of the scientist to the government's policy of weapons is thus 
essentially the relationship of an individual to the political community. 
The scientific community does not act as an independent social force in 
which the individual must find his place and with which the government 
must come to grips over its weapons policies. The scientific community 
does give some support to government programs insofar as the scientific 
ethos supports the advancement of the scientific quest under government 
sponsorship where that is needed. At the same time, misgivings prevail 
in the scientific community over government restrictions on scientific 
communication and over possible government distortion of the scientific 
quest by overemphasis on applied research. In general, the scientist 
who makes an independent evaluation of weapons policies will not find 
any evaluation or course of action especially enjoined by the scientific 
community in the United States. His decision must be in relationship 
to the wishes of the political community, and the scientific community 
will not censure him as long as he remains true to the traditions and 
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values of the scientific quest. If he declines to participate in 
weapons development, he may join a group of like-minded men of science, 
but they are a distinct minority of the whole. 
5. Limitations 
Society is able to function in an integrated fashion by combining 
individual efforts through social customs and institutions. Whenever 
the individual takes responsibility for passing judgment on the current 
social pattern by independent analysis, he runs the risk of finding him-
self thinking and acting in ways not coordinated with the social arrange-
ment then prevailing. This is likely to produce problems of confusion, 
lack of social support, and internal contradictions in patterns of ac-
tion. Many of the limitations on independent evaluation as a course of 
responsible action stem from this fact. Some of the important limita-
tions will be discussed here; according to their seriousness they limit 
or invalidate the responsible nature of this approach. 
i. Difficulties in evaluation 
Some of the limitations spring from difficulties in making valid 
evaluations of weapons policies. Others spring from problems encoun-
tered when action is based on independent evaluation. These will be 
discussed in order. 
(1) The complexity of political affairs.--In the midst of a pat-
tern of international struggle and antagonism, taking place in the con-
text of a complex web of interrelationships among nations, the unexpected 
frequently occurs. The predictive powers of the political and social 
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sciences are limited, and a high degree of specialized skill is needed 
to use these sciences fully. Grobstein indicates that as the complex-
ities of the international situation have grown since World War II, sci-
entists have become less certain and more divided as to what policies 
1 
they should support. 
The social and political significance of scientific developments 
is also hard to predict, and this problem is complicated by the fact 
that modern research programs are so complex that the working scientist 
may not know what the end-product of the project he is engaged in will 
2 be, or even who sponsors the contract. When this difficulty is com-
bined with the complexity and uncertainty of political affairs, a serious 
question is raised as to the feasibility of evaluation outside of special 
centers of study with full access to necessary information, such as gov-
ernment policy-planning groups. 
(2) The political competence of scientists.--The difficulties for 
the scientist in independent evaluation are compounded whenever he lacks 
training and competence in social and political affairs. The view that 
scientists generally lack the requisite ability in these areas is a re-
current theme in the writings of scientists on social responsibility. 
This is true of the statements of scientists who favor independent eval-
uation of weapons policies, such as Kathleen Lonsdale, and those who 
generally support other patterns of responsibility, such as J. Robert 
1Grobstein, pp; 243-44. 
2Barber, pp. 220-21; 
Edward L. Long, Jr., "Ethical Problems in a Space Age," 
Religion in Life, 30 (Summer, 1961), pp. 368-69. 
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1 Oppenheimer. Much of this concern stems from the conviction that the 
education of natural scientists does not include enough attention to 
social and political matters to equip them for independent political 
thought. The intensive study of the natural sciences tends to leave 
time for only a miaimum of studies in other fields. Robert Fitch holds 
that education in the natural sciences inclines men to be purists in 
their thought, unable to deal successfully with the necessity of com-
promise in social relations or with the mingling of evil and good in 
human nature that allows noble efforts to become entangled in catas-
2 trophe. 
It may be that schools of science and technology are taking the 
new political significance of scientific work seriously and increasing 
their stress on social and political affairs in the education of nat-
ural scientists. This would not escape the problem created by the pos-
sibility that the natural sciences are attractive to persons whose basic 
abilities in grasping knowledge of the world of nature are high, while 
their abilities in dealing with social and political affairs tend to be 
low. The question of the competence of the scientist cannot be dealt 
with in, generalities, however; if the individual scientist is to make an 
independent analysis, it is his individual ability that is important. 
The fact is, as a survey of their writings shows, that some scientists 
have evaluated weapons policies with sharp perception and clear under-
1Kathleen Lonsdale, "Scientists and the People," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 14 (September, 1958), 244; 
Oppenheimer, The Open Mind, p. 91. 
2 Fitch, p. 370. 
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standing, while others have not. The scientist must call upon his 
training and ability in disciplined thought to help himself in evaluat-
ing his own ability. The greater his competence in political analysis' 
and ethical judgment, the more he is able to decide the question of par-
ticipation on the basis of independent evaluation of weapons policies. 
ii. Problems of action 
The many possible forms of action follow from the wide range of 
weapons policies which may be selected by independent evaluation. Many 
of the patterns of action include participation in the government's 
weapons development program, as discussed above. The social system 
generally supports such action, so that given the scientist's evalua-
tion, his participation will bring results consistent with his intention 
to use scientific ability in the development of weapons. Where the pat-
tern of action chosen cuts across the pattern accepted by the community, 
however, as in the scientist's refusal to participate, problems are en-
countered which limit the effectiveness of the chosen plan of action 
and the validity of action based on independent analysis. 
(1) Science without weapons.--One of the most basic of these prob-
lems is that of continuing to do scientific work without participating 
in weapons development. The vast influence of government weapons pro-
grams in contemporary American science immediately sets aside a large 
share of scientific activity, often well-financed and employing the best 
available equipment, outside of the options available to the non-partici-
pant in weapons work. Most non-participants accept this fact as the most 
obvious consequence of their commitment. There is other applied research 
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work available, although the members of the Society for Social Respon-
sibility in Science have found it more difficult to locate than might 
be expected. One of the activities of the Society is the location of 
employment opportunities for scientists who do not wish to participate 
in destructive work. 
Applied research is only a part of the activity of the scientific 
quest, however. One of the most common approaches taken by non-partici-
pants is to hold that fundamental research is a responsible action, but 
that participation in the application of fundamental science to the de-
velopment of weapons is not. This view was presented by Victor Paschkis, 
then president of the Society for Social Responsibility in Science, to 
the convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
1 in 1960. If such a view were shared by a large number of scientists, 
so that by taking that stand they would be able to modify the govern-
ment's policy concerning the development of weapons, the importance of 
the distinction might be granted. It appears, however, that government 
programs have not been seriously hampered by inability to find the de-
sired proportion of scientists who are willing to do applied research on 
weapons. As long as this is true, the efforts of others in fundamental 
research, with free communication of discoveries, become a contribution 
to the development of weapons wherever they are relevant. The unpredict-
ability of scientific research prevents any assurance that the work may 
not be relevant, while the predictive nature of scientific theories 
would close whole areas of science to the non-participant by indicating 
1sSRS Newsletter, No. 102 (February, 1961). 
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that possible findings might have significance for weapons. 
This relationship, which was discussed more fully in the fifth 
chapter, places severe restrictions on the amount of scientific work 
that can be done without any contribution to weapons development. 
Furthermore, discoveries on the fundamental level are often of decisive 
importance to weapons development, for they make applications possible 
and when known they are available for application whenever governments 
wish to sponsor the effort. Fundamental research may therefore turn out 
to be involuntary participation of the most significant kind. 
It is also possible to refrain from participation in applied re-
search in the development of weapons as a form of social witness both 
to other scientists and to the community at large. The limitations of 
this approach must also be recognized. 
(2) The limits of social witness.--Some scientists have declined 
to participate in the development of weapons partly because they have 
hoped that their witness in so doing would encourage others to take a 
similar stand. In 1948 Daniel and Squires expressed the opinion that a 
few scientists who declined to participate could provide enough moral 
leadership within the scientific community to change the prevailing cli-
mate of opinion and prevent further research on destructive projects. 1 
In 1960 Victor Paschkis expressed the hope that such a movement might 
2 yet begin. 
The experience of the years since World War II has been that, 
1oaniel and Squires, "Freedom Demands Responsibility," p. 303. 
2ssRS Newsletter, No. 102 (February, 1961). 
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although many scientists have been deeply shocked by the destructive 
power of modern weapons, only a few have declined to participate in the 
development of new weapons. The number which has declined has not ap-
parently hampered the development of weapons in the United States in a 
significant way. The witness that these few have made has not started 
a larger movement, and there is little cause to suppose that one will 
begin as long as present conditions continue. Eugene Rabinowitch com-
ments in regard to non-participation in weapons development: "It is, 
however, unlikely that, in any one country, a majority of scientists 
will choose this path, and thus effectively impose unilateral disarma-
1 
ment on their own nation." Many others have shared this view, includ-
2 ing some who might have wished it otherwise, such as Albert Einstein. 
The social witness of scientists who decline to participate in 
weapons development thus appears to be limited to the roles of educa-
tion, of representing a minority position and keeping some fundamental 
convictions alive in the debate over responsible participation, and of 
possible influence for change over a long period or in the event of 
changed conditions. 
(3) The danger of social confusion.--Another limitation of the 
responsibility of non-participation stems from the possibility that it 
might be moderately successful as a social witness seeking to induce 
non-participation in others. In this case a segment of the scientific 
community would exert a significant force at cross-purposes with the 
1Rabinowitch, "Responsibilities of Scientists in the Atomic Age," 
p. 3. 
2Einstein, pp. 474-75. 
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political unit which has direct responsibility in international affairs. 
\ 
One result might be policy modifications desired by the scientists. 
Another might be confusion and frustration in the political community 
which would prevent the government from pursuing any responsible course 
of action. Such a breakdown could have disastrous results if it meant, 
for instance, a breakdown of military deterrence without replacement by 
1 
effective international policies based on non-military influence. 
This does not mean that fundamental changes in national policy 
should not be sought through the witness of non-participation. If the 
goal of the scientists should be something as fundamental as the ending 
of the military policy of deterrence, with the accompanying competition 
in weapons development, it would be expected that the confusion and in-
ternal conflict accompanying such a change would be extensive. This may 
seem to be a reasonable risk if disastrous results are foreseen in the 
absence of such a change. Nor should it be supposed that persons press-
ing for such a change would be able to offer a well-developed program 
of alternative policies at an early stage. It would be necessary, how-
ever, for them to consider seriously how to meet the need for responsible 
and effective government, passing through the stage of confusion as 
quickly as possible. 
6. Summary 
This chapter is concerned with the responsibility of the scien-
tist to determine the question of his participation in weapons develop-
1A. P. Lerner, "An Economist Comments," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 307. 
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ment on the basis of an independent evaluation of possible policies re-
garding the development and handling of weapons. The scientist has in-
dividual responsibility for the use of his abilities in any case; the 
question here is that of making a personal and direct evaluation of the 
policy of the government and the other approaches to weapons that might 
be taken. In the previous two chapters the questions focused on parti-
cipation due to responsibility to the community or to the advancement of 
the scientific quest, without asking that the scientist evaluate directly 
the government's policy for the development and use of weapons. 
Action according to independent analysis is held to be responsible 
for three reasons. First, the crucial character of the problem of weapons 
requires that this problem be considered directly, rather than determining 
responsibility through discussion of the place of the individual in the 
community or of the values of the scientific quest. Second, the influ-
ence of modern weapons over all mankind requires that weapons policies 
be evaluated for their responsibility to all men and that this be a dom-
inant criterion. Finally, the need for independent witness as a con-
tribution to the debate out of which national policy is formulated and 
corrected requires that independent analyses be made and expressed in 
corresponding actions. 
Action based on independent analysis can take many forms, which 
may be classified in general groups as agreement with the government 
policy and participation in the government's program of weapons develop-
ment; leadership in establishing a government policy of weapons develop-
ment, including participation in the actual development; refusal to par-
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ticipate in weapons development; and participation provided certain 
conditions are met by the government. Examples of all types of partici-
pation except the latter, on the basis of independent analysis of weapons 
development policies, are available. The scientist is a member of the 
scientific community, but he faces the question of evaluation and par-
ticipation primarily as an individual because the scientific community 
has not taken any position as a unit regarding a particular evaluation 
of weapons policies or particular approaches to participation. A wide 
range of approaches is represented among the members of the community. 
As was the case in the fourth and fifth chapters, the pattern of 
responsibility presented here has important limitations. The complexity 
of the political order and the difficulty of making responsible judg-
ments, combined with possible limits on the ability of the specialist in 
science to make political evaluations, limits the possibility of respon-
sible independent evaluation. If the scientist chooses not to partici-
pate in weapons development, he will find himself cutting across the 
prevailing pattern of social integration. He may find it difficult to 
do scientific work without assisting in the development of weapons; if 
he concentrates on fundamental scientific research, any relevant dis-
coveries he makes are likely to be applied to weapons by others. The 
possibilities of contributing to the responsible use of weapons by the 
social witness of non-participation are apparently limited to the con-
tributions of a minority group. No successful movement for large-scale 
refusal to participate has yet appeared. 
In this chapter and the two which have preceded it, three separate 
approaches to the responsibility of the scientist in the development of 
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weapons have been presented. All of these have been held to be respon-
sible approaches, within certain limits. The next chapter must consider 
the problem of making a decision among the patterns of responsibility 
open to the scientist. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE PROBLEM OF DECISION 
1. Introduction 
Each of the last three chapters has discussed a pattern of action 
for the responsible use of the ability of the scientist in relation to 
the development of weapons. It was found that if appropriate limita-
tions are not violated, each of the three approaches can be considered 
acceptable under the standards of the ecumenical concept of the respon-
sible society. Thus the crucial question becomes, when a decision must 
be made, how does the scientist determine which pattern of action to 
follow? 
No general answer to this question can be given in this disserta-
tion. Because of the scarcity of other useful studies Gf the problem 
at hand, the function of this study is primarily to determine a basic 
method for approaching the ethical problem of the scientist's respon-
sibility. The specific determination of the proper course of action for 
the scientist must await additional study on another level, where the 
current national policies can be investigated in their international 
context and where the specific concrete decisions confronting the sci-
entist can be taken into account. This should include a consideration 
of the nature of the weapons to be developed and a consideration of the 
many social forces which bring pressure on the scientist at the point 
of decision. It is possible at this point in the study, however, to 
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indicate a useful approach to the problem of concrete decision and to 
specify some of the particular considerations that are likely to be im-
portant in the effort to make a responsible choice. 
The concept of the responsible society is a normative standard 
for a system of social relations that is relevant to the present day 
and is also relevant to differing cultural patterns. It functions pri-
marily as a social standard within which this study has sought to trace 
appropriate patterns of individual responsibility. As a final criterion 
of individual responsibility, the system of moral laws formulated by 
Edgar S. Brightman and extended by L. Harold DeWolf and Walter G. Muelder 
will be introduced in this chapter and applied to the problem of specific 
decision. This system of laws lacks the relatively structured ~ocial 
ideal which was necessary to identify patterns of responsible action in 
a complex social situation. By its systematic and universal approach to 
questions of individual moral responsibility, however, it will indicate 
the moral considerations which must be considered in relating the pat-
terns of action and making a concrete decision. 
2. The System of Moral Laws 
In this section the general nature of the system of moral laws 
will be indicated, and in the next major section of the chapter the laws 
will be directly employed in reaching an understanding of the approach 
to decision in concrete questions of weapons development. 
i. The philosophical basis 
(1) Method. --A moral law is defined by Edgar Brightman as "a uni-
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versal principle to which the will ought to conform in its choices." 
The set of principles to be considered here was developed by Brightman 
through the rational analysis of moral experience. 
Experience is defined by Brightman to include all the processes 
or states of awareness in the entire field of consciousness,and those 
aspects of experience which involve a sense of obligation or of the need 
to choose between options felt to be better or worse are designated as 
moral experience. The three basic themes of moral experience are the 
experiences of value, obligation, and law. Law refers to rational prin-
ciples which are employed in experience for the purposive control of 
conduct; it is a fact of human experience that persons do formulate and 
2 
use such principles, however inconsistently and inadequately. 
These sociological and psychological facts regarding the experi-
ence of moral categories are not by themselves normative prescriptions, 
however. Normative moral laws are discovered only through the rational 
analysis of moral experience. Observation of experience, the formula-
tion of generalizations based on observation, and the criticism of the 
generalizations in order to eliminate contradictions are necessary phases 
of the rational analysis. Then there follows a final interpretive phase, 
in which a hypothesis is formed regarding the rational connection of ex-
periences. This is necessary in order to move beyond the mere accumula-
tion of non-contradictory principles to a system which is adequate for 
normative use in a connected and integrated life of forward movement and 
rich meaning. The hypothesis is then tested both by rational analysis 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 63. 2Ibid., pp. 53-70. 
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of its relationship to the principles it is intended to relate and by 
the practical test of its effect in daily living. 1 
A system of laws so developed is an effort to show the rational 
implications of the fundamental fact that moral experience is an inte-
gral part of human experience. Such a system is therefore prescriptive 
in nature. It is a set of principles with which the person may "confront 
the many conflicting claims of daily experience and show us where the 
true value of life lies. 112 Its normative quality is thus based on the 
nature of moral questions as fundamental aspects of experience and on a 
commitment to reason as the valid interpreter of the implications of ex-
perience. As the discussion proceeds, it will be seen that the system 
of moral laws developed by Brightman is largely formal in characterG)in 
the sense that it deals with the interpretation and choice of values but 
leaves it to the individual to commit himself to values of his choice, 
in a manner consistent with the system. The system is not formal, how-
ever, in the sense of being concerned only for the will of the actor; 
it specifically requires consideration of empirical value questions. 
The systematic nature of Brightman's set of moral principles is 
a matter of fundamental importance in understanding his approach. 
Rational method means to see coherent relationships both in logic and 
experience. "Proof consists in showing the coherent relations of a 
proposition to other propositions, to experience, and to the system of 
3 
which it forms a part." Coherence is both a principle of reason and 
of interpretation for Brightman, and it is fundamental to his set of 
1Ibid., p. 85. 2Ibid., p. 29. 3Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
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moral laws that they form a system and that moral choice and action is 
not conducted in conformity with one of the laws but with the system as 
a whole. This does not mean that all the laws are equally relevant to 
every decision, but it does mean that the neglect of any law or of the 
pattern of relationship between the laws is a distortion. of the system 
and a violation of its normative character. The system aims at a crit-
ical and coherent account of moral experience, and it is one of the 
characteristics of the hypothesis that coherence itself is found to be 
morally obligatory. 
(2) Religious and metaphysical context.--Moral laws which are 
formulated by a reasoned account of moral experience and its implications 
are logically prior to religious affirmations. They depend on no theo-
logical statement in their formulation, and their truth is not conditioned 
on whether they are consistent with moral commandments from religious 
sources. In fact, the logical relationship is somewhat the reverse, for 
religious outlooks often associate goodness with the divine and thus be-
l 
come dependent on moral standards of interpretation. Thus the use of 
Brightman's moral laws as an approach to the problem of decision among 
the patterns of responsibility in this study introduces a second stand-
ard of evaluation which is based on philosophical considerations, while 
the concept of the responsible society springs from a theological ap-
proach to ethics. The two standards should not be interpreted as incon-
sistent, however. The concept of the responsible society was formulated 
with the help of rational interpretations of experience and of theologi-
lrbid., pp. 264-68. 
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cal p~opositions, to begin with. The system of moral laws, on the other 
hand, was developed in a context of metaphysical interpretation which 
makes the theistic interpretation of the universe quite consistent with 
the results of Brightman's reasoned account of moral experience. 
From a consideration of the nature of experience, which is to say 
of the fact and character of consciousness, Brightman arrives at a view 
of the universe in which personality is the fundamental category. Finite 
persons are separate individuals who are distinct from each other and by 
virtue of their freedom distinct from the Supreme Person in Whom the 
universe is grounded. All finite things exist first of all in the con-
sciousness of the Supreme Person; those which have consciousness in their 
own right also have a measure of freedom and independence. Together they 
exist in an organic relationship in which the welfare of individual per-
sons and their relationship to the Supreme Person is dependent on their 
1 
membership and experience in the social whole. The Supreme Person as 
conceived by Brightman is quite consistent with the Christian idea of 
God, and Brightman regularly uses that_term. Thus the interpretation of 
the universe in this thought is theistic, and the moral laws, while not 
derived from theological presuppositions, are identified through the 
fundamental category of personal consciousness as an expression of the 
2 
reason of God. 
(3) The moral laws as natural law.--The moral laws may be regarded 
1Brightman, "A Christian View of Nature," pp. 69-75; 
Walter G. Muelder, "The Social Philosophy of Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman," Philosophical Forum, 8 (Spring, 1950), 9. 
2Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 269. 
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as a modern approach to the problems which have been attacked in the 
history of Western thought with doctrines of natural law. The moral 
laws are universal in the sense that they furnish normative guidance 
for all moral choices. They also transcend differences in moral outlook 
based on claims of special insight such as religious revelation, for 
they appeal only to reason and to moral experience which is held to be 
common to all men. They are formal in character, defining a structure 
of moral responsibility without specifying particular claims of right 
and wrong or specific ideals of personal and social life. In this way 
they differ from many formulations of natural law, such as that in 
John Locke's Second Treatise on Government. Although their concrete 
significance is less readily seen because of their formal nature, this 
quality of the moral laws avoids one of the frequent difficulties of 
natural law formulations, which is their tendency to embody the assump-
tions of the culture in which they were developed. The moral laws are 
held to be "natural" because they seek to set forth the normative impli-
cations of moral experience, which is common to all persons, by a rational 
1 
method which can be universally accepted. 
Against this background, the system of moral laws can now be set 
forth. Illustrations of the general reference of the various laws will 
be drawn from the patterns of responsible action discussed in the pre-
vious three chapters. Only after the system of laws has been set forth 
and illustrated, however, will it be applied to the problem of decision 
among the patterns. The selection of illustrations in the following 
1walter G. Muelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society" (un-
published manuscript from the files of the author), pp. 11, 32, 72. 
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discussion must not be confused with an attempt to solve the problem of 
decision; it is rather an attempt to explain the laws in relevant terms. 
ii. Statement of the laws 
The moral laws are grouped in four categories, and they will be 
discussed in order by groups. The categories are arranged in the order 
of increasing concreteness. 
(1) The formal laws.--The logical law and the law of autonomy 
make up the category of formal laws. The term "formal" here means that 
these laws concentrate on the form of the will of the actor, rather 
than on the nature of the act. The logical law holds that "each person 
ought to will to be free from self-contradiction and to be consistent 
in his intentions." 1 The law of autonomy is swmnarized in the simple 
2 phrase, "self-imposed ideals are imperative." Together the laws re-
quire consistency and integrity; a good will must not allow itself to 
undermine rationality by allowing self-contradiction, nor may it ignore 
the claim for conformity with those ideals which it acknowledges to have 
a claim of obligation on it. These themes have been stressed in the 
history of ethics particularly by Kant. 
The logical laws require the seientist who acknowledges a respon-
sibility to use his power in a manner that is responsible to those af-
fected by it to acknowledge the obligation in making his choices and to 
make consistent and rational choices. These basic principles of ethics 
are so fundamental as to frequently seem self-evident, and since the 
concern of this study is with the nature of the act rather than with 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 98. 2rbid., p. 106. 
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the form of the will, it will not be necessary to discuss the formal 
laws again. 
(2) The axiological laws.--The axiological laws embody the prin-
ciple that an intelligent choice of values must be a coherent choice, 
and the laws outline several dimensions that must be observed if effec-
tive coherence is to be achieved. The first of these laws carries the 
name "axiological law," and it requires that "all persons ought to choose 
1 
values which are self-consistent, harmonious, and coherent." The re-
sponsible person must avoid value-choices which are contradictory or 
incoherent, and the fullest realization of value comes in the experi-
ence of a person who chooses in conformity with a harmonious set of 
values. The meaning of this law can be seen in the requirement that the 
scientist who participates in weapons development in order to advance 
the scientific quest may do so responsibly because the values so devel-
oped are a contribution to the social goal of community and provided 
that the weapons so developed do not undermine the community among 
nations. 
The second axiological law is the law of consequences. This law 
reads, "All persons ought to consider and, on the whole, approve the 
foreseeable consequences of each of their choices. Stated otherwise, 
2 
choose with a view to the long run, not merely the present act." This 
law stresses coherence in the time dimension; the achievement of any 
value in the present cannot be acceptable if the consequences of that 
achievement in the future are unacceptable. Similarly, to seek a distant 
1 Ibid., p. 125. 2 Ibid., p. 142. 
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goal by a process which has unacceptable consequences along the way is 
1 
an incoherent approach. The law does not speak of intended conse-
quences, but of foreseeable ones, implying the duty df the actor to ask 
what the consequences of his choice are likely to be and to consider 
all of the important ones. The law of consequences is a difficult prin-
ciple to apply in complex situations. Highly destructive modern weapons, 
for example, often destroy lives and property which are not of military 
significance when the weapons are used for the purpose of dest.roying 
military targets. The law of consequences does not set specific limits 
to the amount of "incidental" destruction which is acceptable, but it 
clearly requires that all of the foreseeable consequences of the use of 
the weapons be seriously considered. None may be set aside on the 
ground that they are incidental to the primary purpose of the act. In 
terms of weapons development, the concern for consequences can be seen 
in such statements as that the advancement of science and technology 
will bring economic advancement on a sufficient scale to undermine some 
of the fundamental causes of war. This becomes an argument for partici-
pation in weapons development in an effort to advance the scientific 
quest. 
The law of the best possible is the third axiological law. It 
requires every person "to will the best possible values in every situa-
tion; hence, if possible, to improve every situation. 112 This law has a 
double focus; it requires a constant stress on improvement, and it also 
~uelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society," pp. 128-.29. 
2Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 156. 
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limits the locus of choice to those acts which are possible in the given 
situation. Thus it calls for compromise of ideal values, but only nec-
essary compromise is acceptable. Decisions must be made with an effort 
to resolve dilemmas and create new values. The decision to participate 
in weapons development in conformity with government policy might thus 
be based on the conviction that only nations have the power to make 
fundamental improvements in the international situation. The participa-
tion of the scientists of the nation might be a necessary condition for 
the success of the national effort to build a cooperative world. Or the 
scientist who declines to participate on the basis of an independent 
evaluation might seek in this way to improve the quality of the political 
debate out of which national policy arises. 
Fourth among the axiological laws is the law of specification, 
which might also be called the law of relevance. "All persons ought, 
in any given situation, to develop the value or values specifically rel-
evant to that situation."1 This law requires attention to the concrete 
existential context of decision and points out that the morality of de-
cisions based on broad ideals in ignorance of immediate complexities is 
dubious. Relevance in moral decision means attention to the primary 
2 problem or the dominant element in the situation faced by the actor. 
Thus the scientist who must decide the question of participation in 
weapons development cannot ignore the essential question of the power 
struggle between nations and the destructive nature of many modern 
1
rbid.' p. 171. 
~uelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society," p. 137. 
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weapons. If he also holds that the values of the scientific quest are 
of central importance, he must relate his concern for these values to 
the military relevance of his work, as is done by the conviction that 
the political order is capable of handling the weapons responsibly and 
that his scientific efforts may contribute to the reduction of inter-
national antagonism. 
The fifth axiological law is the law of the most inclusive end. 
This law holds that it is the duty of each person "to choose a coherent 
1 life in which the widest possible range of value is realized." It 
recognizes the complexity of the problem of value realization and warns 
against the attempt to achieve coherence by concentrating on a narrow 
range of value themes and neglecting other important factors. Brightman 
developed this law with the primary focus on a wide range of individual 
personal value experience, over a life span, but it would seem to apply 
equally well to the wide range of values realizable in a particular sit-
uation. Thus the law is a supplement to the law of specification. The 
scientist who participates in weapons development in response to govern-
ment policy may do so on the conviction that the primary value in that 
situation is group solidarity in the face of an external threat. But 
he might also support that conviction with the observation that a whole 
range of values depends on international stability which must be guar-
anteed by nations capable of united action, and that the intrinsic values 
of scientific discovery are available to him personally as he partici-
pates. 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 183. 
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The law of ideal control is the sixth and final axiological law. 
This law is a guide for unifying and systematizing the choices made 
under the other laws. It reads, "All persons ought to control their 
1 
empirical values by ideal values." Empirical values are the actual 
experiences which are available to persons in concrete life, while ideal 
values are basic value themes which are the objects of rational con-
sideration but which are not fully realized in actual life. 2 Equality, 
national loyalty, and community are examples of ideal values. The law 
of ideal control requires that coherence be advanced by maintaining the 
tension between the concrete and ideal situations and organizing and 
criticizing the empirical experience by the standards of the ideal. The 
ideals so employed are validated by testing them for coherence among 
themselves and for their basis in value experience and fruitfulness in 
. i . 3 1.nterpret ng 1.t. Ideal values such as group loyalty and human brother-
hood across national barriers have been frequently employed in the dis-
cussions of the preceding chapters. 
(3) The personalistic laws.--While the axiological laws dealt with 
the coherent organization of values, the personalistic laws concentrate 
on the influence of the fact that values have meaning only in respect to 
persons. There are three laws in this group. The law of individualism 
holds that "each person ought to realize in his own experience the max-
4 imum value of which he is capable in harmony with the moral law." The 
1 Ibid., p. 194. 2 Ibid., p. 129. 
~uelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society, 11 pp. 120-21. 
4Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 204. 
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law of altruism requires that "each person ought to respect all other 
. 1 persons as ends ~n themselves." These two laws stand in the relation-
ship of tension and balance toward each other. The law of individualism 
notes that value experience is always the experience of persons and that 
the individual person has a responsibility to make moral choices in an 
effort to realize values in himself. It further notes that the indi-
vidual person is the subject who makes value choices which affect others, 
and he therefore has a responsibility to himself to develop his own abil-
ities and responsibility in order to meet this obligation effectively. 
The law of altruism defines this obligation more fully, emphasizing that 
the experience of others must be taken into account in the choices of 
each person and also emphasizing that other persons have the right to 
moral autonomy and must not be manipulated unnecessarily even by per-
2 
sons genuinely concerned for the welfare of the others. 
Thus the scientist has an obligation to develop his scientific 
ability and comprehension, which will among other things increase his 
ability to grasp the importance and usefulness of science to others. 
The scientist who declines to participate in weapons development on the 
basis of independent evaluation of weapons policies may recognize this 
and yet seek to balance it against the concern that he should not par-
ticipate in developments which will allow one or a few nations to decide 
the fate of many others. 
To the laws of individualism and altruism, the law of the ideal 
1rbid., p. 223. 
~uelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society," pp. 120-21. 
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of personality is added. This law stresses the need for a unified con-
cept of the ideal personality, avoiding fragmentation by the various 
social roles of the person. It does not propose a standardized "good" 
or "normal" personality to which persons ought to conform, but stresses 
rather the need for persons to form normative goals for themselves and 
to control their choices by such goals. The law states, "All persons 
ought to judge and guide all of their acts by their ideal conception 
. . of what the whole personality ought to become both individually and 
1 
socially." 
The type of concern raised by this law can be illustrated by 
noting the predicament of the scientist who participates in weapons de-
velopment on the ground that it is important to contribute to the ad-
vancement of the scientific quest. To do so will reflect his personal 
goals of increased knowledge of the natural world, increased appreciation 
of and sensitivity to the aesthetic qualities of nature, and responsible 
cooperation in the work of the scientific community. But if at the same 
time his sensitivity to the needs of the potential victims of the weapons, 
and to their right to be treated as ends in themselves, decreases, his 
actions will be judged by an ideal of personality which requires the 
sharpening of such sensitivities. The conviction that his scientific 
work will ultimately benefit these people and that the threat of destruc-
tion will pass off in time may prevent erosion of his sensitivity and 
avoid serious violation of the law of the ideal of personality. 
(4) The communitarian laws.--The communitarian laws develop the 
1Brightman, Moral Laws, p. 242. 
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implications of the fact that persons live in groups and that values, 
while always realized in the life of the person, are generally condi-
tioned by or dependent on group life. The person can be described as 
"a socius with a private center."1 Much of the value that he knows 
comes directly from interpersonal experience and is possible in no other 
way, and other values are enhanced when their experience is shared with 
others. A coherent approach to values must take this relationship into 
account, and it must come to grips with the problem of the type of group 
life which embodies and supports value experience. 
In writing the personalistic laws, Edgar Brightman intended to 
include the dimension of community life. At the same time he was con-
cerned that the group not be given a status that would obscure the fact 
that moral responsibility always rests first of all with the person. 
Thus the personalistic laws include only limited explicit reference to 
the problems posed by the fact of group life. L. Harold DeWolf and 
Walter G. Muelder have therefore extended the moral laws to include the 
communitarian laws, to make their relationship to the group situation 
2 quite explicit. 
The first of the communitarian laws is the law of cooperation, 
which states that "all persons ought as far as possible to cooperate 
3 
with other persons in the production and enjoyment of shared values." 
This law was a part of Brightman's original statement of the law of 
altruism; it was placed instead in the communitarian laws by DeWolf. 4 
~uelder, "Theology and the Responsible Society," p. 171. 
3Ibid., p. 175. 4Ibid., pp. 159-60. 
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This law emphasizes morally responsible participation in group life as 
a corollary of the fact of human interdependence. The realization of 
human values requires cooperative participation in meeting the needs of 
the group and in the development of true community, where many values 
are inherent in the fact of participation itself. A very simple instance 
of the application of this law is seen in the point of view that the 
scientist should participate in the development of weapons as a contri-
bution to the security of the national community. 
The law of social devotion advances the previous law by the addi-
tion of a note of genuine altruism. The best interests of the group 
have precedence over individual interests where this is feasible. "All 
persons ought to devote themselves to serving the best interests of the 
1 
group and to subordinate personal gain to social gain." This kind of 
approach by the members of the group is a precondition of a type of com-
munity life in which the values of interpersonal relationships, rather 
than the mere joint accomplishments of group functions, are realized. 
It should be noted, however, that the use of the phrase "best interests" 
raises the law above the level of uncritical cooperation with announced 
group purposes. Creative dissent may be a fulfillment of this law, as 
in the case of the scientist who declines to participate in weapons de-
velopment on the ground that the government policy regarding weapons is 
irresponsible. 
The law of the ideal of community is the final communitarian law. 
'~11 persons ought to form and choose all of their ideals and values in 
1 Ibid., p. 179. 
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loyalty to their ideals . . . of what the whole community ought to be-
come; and to participate responsibly in groups to help them similarly 
choose and form all their ideals and choices." 1 No particular cultural 
content is specified by this law, but the law requires that a standard 
of community be developed and employed in the criticism and control of 
value choices. The concept of the Kingdom of God, which calls for the 
"full actualization of personal and group relationships in love," is 
such a standard at a level which must yet be interpreted for particular 
social situations. The concept of the responsible society attempts to 
spell out in a more concrete way the implications of this ideal for the 
contemporary scene. Yet this concept will have different meanings in 
different places, and its concrete implications must be developed in the 
light of the socio-cultural situation at hand. Some of this development 
is a part of the purpose of this study and, at the same time, all of the 
patterns of responsibility discussed in the three preceding chapters 
have been developed under the general norm of the responsible society. 
With the help of the system of moral laws which have been pre-
sented here, it will be possible to approach the problem of decision 
among the three patterns of responsibility. 
3. Specific Bases for Decision 
i. The function of the limitations 
The first area of application of the moral laws springs from 
their relationship to the limitations within which the three patterns 
are held to be responsible courses of action. Briefly stated, the 
1rbid., p. 181. 
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responsibility of the scientist to the policy of the government is con-
ditional upon the legitimacy of the government, its competence, and its 
responsibility to the international order and to the welfare of future 
generations. The responsibility of the scientist to participate in the 
development of weapons as a means of advancing the scientific quest is 
dependent upon the existence of institutions in the international order 
capable of handling the weapons in a responsible manner and preventing 
great catastrophes, and upon the condition that the problems created by 
the development of weapons do not undermine the contributions made by 
the advancement of science. The responsibility of the scientist to base 
his participation on an independent evaluation of government policy and 
to decline to participate if he feels that he should not support that 
policy is conditional upon his possession of the ability to arrive at a 
responsible evaluation, upon a realistic appraisal of the social effects 
of his action, and upon the serious grappling with the problems of re-
sponsible government action which could prevail if the overthrow of cur-
rent weapons policy should produce social confusion and the threat of 
a breakdown of the ability of the government to function. 
(1) Coherence among the patterns.--The first function of these 
limitations in indicating the path of decision among the patterns of 
responsibility is their effect on the degree of coherence among the 
patterns. The axiological law calls for the selection of values which 
are harmonious and coherent, and this standard must now be applied to 
the relationship between the three patterns. 
The first pattern, discussed in the fourth chapter, held that 
the scientist should participate in weapons development in response to 
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the invitation of the government for his help in carrying out the gov-
ernment's policy. The second pattern, discussed in the fifth chapter, 
holds that participation in the development of weapons is a responsible 
course of action since it is a path to the advancement of the scientific 
quest. The third pattern, discussed in the sixth chapter, indicated 
that the scientist should participate in the development of weapons if, 
on the basis of an independent evaluation, he is convinced that the 
policy of the sponsoring government is responsible and worthy of support. 
Thus the three patterns may seem to converge on the duty of the scien-
tist to participate in weapons development. One pattern stresses re-
sponsibility to the national community; the second stresses the many 
values of science, and the third stresses the welfare of persons around 
the world. If a single course of action can fulfill three criteria of 
responsibility, with their attendant values, then a high degree of co-
herence has been achieved. In such a case there would be little need 
of pursuing the question further; a decision to participate could be 
made at that point. Apparently there have been times, as during World 
War II in the United States, when many scientists have felt that the 
patterns of responsibility did converge in this manner. 
It is also possible that an attempt to invoke one of the patterns 
in a particular situation will fail because of internal incoherence. 
That is, an investigation of the applicability of the pattern in a par-
ticular instance will reveal that the limitations on that pattern are 
violated, as when the government asking for the scientist's participa-
tion is not the legitimate agent of the national community. When this 
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occurs, no appeal to the values on which the pattern is based is pos-
sible, for the process has become incoherent with the outcome. It may 
be that two of the three patterns will be found inapplicable for this 
reason, as when a government is not legitimate and not capable of, or 
without intention of, handling weapons without touching off major catas-
trophes. In such a case only one coherent option would remain, and the 
choice is again simplified. It might also be that none of the patterns 
is applicable, as when a scientist in the situation just mentioned finds 
himself incapable of evaluating the action of the government, perhaps 
due to lack of information. In this case responsible action becomes 
highly problematic. 
The problem of decision becomes acute when there are conflicting 
patterns of responsibility which are not disqualified by violation of 
their own limitations. The patterns are then incoherent, for the real-
ization of the values in one pattern prevents the realization of those 
in another, and it is necessary to look further for criteria of decision. 
Such a situation was held by some to exist during World War II, when it 
seemed that the development of the atomic bomb was a responsible course 
of action for the legitimate government of the United States, in the 
face of the Nazi threat. At the same time it appeared that the develop-
ment of such a destructive weapon would foster catastrophes to which the 
responsible scientist could not contribute, in the eyes of these persons. 
Those who felt confronted by the dilemma in this form resolved it only 
with great difficulty and little satisfaction. 
This discussion has thus far been based on the axiological law, 
but the moral laws form a system. The best decision is the one which 
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most fully satisfies the requirements of the system of moral laws. Thus 
the predicament of conflicting patterns of responsibility must be ap-
proached by a consideration of the meaning of the other laws in the sys-
tem. 
(2) The personalistic and communitarian laws.--The limitations on 
the validity of the patterns of responsible action have another impor-
tant function in relating the patterns of action to the moral laws. 
These limitations were assigned to the patterns under the normative 
guidance of the concept of the responsible society, with an accompanying 
concern for related standards of personality. The result is that the 
limitations embody the essential demands of the personalistic and com-
munitarian laws. 
Among the most important personal values involved in the issue 
of participation in weapons development are the values of the scientific 
quest, including knowledge of the natural world, moral response to the 
demands of the scientific discipline, aesthetic experience, and theo-
logical perspective. Another important value category is the value of 
responsible character, which is developed, preserved, or sharpened in 
the effort to decide and follow a responsible course in regard to par-
ticipation in weapons development. Each of the three patterns of action 
seeks to determine the limits within which the personal values in both 
catego~ies can be realized together, without violation of one category 
for the sake of the other. Where there is a contradiction between the 
two, however, the important social effects of weapons have required that 
the limitations be established according to the social problems involved, 
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which means that the limitations also embody the communitarian laws. 
The question of participation arises within the social context 
of fundamental intergroup conflicts, with only the beginnings of a 
sense of community on a world basis established. Each of the three pat-
terns of responsibility stresses cooperation in the realization of values 
shared by a group. In one case, it is primarily the national community. 
In the case of participation in order to advance the scientific quest, 
the primary cooperative group is the scientific community, but it is 
hoped that many of the values will be quite widely shared. Participa-
tion on the basis of independent evaluation, as defined in the sixth 
chapter, requires cooperation in the context of the world community, 
although this community has as yet little cooperative structure. In 
each case the scientist is concerned for the best interests of the 
group and subordinates, if necessary, his personal interests and ad-
vantages to the group need. 
All of the patterns are related in different ways to the ultimate 
goal of world community, and limitations are applied to prevent viola-
tion of this aim. The modes of relationship are various, however. They 
are controlled by the concept of the responsible society, but the frag-
mentary nature of the international order at present means that various 
and even contradictory patterns are acceptable within that general con-
cept, when the effort is made to determine responsible action in the 
context of the situation. 
Thus the personalistic and communitarian laws are employed by the 
application of the limitations to the patterns of responsible action. 
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A more fully detailed application would be possible in a specific sit-
uation, with a fully structured ideal of community, but it is the func-
tion of this study to outline the manner of the solution of the problem 
of participation in weapons development, in the light of the general 
social situation, so that specific problems may be solved when they arise. 
Because the limitations were included in the original discussions 
of the patterns of responsible action, they do not add any new criteria 
at this point for decision among the patterns. Additional criteria of 
this kind will be found by using the specific axiological laws to dis-
cover important questions and options concerning the coherence of the 
patterns of responsible action in the context of the various specific 
situations which may arise. The personalistic and communitarian laws 
will be in use here, of course, for the moral laws form a coherent sys-
tem. But it is by attention to the specific axiological laws that the 
important criteria of decision, beyond those provided by the limitations, 
will be discovered. 
ii. Specific axiological laws 
(1) The uniqueness of the situation.--The law of specification 
requires that primary attention be given to the dominant value elements 
present in the specific situation at hand. In this study the general 
theme of participation by scientists in weapons development has been 
illuminated by the development of three patterns of responsible action 
in response to the question of participation. The final decision to 
participate is a specific one, however, and cannot be made in advance 
in a study of this type. 
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Because some of the general characteristics of the contemporary 
social situation will apply to the specific context of decision, how-
ever, it is possible to aid in the application of the law of specifica-
tion by discussing some of the important factors which may vary in the 
situation and which may be important for the question of weapons devel-
opment. 
The nature of the weapons to be developed may be an important 
factor. One fundamental distinction is that between offensive and de-
fensive weapons. It is more likely that weapons which have only defen-
sive applications can be responsibly handled by national governmen$ than 
is the case with destructive offensive weapons. The peculiarly baffling 
logic of nuclear weapons has made the distinction extremely difficult to 
apply, however. No truly effective defense has been found against a 
large-scale attack with thermonuclear weapons, especially when they are 
delivered by ballistic missiles. The antagonists who possess these 
weapons therefore rely for defense on the program of nuclear "deterrence, 11 
in which a nation defends itself by the threat of destruction for its 
attackers. Thus the primary defensive weapons are in fact deadly offen-
sive weapons. Furthermore, minor improvements in defense have been held 
to increase the likelihood of nuclear war by inviting attack before de-
fense preparations can be completed or by making the possessors of the 
defensive equipment less fearful of retaliatory attack. Thus even 
shelters against radioactive fallout have been held to increase the 
1 danger of nuclear war. On the other hand, efforts to increase the re-
liability and invulnerability of the offensive force have been held to 
1 
Piel, p. 8. 
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. 1 
contribute to international stab1lity. 
Another important distinction based on the nature of weapons con-
cerns the degree and selectivity of destruction caused by the weapons. 
A distinction might be made between efforts to reduce the radiation 
hazards caused by thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs and a project to de-
velop the "neutron bomb," which is a thermonuclear bomb utilizing a 
process of nuclear fusion which gives off a large amount of intense 
radiation, destroying living organisms in the vicinity of the blast. 2 
Some scientists who have been disturbed by the threat of thermonuclear 
weapons have participated in the development of weapons for limited war 
in the hope of supporting a less destructive, although still unfortunate, 
3 
alternative. E. James Lieberman has protested the development of psy-
chotogenic chemicals as weapons. These drugs are designed to produce 
temporary psychosis, without permanently harming the victims or destroy-
ing property. Lieberman argues that the use of such drugs on popula-
tio~s will have compounded results leading to social and military disas-
ters and that the drugs will select for direct and permanent damage the 
weaker persons, such as children and the infirm. 4 Where weapons seem 
unnecessarily destructive, for example, or where they can serve only 
1Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," 
Daedalus, 89 (Fall, 1960), 896-98. 
2Freeman J. Dyson, "The Neutron Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 17 (September, 1961), 271-72. 
3Dupre~and Lakoff, pp. 121-23. 
4E. James Lieberman, "Psychochemicals as Weapons," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 18 (January, 1962), 12-13. 
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offensive purposes, the argument that the scientist must participate in 
their development because of responsibility to his national community, 
rather than on the basis of independent evaluation, is weakened. 
The nature of the research through which the scientist is asked 
to participate in weapons development is also an important factor. The 
scientific quest advances in unpredictable ways, and its rapid advance-
ment in the modern world is dependent on financial support from its in-
volvement in weapons development generally. Nonetheless, a scientific 
task may contribute a great deal more to weapons development than to 
significant advancement of the scientific quest. It is difficult to 
appraise these effects in fundamental research, but they are often clear 
in applied research. Where a scientific task has this nature, the rel-
evance of the scientist-'s concern for the advancement of science is 
weakened by the nature of the specific situation. He must give primary 
attention to patterns of responsibility focusing on the problem raised 
by the weapon itself. 
The current state of international affairs will affect the rele-
vance of the patterns of responsible action in various ways. One such 
concern which can be discussed here is the matter of urgency. All of 
the patterns of responsible action have been developed with a concern 
for an emergent community of cooperation involving all mankind. The 
urgency of the demand for weapons development may introduce a distinction 
between the patterns, indicating one or another to be more relevant. 
During World War II, for example, it was widely felt that the develop-
ment of international cooperation was conditional on arresting the ad-
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vancement of control by Nazi Germany. In the present day, it has been 
held that the preservation of values basic to the goal of community de-
pends on the ability of the United States to develop the means of con-
1 
trolling outer space. The scientist whose independent evaluation leads 
him to the conviction that non-participation as a witness to the need 
for a more responsible government policy is a responsible course might 
find this approach less relevant than participation in response to gov-
ernment policy if the threat to the nation and its role in advancing 
world community is acute. He might disagree with the national policy 
and yet feel that joining in the action was a more relevant approach in 
view of the urgency of the situation than the slow effects of a lonely 
witness. Where there is less urgency, the path of non-participation 
might seem more relevant. It is also possible that he might make a 
different evaluation of the response that is required to the acute 
threat and hold that the expression of dissent by non-participation is 
particularly relevant in times of intense military activity. In this 
case, urgency would have just the opposite implication for action. 
The nature of the law of specification makes it impossible to 
prescribe in advance all of the concerns which it may raise in a par-
ticular problem of decision. A few general categories have been illus-
trated here, but the problem in a specific case will undoubtedly be more 
complex. 
(2) Concern for the future.--The law of consequences focuses 
1Thomas D. White, "Space Control and National Security, 11 in 
Space Weapons, ed. Editors of Air Force (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1959), pp. 11-13. 
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attention on the significance of the scientist's action for the future. 
One of the most crucial problems pointed up by this law is the relation-
ship of the relatively permanent advances of science to the changing 
scene in international politics. Fundamental science is an international 
quest, participated in by scientists around the world, who often work in 
nations hostile to one another. The various sciences share a common body 
of theory and common methods within the context of generally common sci-
entific interests and questions. It is true that weapons are generally 
developed in secret, but when the basic scientific work underlying a 
weapon has been performed, it soon becomes possible for other nations to 
develop the technology to produce the same weapon for themselves. Thus 
Eugene Rabinowitch notes that in the context of international antagonism, 
the universality of science "made inevitable" the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by nations other than the United States, once they were first 
1 developed there. The atomic blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
themselves communicated important information about weapons to scientists 
in all countries; it was not known in the United States and Britain when 
the project was started whether a successful bomb could be made by 
nuclear fission or not. Other nations embarking on the project and con-
templating the vast cost involved had both the stimulus of the knowledge 
that the United States and Britain possessed nuclear weapons and the sig-
nificant knowledge that successful construction of a nuclear bomb was 
possible. 
1Eugene Rabinowitch, "Science Faces a Double Danger," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 9 (March, 1953), 34. 
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Thus when a scientist engages in research basic to the develop-
ment of a weapon which has not been developed elsewhere, he may con-
tribute to the introduction of new weapons in his own country and around 
the world. This influence is particularly significant if his work in-
volves advances in scientific theory which can lead to the development 
of weapons of a type or strength not known before. The develop~ent of 
nuclear weapons was certainly an instance of this effect, as the devel-
opment of psychochemicals, space weapons, or climate control would be. 
The scientific knowledge involved is permanent; it will become the prop-
erty of the scientific community and will be available to nations which 
in the present or the future wish to invest the necessary economic and 
scientific resources. 
Political and economic factors, however, are subject to change. 
The general trend at present is for an increase in the total economic 
and technological capacity of nations. This is accompanied by changes 
in political relationships; at the time of this writing there seems to 
be a decrease in cooperation between the Soviet Union and mainland China, 
for example. Thus the scientist who contributes to the fundamental 
science underlying new types of weapons may help to introduce weapons 
problems that will outlast the political situation in which they were 
developed. This is certainly true of the atomic bomb and of the hydro-
gen bomb which followed in its wake. The Franck Report recognized this 
fact and recommended restraint in the use of the bomb in Japan as an aid 
in controlling it after the defeat of Japan. 1 
lJungk, pp. 348-49, 354-55. 
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If it seems likely that the scientist's work will introduce 
problems that will outlast the political situation in which it was de-
veloped, arguments regarding the responsibility of the scientist which 
are based on the current political situation are weakened. He must not 
only consider his responsibility to his national community but also the 
time when the problems of the national community have changed, or even 
the nation itself has changed. And the scientist who stresses respon-
sibility for the advancement of the scientific quest must realize that 
in the future the weapons may pose unforeseen problems that obscure the 
values of the advancement of science. 
(3) Transforming the situation.--The law of the best possible 
limits responsibility to the best possible option and also stresses the 
need to choose the course of action which will improve the situation 
where this is possible. The general international situation today in-
cludes offensive weapons of mass destruction in the hands of sovereign 
nations, with fundamental patterns of antagonism determining the poten-
tial employment of the weapons. The concept of the responsible society 
refers to the goal of international community and to the international 
control of powerful weapons as an indication of the direction in which 
the situation should be improved. 
In general, the second and third patterns of responsible action 
are concerned more directly with the transformation of the situation 
than the first. The second includes a stress on the international pur-
suit of science as a force for understanding and reduction of inter-
national antagonisms. The third allows the scientist to witness to his 
concern for international cooperation by non-participation in weapons 
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development. This approach may claim the additional advantage that it 
does not contribute to the development of weapons which make the prob-
lem more severe. These are general considerations, however, and their 
applicability must be tested in the light of the specific situation and 
the implications of the other laws. 
(4) An inclusive range of values.--Thus far this study has 
focused on the single problem of participation in the development of 
weapons. Since this problem has been often ignored, either from indif-
ference or on the conviction that other issues were more pressing, the 
relationship of this problem to some important side issues has not been 
explored, in an effort to concentrate on the main theme. 1 The law of 
the most inclusive end, however, warns against achieving coherence in 
value choices by drawing narrow limits within which to choose. Thus 
the question of participation in the development of weapons must be seen 
in the context of a wider pattern of responsible action, based on the 
social power which the scientist has as a result of his particular abil-
ity. This in turn may be related by the individual scientist to other 
forms of social power which he may possess. The wider context may af-
feet the pattern of action relative to weapons development which is 
chosen, although it does not furnish any reason for avoiding the choice. 
Participation in an effort to advance the scientific quest 
stresses the achievement of intrinsic, cultural, and technological values 
which have wide significance including but not limited to their effect 
on the problems raised by modern weapons. Similarly, Hans Bethe holds 
loupre/and Lakoff, pp. 106, 122-23. 
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that the scientist who would make his voice felt in the process of 
decision-making by the government can best do so if he is a participant 
in scientific programs under government sponsorship. 1 Such a considera-
tion could be useful in making a decision among the patterns. The sci-
entist whose independent analysis indicates non-participation in weapons 
development on the ground that the witness of non-participation is the 
most responsible course might include in his considerations the possibil-
ity that his action might reinforce the efforts of non-scientists to 
modify government policy or to change the climate of antagonism. He may 
also couple this reasoning with considerations about other valuable work 
that may be done as an alternative to weapons development, such as work 
related to problems of health and economic advancement in areas of 
2 poverty. 
(5) Controlling values.--To the problem of decision among the 
factors the law of ideal control contributes an important warning against 
the adoption of immediate empirical values and limited perspectives as 
final considerations. It is necessary to guard against confusing a 
false nationalism with responsibility to the national community held in 
the context of loyalty to an emergent world community. It is necessary 
to avoid confusing the idea that the scientist's only concern is science, 
regardless of its effects, with the critical decision that participation 
is responsible in a particular case because of its contribution to the 
scientific quest, with its various effects. And it is necessary to dis-
1 Bethe, p. 428. 
2Lonsdale, "Ethical Problems of Scientists," p. 204. 
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tinguish between a personal emotional reaction to the government's 
weapons policy and a critical evaluation of that policy and the probable 
results of abstaining from participation in it. The empirical case must 
always be held under the criticism of the ideals on which the patterns 
of responsible action are based. 
4. The Need for Creative Decision 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that there is no 
clear system of moral logic that can be used to derive the proper course 
of responsible action for the scientist in a concrete case. Basic pat-
terns of responsible action have been described, and an approach to 
weighing and relating them has been outlined. But the law of specifica-
tion requires careful consideration to make the decision relevant to the 
situation and precludes the offering of any final answer except after 
careful study of the factors which are relevant to the decision regard-
ing participation in a particular weapons development program or class 
of programs. Furthermore, the moral laws raise relevant considerations 
but do not offer any precise formula for extracting a decision from the 
various factors which are present. Responsible decision depends finally 
on the creative act of formulating interpretations of responsibility in 
the specific case and evaluating them in the light of the considerations 
previously described. 
While this study has focused on the problems posed for the scien-
tist by the development of weapons, there has been no intention to imply 
that this is the only question faced by the scientist, or that it is 
always the dominant question of social responsibility in science. The 
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analysis in the fifth chapter indicated that it is a difficult question 
to avoid in the United States because of the interpenetration of the 
natural sciences and the program for national defense. It may well be 
that other problems will take precedence over the question of partici-
pation in weapons development; a scientist might, for example, recognize 
a responsibility to assist the community in response to government pol-
icy and yet feel a greater responsibility to work on another problem, 
such as medical research not related to weapons development. Thus the 
problem of responsible decision is more complex than the problem of de-
cision in relation to weapons development alone, and this fact heightens 
the necessity for creativity in decision-making. 
Thus the scientist is equipped with a body of norms focusing in 
the concept of the responsible society, with three basic patterns of re-
sponsible action in relation to the problem of weapons development and 
with a system of moral laws to assist in relating the three patterns in 
the context of a specific situation. He is also confronted with the 
relationship of the problem of weapons development to the other problems 
to which science may address itself. With this equipment and in this 
context he must make a creative decision. Creativity as well as crit-
icism is a basic factor in personal responsibility. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abrecht, Paul. "Social Questions--The Responsible Society in a World 
Perspective," The Ecumenical Review, 6 (October, 1953), 26-31. 
"AEC Majority Decision," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 
(September, 1954), 275-77. 
[Allison, Helen C.). "Scientist as Citizen," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 (May, 1962), 34-35. 
Allison, Samuel K. "Nuclear Power in the Next Twenty Years," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (December, 1962), 13-14. 
Appleby, Paul H. Morality and Administration in Democratic Government. 
Baton •ouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952. 
Appleton, Edward. "Science for Its Own Sake," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 9 (December, 1953), 354-58, 390. 
Ascoli, Max. "There Must Be an End to It," The Reporter, 16 (May 16, 
1957), 8-9. 
Ashby, Eric. "Electronic Don Quixotes?" Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 305-305. 
Auger, Pierre. "Science as a Force for Unity among Men," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 12 (June, 1956), 208-10. 
Barber, Bernard. "Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery," 
Science, 134 (September 1, 1961), 596-602. 
Barber, Bernard. Science and the Social Order. Glencoe, Ill.: 
The Free Press, 1952. 
Barbour, Ian G. Christianity and the Scientist. New York: Association 
Press, 1960. 
Batchelder, Robert C. The Irreversible Decision: 1939-1950. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962. 
Bates, Ralph S. 
revised. 
Scientific Societies in the United States. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. 
248 
2d ed. 
249 
Baxter, James Phinney, 3rd. Scientists Against Time. Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1946. 
Benfey, 0. T. "The Scientist's Conscience: Historical Considerations," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (May, 1956), 177-78. 
Bennett, John C. Christian Ethics and Social Policy. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. 
Bennett, John C. Christians and the State. New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1958. 
Bennett, John C., and Others. Christian Values and Economic Life. 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. 
Bethe, Hans. Review of Brighter than a Thousand Suns, by Robert Jungk. 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 14 (December, 1958), 426-28. 
Bethe, Hans, and Donald McDonald. Science. "Interviews on the 
American Character." Santa Barbara, California: Center for the 
Study of Democratic Institutions (The Fund for the Republic, 
Inc.), 1962. 
Blackett, P. M. S. Fear, War, and the Bomb. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1948. 
Blackett, P. M. S. Studies of War. New York: Hill and Wang, 1962. 
Bohr, Niels. "Niels Bohr's Memorandum to President Roosevelt, July, 
1944," in Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. Pp. 344-47. 
Born, Max. ''Man and the Atom," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
13 (June, 1957), 186-94. 
Born, Max. Physics and Politics. Edinburgh and London: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1962. 
Braun, Wernher von. "From Small Beginnings . 
Satellite. Edited by Kenneth Gatland. 
Centre, 1958. Pp. 19-49. 
. . , " in Project 
New York: British Book 
Braun, Wernher von, and Frederick I. Ordway III. "Astronautical 
Fallout," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (November, 
1962), 13-17. 
Bridgman, P. W. Reflections of a Physicist. New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1950. 
250 
Brightman, Edgar S. "A Christian View of Nature," in Christian Bases 
of World Order. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 
Brightman, Edgar S. An Introduction to Philosophy. New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1925. 
Brightman, Edgar S. Moral Laws. New York: Abingdon Press, 1933. 
Broda, E. "A German View of the Atomic Bomb." Review of Die Geschichte 
der Atombombe, by Hans Thirring. Nature, 159 (June 14, 1947), 
792. 
Bronowski, J. "The Real Responsibilities of the Scientist," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (January, 1956), 10-13, 20. 
Bronowski, J. Science and Human Values. New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1959 .. 
Cahn, Edmond. The Predicament of Democratic Man. New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1961. 
Carr, Edward H. Nationalism and After. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1945. 
Cavers, David F. "Atomic Power Versus World Security," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 3 (October, 1947), 283-88, 302. 
Chiaramonte, Nicola. "State Reason and Individual Reason," Confluence, 
5 (July, 1956), 158-65. 
Clark, W. H. "Chemical and Thermonuclear Explosives," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 17 (November, 1961), 356-60. 
Compton, Arthur H. Atomic Quest. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1956. 
Compton, Arthur H. "Let the People Decide," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 6 (March, 1950), 74-75. 
Compton, Karl T. "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used," The Atlantic 
Monthly, 178 (December, 1946), 54-56. 
Coulson, C. A. Science, Technology, and the Christian. London: 
The Epworth Press, 1960. 
Cousins, Norman, and Thomas K. Finletter. "A Beginning for Sanity." 
Review of A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, 
prepared by David E. Lilienthal and Others. Saturday Review, 
29 (June 15, 1946), 5-9, 38-40. 
Cowen, Robert C. "Research Costs Soaring," The Christian Science 
Monitor (Boston), January 16, 1963, p. 10. 
Cowen, Robert C. "The Sciences and Society," The Christian Science 
Monitor (Boston), December 26, 1962, p. 1. 
251 
Daniel, Cuthbert, and Arthur M. Squires. "Freedom Demands Responsibil-
ity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 
300-304. 
Daniel, Cuthbert, and Arthur M. Squires. "The International Control of 
Safe Atomic Energy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3 (April-
May, 1947), 111-16, 135. 
Daniel, Cuthbert, and Arthur M. Squires. "Scientists' Responsibilities 
on the Way to Peace and After," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
5 (January, 1949), 27-28, 32. 
Daniels, Farrington. "The Role of Energy," The Nation, 180 (June 18, 
1955), 517-19. 
"Declaration of the German Nuclear Physicists," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 13 (June, 1957), 228. 
Dedijer, Stevan. "Research: The Motor of Progress," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (June, 1962), 4-7. 
Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge, 
Mass.: The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1953. 
Dickinson, Richard D. N. "A Comparison of Concepts of the State in 
Roman Catholicism and the Ecumenical Movement." Microfilm Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Boston University, 1959. University Microfilms: 
Mic. 59-3457. 
Dubarle, Daniel. "Observations in the Relations between Science and 
the State," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, ll (April, 1955), 
141-44. 
Dubarle, Daniel. "The Scientist and His Responsibilities," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 12 (September, 1953), 253-57. 
Dubarle, Dominic. "Toward a World Community of Scientists," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 15 (May, 1959), 178-80. 
Dubinin, M. M. "Potentialities of Chemical Warfare," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 16 (June, 1960), 250-51. 
DuBridge, Lee A. "Assumption of Duties Is a Personal Matter," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (March, 1948), 74. 
252 
Duff, Edward. The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches. 
New York: Association Press, 1956. 
Dupre(, J. Stefan, and Sanford A. Lakoff. Science and the Nation. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962. 
Dyson, Freeman J. "The Neutron Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
17 (September, 1961), 271-72. 
Edel, Abraham. "Relation of Science and Democracy," Journal of 
Philosophy, 41 (December 21, 1944), 701-10. 
Edleson, Burton I. ''Mutual Obligations: Science and the Military," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 14 (May, 1958), 169-72. 
Einstein, Albert. Einstein on Peace. Edited by Otto Nathan and Heinz 
Norden. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. 
Fitch, Robert E. "The Scientist as Priest and Savior," Christian 
Century, 75 (March 26, 1958), 368-70. 
Fozzy, Paula. "Research Coordination," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 18 (March, 1962), 29-31. (This issue carries the 
erroneous volwne number "17.") 
[ Fozzy, Paula]. "Scientists' Social Responsibility," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (March, 1962), 45-46. (This issue carries 
the erroneous volume number "17.") 
Franck, James. "The Social Task of the Scientist," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 3 (March, 1947), 70. 
Franck, James, and Others. "A Report to the Secretary of War, June 
1945," in Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. Pp. 348-60, 
Frank, Jerome. "The Place of the Expert in Democratic Society," 
Philosophy of Science, 16 (January, 1949), 3-24. 
French Association of Scientific Workers. "French A. Sc. W. Statement," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 309-10. 
Garrison, Lloyd K. "Oppenheimer Requests Review," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 10 (June, 1954), 251-54. 
Glass, Bentley. "Scientists in Politics," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 (May, 1962), 2-7. 
Goudsmit, Samuel A. Alsos, the Story of a Mission. New York: 
Henry Schuman, 1947. 
253 
Grobstein, Clifford. "The Social Conscience of U.S. Science: Sketch of 
a Decade," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (September, 
1956), 241-46. 
Haddow, Alexander. ":The Scientist as Citizen," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 12 (September, 1956), 247-52. 
Haskins, Caryl P. "Society and Scientific Research," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 16 Q1ay, 1960), 146-50. 
Heinecken, Martin J. God in the Space Age. Philadelphia: John C. 
Winston Company, 1959. 
Heisenberg, Werner. "Research in Germany on the Technical Application 
of Atomic Energy," Nature 160 (August 16, 1947), 211-15. 
Hewlett, Richard G., and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr. The New World, 1939/ 
1946. Vol. I: A History of the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission. University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1962. 
Hill, A. V. "Scientists Are Quite Ordinary Folk," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 7 (December, 1951), 371-72. 
Hoagland, Hudson. "Some Reflections on Science and Society," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 15 (September, 1959), 284-87. 
Horner, Richard E. "Space Weapons Today and Tomorrow," in Space 
Weapons. Edited by Editors of Air Force. New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1959. Pp. 99-105. 
Huxley, Aldous L. Science, Liberty, and Peace. New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1946. 
Jaspers, Karl. "Is Science Evil?" Commentary, 9 (March, 1950), 229-33. 
Jungk, Robert. Brighter than a Thousand Suns. Translated by James 
Cleugh. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1958. (Heller als 
tausend Sonnen, 1956.) 
Kapitza, Peter L. "The Future of Science," Bulletin of the Atomic 
' Scientists, 18 (April, 1962), 3-7. 
Kidd, Charles V. American Universities and Federal Research. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. 
Lang, Daniel. "A Reporter at Large," The New Yorker, 27 (April 21, 
1951)' 75-93". 
254 
Laue, Max von. "The Wartime Activities of German Scientists," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (April, 1948), 103. 
Laue, Max von. "The World Needs New Ethical Standards," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 4 (November, 1948), 337-38. 
Lefever, Ernest. Ethics and United States Foreign Policy. New York: 
Meridian Books, 1957. 
Lerner, A. P. "An Economist Counnents," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 4 (October, 1948), 306-309. 
Levine, Murray. "Scientists Have a Duty to Society," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 7 (December, 1951), 376-78. 
Lewy, Guentner. "Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of 
Conscience: The Dilemma of Military Obedience in the Atomic Age," 
American Political Science Review, 55 (March, 1961), 3-23. 
Lieberman, E. James. "Psychochemicals as Weapons," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (January, 1962), 11-14. 
Long, Edward L., Jr. "Ethical Problems in a Space Age," Religion in 
Life, 30 (Summer, 1961), 366-73. 
Lonsdale, Kathleen. "The Ethical Problems of Scientists," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 7 (August, 1951), 201~204. 
Lonsdale, Kathleen. "Scientists and the People," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 14 (September, 1958), 242-45. 
Lonsdale, Kathleen. "Security and Responsibility," SSRS Newsletter 
(Society for Social Responsibility in Science), No. 29 
(September, 1954). 
Loomis, F. Wheeler. "Can Physics Serve Two Masters1" Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 6 (April, 1950), 115-20, 127. 
Maciver, R. M. Web of Government. New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1947. 
Manley, John H. "Science and Crisis," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 15 (March, 1959), 114-17. 
Maritain, Jacques. "The Scientist and the Counnunity," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 4 (December, 1948), 367. 
Massey, H. S. W. "An English Physicist Considers His Obligations," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (November, 1948), 339-40. 
255 
McCormack, James, and Vincent A. Fulmer. "Federal Sponsorship of Uni-
versity Research, " in .:T ... h;.;::;e.....::.F-=e-=d;.;::;e.::.r.::a.:l'--'=G-=o...:.v-=e.::.r.:::nm=e=n.:t--=i=n:......:.:H:::i:cg.::h:::e:.::.r-=E:.=d:..:u::c:.::a:.=t:..::i:.:::o~n. 
Edited by the American Assembly. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1960. Pp. 76-139. 
Meier, Richard L. "The Origins of Scientific Species," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 7 (June, 1951), 169•73. 
Meier, Richard L .. "What Should the Atomic Scientists Do Now?" 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (March, 1948), 81-82. 
Mendelsohn, Everett. "Scientists and the Development of Atomic Weapons," 
SSRS Newsletter (Society for Social Responsibility in Science), 
No. 116 (April, 1962). 
Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. 2d ed. revised. 
Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957. 
Miller, Merle. "The Atomic Scientists in Politics," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 3 (September, 1947), 242, 252. 
Morrison, Phillip. "Alsos: The Story of German Science," Review of 
Alsos, the Story of a Mission, by Samuel A. Goudsmit. Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 3 (December, 1947), 354, 365. 
Morrison, Phillip. "Science Is Essentially Social," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 7 (December, 1951), 373-75. 
Mott, N. F. ''Working for a Society Where Science Can Thrive," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 7 (December, 1951), 375-76. 
Muelder, Walter G. Foundations of the Responsible Society. 
New York: Abingdon Press, 1959. 
Muelder, Walter G. "The Social Philosophy of Edgar Sheffield Brightman," 
The Philosophical Forum, 8 (Spring, 1950), 9-14. 
Muelder, Walter G. "Theology and the Responsible Society." 
Unpublished manuscript, from the files of the author. 
Muelder, Walter G. ''Why I Believe in Pacifism." Unpublished manuscript, 
Boston University School of Theology Library. 
Muller, H. J. "Science for Humanity," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
15 (April, 1959), 146-50, 176. 
Mumford, Lewis. "Anticipations and Social Adjustments in Science," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 (February, 1954), 34-36. 
Munby, D. L. "Social Questions--the Responsible Society in a World 
Perspective," Ecumenical Review, 7 (October, 1954), 36-41. 
256 
Murray, Thomas E. "Concurring Opinion of Thomas E. Murray," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 10 (September, 1954), 277-79. 
Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, 1961. 
Nesmith, Richard Duey. "The Development of the Concept of the Respon-
sible Society: Stockholm to Evanston." Microfilm Ph.D. Disser-
tation, Boston University, 1957. University Microfilms: 
Doctoral Dissertation Series, No. 21,744. 
Neumann, John von. "Can We Survive Technology?" in American Strategy 
for the Nuclear Age. Edited by Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1960. 
Nichols, K. D. "Findings and Recommendations of General Nichols," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 (September, 1954), 271-74. 
Nichols, K. D. "Nichols Presents Charges," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 10 (May, 1954), 174-76. 
Nielson, J. Rud. "Our Responsibilities as Scientists," Scientific 
Monthly, 81 (August, 1955), 65-70. 
Nock, S. A. "Scientists and Ethics," Ethics, 54 (October, 1943), 14-28. 
Oldendorf, W. H. "On the Acceptability of a Device as a Weapon," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (January, 1962), 35-37. 
Oppenheimer, J. Robert. The Open Mind. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1955. 
Oppenheimer, J. Robert. "Oppenheimer Replies," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 10 (May, 1954), 177-87, 191. 
Orr, Boyd. "Lord Boyd Orr on the Responsibilities of the Scientists," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 7 (December, 1951), 379. 
Otto, Max. Science and the Moral Life. New York: New American Library 
(Mentor Books), 1949. 
Paschkis, Victor. "The Future of the SSRS," SSRS Newsletter (Society 
for Social Responsibility in Science), No. 113 (January, 1962). 
Paschkis, Victor. "The Scientist's Responsibility: A Pacifist View," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 11 (September, 1955), 265-66. 
Pauling, Linus. "Genetic Effects of Weapons Tests," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (December, 1962), 15-18. 
257 
Piel, Gerard. "The Illusion of Civil Defense," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 (February, 1962), 2-8. (This issue carries the 
erroneous volume number "17.") 
Pigman, W., and E. Carmichael. "An Ethical Code for Scientists," 
Science, 111 (June 16, 1950), 643-47. 
Pollard, William G. "The Place of Science in Religion," The Christian 
Scholar, 36 (June, 1953), 110-21. 
Polyani, John C. "Armaments Policies for the Sixties," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 17 (December, 1961), 403-406, 432-35. 
Rabi, I. I. "Publication Is the Chief Responsibility," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 4 (March, 1948), 73. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "Everyone Shares the Responsibility," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 4 (March, 1948), 75. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "History's Challenge to Scientists," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 12 (September, 1956), 238-40. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. ''Man Must Prevail," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 18 (December, 1962), 4-6. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "Pugwash--History and Outlook," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 13 (September, 1957), 243-48. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "Responsibilities of Scientists in the Atomic 
Age," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 15 (January, 1959), 2-7. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "Science Faces a Double Danger," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 9 (March, 1953), 34-35, 42. 
Rabinowitch, Eugene. "Ten Years that Changed the World," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 12 (January, 1956), 2-6, 32. 
Ramo, Simon. "Choosing Our Space Goals," in Space Weapons. Edited by 
Editors of Air Force. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 
Pp. 163-75. 
Reichenbach, Hans. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951. 
Ridenour, Louis N. "Physical Science and the Future," in Facing the 
Future's Risks. Edited by Lyman Bryson. New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1953. 
Riesman, David. "Private People and Public Policy," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 15 (May, 1959), 203-208. 
258 
Ritchie, A. D. "The Special Responsibility of Scientists," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 4 (October, 1948), 305-306. 
Rosebury, Theodore. "Some Historical Considerations," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 16 (June, 1960), 227-35. 
Rozak, Theodore. "Scientists for Peace," The Nation, 193 (September 30, 
1961), 205-206. 
Rozak, Theodore. "Seduction of the Scientist," The Nation, 192 
(June 3, 1961), 477-81. 
Rozak, Theodore. "The Social Responsibility of Scientists," SSRS News-
letter (Society for Social Responsibility in Science), No. 111 
(November, 1961). 
Russell, Bertrand. "The Social Responsibilities of Scientists," in 
The New Scientist. Edited by Paul c. Ohler and Herman A. Estrin. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962. Pp. 112-16. 
Sarton, George. "Science and Morality," in Moral Principles of Action. 
Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1952. Pp. 436-52. 
Sawyer, Roland. "The H-Bomb Chronology," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 10 (September, 1954), 287-90, 300. 
Schelling, Thomas C. "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," 
Daedalus, 89 (Fall, 1960), 892-914. 
Schrodinger, Erwin. Science Theory and Man. New York: Dover Publica-
tions, 1957. 
"Scientists--our Modern Mercenaries," Christian Century, 65 (June 16, 
1948), 597-99. 
Seitz, Frederick. "Physicists and the Cold War," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 6 (March, 1950), 83-89. 
Shapley, Harlow. "The Uses and Abuses of Scientific Societies," in 
Physical Sciences and Human Values. Edited by Eugene P. Wigner. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1947. Pp. 74-83. 
Shils, Edward. "The Scientific Connnunity: Thoughts After Hamburg," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 (May, 1954), 151-55. 
Siekevitz, Phillip. "A New Ethics for Science," The Nation, 
186 OMarch 15, 1958), 222-27. 
Simpson, Mary M. "The Scientist in Politics: On Top or on Tap," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 (January, 1960), 28-29. 
Smyth, Henry DeWolf. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1945. 
259 
Smyth, Henry DeWolf. "Dissenting Opinion of Henry DeWolf Smyth," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 10 (September, 1954), 280-82. 
Smyth, Henry DeWolf. "The Place of Science in a Free Society," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 (June, 1950), 180-85. 
Snow, C. P. "The Moral On-Neutrality of Science," in The New Scientist. 
Edited by Paul C. Ohler and Herman A. Estrin. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962. Pp. 125-40. 
Snow, C. P. Science and Government. London: Oxford University Press, 
1961. 
Sponsler, George C. "Needed: Scientists on Top," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (June, 1962), 17-20. 
SSRS Newsletter (Society for Social Responsibility in Science), No. 60 
(April, 1957). 
SSRS Newsletter, No. 61 (May, 1957). 
SSRS Newsletter, No. 102 (February, 1961). 
SSRS Newsletter, No. 117 (May' 1962). 
SSRS Newsletter, No. 124 (December, 1962). 
SSRS Newsletter, No. 125 (January, 1963). 
Steinbach, H. Burr. "Scientists and Public Policy," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 18 (March, 1962), 10-13. (This issue carries 
the erroneous volume number "17.") 
Stewart, Bruce. "Science and Social Change," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 17 (September, 1961), 267-70, 286. 
Stimson, Henry L. "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," Harper's 
Magazine, 194 (February, 1947), 97-107. 
Sullivan, J. W. N. The Limitations of Science. New York: New American 
Library, 1949. 
Synge, R. L. M. "The Scientist's Responsibilities," Nature, 172 
(July 11, 1953), 62-64. 
260 
Szilard, Leo. "A Personal History of the Atomic Bomb," University of 
Chicago Round Table, No. 601 (September 25, 1949), 14-16. 
Teller, Edward. "Atomic Scientists Have Two Responsibilities," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2 (December, 1947), 355-56. 
Teller, Edward. "Back to the Laboratories," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 6 (March, 1950), 71-72. 
Thirring, Hans. "The Super Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
6 (March, 1950), 69-70. 
Urey, Harold C. "Scientists and Social Responsibility," Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 4 CMarch, 1948), 72-73. 
Urey, Harold C. "A Scientists' Strike Will Not Insure Peace," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 4 (November, 1948), 337. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: 
Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board, April 12 
through May 6, 1954. Washington, D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1954. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Personnel Security Board. "Report of the 
Special Personnel Security Board," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 10 (June, 1954), 243-50, 254. 
U.S. National Science Foundation. Federal Funds for Science X. 
Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1962. 
U.S. President's Science Advisory Committee. Scientific Progress, the 
Universities, and the Federal Government. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1960. 
Vries, Egbert de. Man in Rapid Social Change. New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1961. 
Watson-Watt, Robert. "Physicist and Politician," Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 15 (September, 1959), 298-301. 
Watson-Watt, Robert. ''Science, Politics, and Citizenship," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 4 (January, 1950), 27-28. 
Weiss, Paul. "The Message of Science," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists, 15 (September, 1959), 274-77. 
261 
Weizsacker, Carl-Friedrich von. "Do We Want to Save Ourselves?" 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 14 (May, 1958), 180-84. 
Weizsacker, Carl-Friedrich von. Ethical and Political Problems of the 
Atomic Age. London: SCM Press, 1958. 
White, Theodore H. "U.S. Science: The Troubled Quest," The Reporter, 
11 (September 14, 1954), 12-18. 
White, Theodore H. "U.S. Science: The Troubled Quest--II," The Reporter, 
11 (September 23, 1954), 26-27, 30-34. 
White, Thomas D. "Space Control and National Security," in Space 
Weapons. Edited by Editors of Air Force. New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1959. Pp. 11-17. 
Wiener, Norbert. ''Moral Responsibilities of a Mathematician," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 12 (February, 1956), 53-57. 
Wiener, Norbert. "A Rebellious Scientist After Two Years," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 4 (November, 1948), 338-39. 
Wiener, Norbert. "A Scientist Rebels," The Atlantic Monthly, 179 
(January, 1947), 46. 
Wiesner, Jerome B. "The Federal Role in Science and Technology," 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 18 (November, 1962), 42, 44-46. 
Wolf, Hans H. "The Old Problem: Science and the Christian Faith," 
Ecumenical Review, 9 (July, 1957), 357-66. 
Wolfle, Dael Lee. Science and Public Policy. Lincoln, Neb.: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1959. 
Wolfle, Dael Lee. "Science and Public Understanding," in The New 
Scientist. Edited by Paul C. Ohler and Herman A. Estrin. 
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962. Pp. 117-26 .. 
World Council of Churches. The Christian Hope and the Task of the 
Church. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. 
World Council of Churches. Ecumenical Documents on Church and Society. 
Edited by John W. Turnbull. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 
1954. (Mimeographed.) 
World Council of Churches. The Evanston Report. Edited by W. A. 
Visser't Hooft. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955. 
World Council of Churches. Man's Disorder and God's Design. New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1948. 
262 
World Council of Churches. The New Delhi Report. Edited by W. A. 
Visser't Hooft. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962. 
World Council of Churches. A Regional Conference on the Responsible 
Society in National and International Affairs. Geneva: World 
Council of Churches, 1956. 
Zahn, Gordon C. "Private Conscience and Legitimate Authority," 
Commonweal, 76 (March 30, 1962), 9-13. 
ABSTRACT 
The problem of this dissertation is the formulation of a method 
for determining the ethical responsibility of the natural scientist for 
participation in the development of modern military weapons. This ques-
tion of responsibility is presented to the scientist by the extreme 
destructiveness of many modern weapons and by the requests of govern-
ments for scientists to participate in the development of new weapons. 
The role of advanced scientific work has become basic and therefore 
crucial to the success of weapons development programs. 
The question of responsibility has been debated among scientists 
and others, particularly since the development of the atomic bomb. In 
general, this debate has been inconclusive, and no extended studies of 
the ethical issues involved or of the method needed for resolution of 
the issue have appeared. This dissertation is an approach to filling 
this need. 
The question of the scientist's participation in weapons develop-
ment is the focus of the study; other issues of social responsibility 
in science are treated only as they relate to the central issue. The 
basic outlines of the social situation in the United States and on the 
contemporary international scene are taken as the social context of the 
study. By taking account of this social context, the study seeks to 
develop a method which has wide contemporary applicability, although 
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more specific studies of these factors will be required when an actual 
decision concerning the responsible course of action for the scientist 
is to be made. No attempt is made to generalize the method to make it 
applicable to other professions or to countries other than the United 
States. 
The basic method of the study involves historical study to de-
termine basic issues of responsibility, the statement of a normative 
ethical concept to be used in treating these issues, the exploration of 
basic patterns of responsibility to determine their justification and 
limits, and the development of a method of relating these patterns as 
an approach to the problem of concrete decision. 
The second chapter is a study of selected historical situations 
in which it was necessary for scientists to decide whether they would 
participate in particular weapons development programs, and to act ac-
cordingly. The development of rockets in Germany before and during World 
War II, the projects in the United States and in Germany for the develop-
ment of the atomic bomb, and the development of the hydrogen bomb in the 
United States are considered. Three general themes emerge from this dis-
cussion. One is the responsibility of the scientist to participate in 
weapons development in response to the government's request, since the 
government represents the national community to which he belongs. The 
second is the responsibility of the scientist to participate in the ad-
vancement of science; weapons development programs provide opportunities 
for scientific work. The third is the responsibility of the scientist 
to act according to his own evaluation of the wisdom of the weapons de-
velopment program under consideration. 
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The third chapter discusses the concept of the responsible soci-
ety, which is the normative ethical concept for the study. This concept 
has grown out of discussions in the Christian ecumenical movement, which 
have sought to develop an ethical approach which is adequate to the 
challenge of modern science, technology, and economic life, and which 
takes account of both the antagonisms and the interdependence among the 
nations of the world. The concept provides a normative framework for 
analysis of problems of ethical responsibility, including a basic stress 
on the goal of world community. 
The ethical principle provided which is particularly relevant to 
the scientist's responsibility is the demand that those who possess power 
exercise it in responsibility to the persons affected by it. The three 
themes of the second chapter are seen as patterns of action that are to 
be explored in the succeeding chapters in the light of this basic prin-
ciple. 
The fourth chapter explores the theme that the scientist's re-
sponsibility is to participate in government-sponsored weapons develop-
ment programs as an aspect of his responsibility to the national com-
munity. Modern nations are units of responsibility in international 
affairs, since they are the fundamental international power units. They 
are communities of common destiny for their members. The scientist's 
ability gives him power to assist the national community in its weapons 
development plans, or to frustrate it by declining to cooperate. If he 
is to be responsible to the people vitally affected by his power, his 
participation in response to the decision of the community to sponsor a 
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weapons development project may be a responsible course of action. 
Such programs are directly planned and sponsored by governments. 
A government is the agent of the state, which is the community in its 
political organization. Thus the government is to be distinguished from 
the community; it is related to the community by its limited function. 
This function includes responsibility for foreign affairs, so that the 
scientist's participation in a government-sponsored weapons development 
program is a response to an agency of the community performing a legiti-
mate function, and thus an act of responsibility to the community. 
There are important practical limits on the validity of this ap-
proach. Cooperation with the government is not responsibility to the 
community if the government is not legitimate. It must observe the dis-
tinction between community and government, conform to its constitutional 
base, allow freedom of political discussion, and be responsive to the 
right of the community to determine the broad policy outlines within 
which the government must operate. The government must also be compe-
tent, and its policies must be generally acceptable in the light of the 
ethical norm. The avoidance of nuclear war, contribution to the devel-
opment of adequate international institutions, and concern for future 
generations in such matters as weapons testing are important consider-
ations. 
As a person with the ability to understand many of the implica-
tions of modern weapons, the scientist has a responsibility to contribute 
to decisions regarding weapons development, b~th by the community and by 
the government. This responsibility is to be distinguished from respon-
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sibility for the development of weapons, however, so that it does not 
follow that because the scientist contributed to the debate, he is 
morally bound because of that to participate if a weapons development 
program is decided upon. 
The fifth chapter deals with the thesis that the scientist is 
responsible for the advancement of science, while responsibility for the 
development and use of weapons lies with the political bodies which 
sponsor their development and use. The importance of the advancement 
of science is seen in the intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and religious 
values which are intrinsic to the process of scientific investigation. 
These are complemented by such factors as general rationality of outlook, 
openness to the contributions of all men, widespread cooperation in com-
mon task$, personal responsibility and a love of freedom, and a deter-
mined responsiveness to the problems confronting men. These factors 
grow out of the practice of science, and modify or reinforce the values 
of the surrounding culture. In addition, modern science is basic to the 
technology which allows the realization of many other values in modern 
life. 
In the United States today, natural science is dependent on gov-
ernment agencies concerned for weapons development for about one-half of 
its financial support. Furthermore, fundamental scientific discoveries 
frequently contribute unavoidably to weapons development, regardless of 
the intentions of the scientists involved in the discovery. The vigorous 
pursuit of the scientific quest requires participation in the development 
of weapons. 
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Where political bodies which sponsor weapons development programs 
can be expected to handle the weapons responsibly, it is legitimate to 
assign primary responsibility for the development and use of weapons to 
them. The scientist can responsibly concentrate on the scientific quest, 
with its many important values. He may not do so if he cannot expect 
that the political bodies will be successful in matters such as avoiding 
nuclear war. Another important limitation is posed by the possibility 
that the weapons may themselves increase international antagonism to the 
point that many of the cultural values of the scientific quest are under-
mined. 
The sixth chapter is concerned with the theme that the scientist 
is responsible for making an independent evaluation of possible policies 
concerning the development and handling of weapons and that he must react 
to the government's policy according to his own evaluation of it. The 
crucial character of the problems presented by modern military weapons 
requires that the ethical norm be applied directly to the problem of 
government weapons policies. The wide influence of modern weapons re-
quires that the scientist consider explicitly his responsibility to all 
mankind. In addition, his decision regarding participation will be a 
witness in the continuing debate over government weapons policy, if the 
decision is based on independent evaluation. 
Independent evaluation may lead to participation in the govern-
ment's program, or even to the leadership of scientists in the establish-
ment of new development programs. It may also cause the scientist to 
decline to participate, or to participate only under certain conditions. 
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In general, the scientist faces this decision alone; the scientific com-
munity has not taken a position regarding participation in weapons de-
velopment. 
Limits on the usefulness of this pattern spring from the diffi-
culties in making the required evaluation, due to the complexities of 
the situation and in some cases to the limited competence of natural 
scientists in political affairs. The difficulties in operating as a 
scientist without participation in weapons development, the fact that 
only a minority of scientists take a stand in contrast to the govern-
ment's policy, and the problem of dealing with the social confusion 
which could result if a significant number of scientists did so and 
frustrated the current policy, also set limits to this approach. 
The concluding chapter deals with the problem of making a deci-
sion concerning the relationship of the three approaches in a concrete 
instance. Such decisions cannot actually be made in this study, for 
they must be related to the specific situation and must be based on 
studies which have been indicated above and which go beyond the scope 
of this project. The legitimacy of the government, the responsibility 
of government policies, the state of the international scene, and the 
possibilities for constructive change are all involved. The relation-
ship of the problem of weapons development to other ethical concerns and 
the pressures and influences on the scientist personally must also be 
considered. Within this context, the scientist must then make the most 
creative decision possible. 
The contribution of this chapter is to offer a basic method for 
relating the three approaches. This is based on the system of moral laws 
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developed by Edgar S. Brightman and extended by L. Harold DeWolf and 
Walter G. Muelder. This system stresses the need for coherent choices 
of values as a basis for the realization of moral goals, and the laws 
are designed as a system which guides choices appropriately. 
If the three patterns of responsibility all point to the same 
action, a high degree of coherence is achieved and decision follows 
directly. Where there are conflicts the problem is more difficult. If 
the limits mentioned with any of the patterns are violated, the pattern 
is internally incoherent and not applicable to the problem at hand. Be-
yond this, some of the moral laws raise particular criteria which are 
useful in resolving conflicts. 
The law of specification concerns the relevance of the factors in 
the situation at hand, such as the nature of the weapons to be developed, 
the value of the proposed research as a contribution to science, and the 
state of international affairs. The law of consequences points out that 
the weapons will probably outlast the situation for which they were de-
veloped. The law of the best possible asks whether the approach at hand 
contributes to the resolution of international antagonisms. The law of 
the most inclusive end requires that the decision regarding weapons de-
velop~nt be related to other problems of ethical responsibility. The 
law of ideal control calls for criticism of the empirical problem in the 
light of the relevant ideals of responsible action and human relation-
ships. The relevance of these laws is much wider than the examples given 
and, with the rest of the system of moral laws, they offer basic guide-
lines for the final decision of the scientist. 
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